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Abstract of Thesis
This study examines the clashes and accords between Western and Chinese decision 
cultures and explores their serious implications for the introduction of Western decision 
approaches into a totally different culture, in particular, that of China. The experimental 
investigation was concentrated on the cultural difference in the way of dealing with 
uncertainty. It extended previous cross-cultural comparisons between Western and 
Chinese decision makers in probabilistic thinking. It is confirmed that British and 
Chinese college students think about uncertainty and make probability judgments 
differently in answering general-knowledge questionnaires. It is also found that Chinese 
economists disliked forecasting economic indices that demonstrate a wide probability 
distribution. However, Chinese amateur card players did make almost perfectly calibrated 
probability judgments. With these findings, it is warned that the applicability of Western 
decision techniques, such as decision analysis and decision support systems, certainly 
cannot be taken for granted in China. This study also proposes a cognitive model to 
describe how people make probability judgments in general, and especially emphasizes 
the building of problem structure and the discriminating of feeling of uncertainty. From 
this, future cross-cultural studies of probabilistic thinking are suggested, that will make 
further investigation into whether Western and Chinese decision makers create different 
structures for the same problem, thereby leading them to think and judge uncertainty 
differently. Finally, this study generalizes the discussion of the rationality behind Western 
decision methods and its conflicts with traditional Chinese decision culture. It is 
concluded that Western approaches to decision making should be introduced into China, 
but its assumptions and conditions must first be carefully investigated. It is predicted that 
more powerful decision aids will emerge from the synthesis of Western and Chinese 
decision cultures.
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Chapter 1. Cultural Clash in Decision Making
1.1. Introduction
Decision making is one of the most important activities engaged in by all human beings. 
Such activities can be traced back to the dim and distant past. To survive calamities or 
battle, man searched for, and took, better courses of action. However, even though today 
we have much experience in making decisions, and we are armed with modem 
technology, it has never become an easy task, especially when we are faced with complex, 
dynamic and uncertain decision situations. Decision making, as a systematic science and 
technology has a very short history. Not until World War n, did formal, analytic 
techniques come to be used extensively for decision making. Arguably, it was British 
scientists who applied operational analysis techniques for the first time to help solve 
critical strategical and tactical problems (Raiffa, 1968). Since then, mainly in Western 
countries, a great deal of research effort has been made by scholars from a number of 
disciplines into making effective decisions. Various theories and techniques of decision 
making have arisen. Especially, within a relatively short period of time, information 
technology and decision analysis techniques have been rapidly developed, and have been 
widely applied in a variety of fields, such as business administration, social policy making, 
engineering evaluation, diagnosis of disease, legal judgment, etc. The influence of 
Western decision approaches are expanding outward to other countries, including China, 
the country we shall be studying in particular detail in this dissertation.
"Stones from other hills may serve to polish the jade of this one" is a well-known saying 
in China, which is apposite to the present Chinese desire to introduce modern Western 
approaches. In the past decade, the open-door policy has invited in a variety of Western 
techniques to improve Chinese decision making. Several years ago, Tor Melae, the chief 
economist of TEXACO, went to China to describe how Western managers make their 
investment decisions. In a one-week seminar, about ten computer software packages were 
demonstrated and taught, including database management systems, statistical analysis 
software packages, and decision support systems. Western decision theory and analysis
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techniques not only are being taught in universities, but also are becoming more and 
more familiar to Chinese decision makers. For example, occasionally some younger men 
within organizations have begun to use techniques such as decision trees though the 
older managers and officers are not taking these methods too seriously. Western decision 
analysts have even been invited to participate directly in decision making activities in 
China. For example, recently over 100 Canadian experts consulted on a crucial 
engineering project — studying the feasibility of realizing a Chinese "great dream" of 
building a dam in the Three Gorges on the Yangtze River; and they presented a report 
recommending the start of this project (in fact, more Western experts have been 
involved, see Lieberthal & Oksenberg, 1988). Although we don't know yet, whether the 
analysis and conclusions of Western style can, or to what extent, affect the decision of 
the Chinese top decision makers on this project, there can be no doubt that Western 
decision approaches have been introduced into China.
However, can Western decision approaches work well, or even work at all, in China, a 
country of radically different history, culture, philosophy, and social ideals? In a 
philosophical discussion on decision analysis, Howard (1980) has pointed out, "The idea 
of a ‘decision’ is a quintessential^ Western idea, an act of hubris to a believer in Eastern 
philosophy and a joke to the enlightened. (Can you imagine Buddha or Lao-Tzu making 
a decision?)." The scepticism comes, not only from theoretical analysis, but also from 
practice. In 1981-1982, Pollock and Chen (1986) went to China to help plan a 
comprehensive project for water pollution control of the Huangpu River. They found that 
it was difficult for their Chinese colleagues to accept Western rationalistic-normative 
methods of decision making — generating alternatives, accounting for uncertainties, and 
eliciting the preferences of decision makers. For example, they complained that they met 
"a decision making environment that was almost completely devoid of a formal concern 
for uncertainty." And they concluded that "Perhaps it was presumptuous of us to expect 
the Chinese — with a bureaucracy and decision making culture highly evolved over a 
period of more than 3,000 years — to accept with more than polite acknowledgment a 
way of looking at problems that is so obviously Western: reductionist, empirical, 
quantitative, democratic in its approach." It was also found that there were few 
computer-based decision support systems presently in use in China, although the
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acceptance of decision support systems, even in the West, can no way be called an 
unqualified success. The Chinese reluctance to use decision support systems was 
accounted for by, among other things, the preference for the traditional, subjective 
decision making approach and for the hierarchical structure of organizations which 
reduces the demands for planning and decision making (Lu, Qiu, & Guimaraes, 1988). 
It seems to be suggested that Chinese culture does not harmonize well with the 
techniques of decision making which are rooted in Western, more specifically, 
Anglo-Saxon thought. The validity of Western decision approaches, both information 
technology and decision analysis techniques, cannot be taken for granted when they are 
transplanted into China. Broadly speaking, it should be questioned in any other culture 
which acts in a way radically different from Western thought — even in countries that 
have experienced 200 years of British Empire! For example, Fukuda (1988) has argued 
that although Japan has assimilated much Western technology, and has become an 
industrialized country, Japanese managers still perceive the world and simplify complex 
realities in a way quite different from Western managers, and have their own distinctive 
subjective rationality. While most Western theorists see decision making as a conscious, 
rational process in which the manager selects a set of criteria and uses it to evaluate 
alternative solutions to a particular problem, Japanese managers tend to regard it as an 
irrational and emotional process. Indeed, Stewart (1981) has observed that in making 
decisions, Japanese managers prefer an intuitive process and do not readily draw ideas 
or conclusions from statistical analysis, although statistical control is widely used in 
industry and business. Japanese managers also prefer categorical predictions and are 
reluctant to make calculated estimates relying on probability. While American managers 
rely on a conceptual base that anticipates future events, the Japanese tend to perceive 
a continuously unfolding train of events to which they can accommodate. These 
observations about Japanese managers suggest that the cultural differences in decision 
making can also be found in many other non-Westem cultures, and it should not be 
ignored when Western methodologies are used to develop decision support systems, or 
when Western decision analysis techniques are used to assist non-Westem decision 
makers to make decisions.
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However, it is overly simplistic to explain the failures in the introduction of Western 
decision methods into China as Chinese culture failing to foster the concept of a 
decision. It is so easy to cite numerous examples of the theory and practice of decision 
making in ancient Chinese history. For example, more than 2,000 years ago, Sun Tzu, an 
ancient Chinese military thinker, wrote "The Art of War" (Griffith, 1963), and proposed 
principles of strategy and tactics, which even today are considered to be of great value 
to businessmen all over the world as well as to military officers. It has even reached 
Hollywood: in the film "Wall Street"; the antihero used the book in his business dealings. 
Also a Chinese word "Yun Chou", which can roughly be translated as "devising strategy 
and tactics", has been used since at least the Han dynasty, or around 200 B.C. (Jiang, 
1986). The term "Operational Research" is actually called "Yun Chou" in China today. 
The concept of decision, "Jue Ce", also has been proposed in "The Romance of the 
Three Kingdoms", a historical novel written several hundred years ago, a book whose 
value in Chinese decision culture goes far beyond its value in literature. Under the term 
of "Jue Ce", the author described how Zhu Geliang, a famous strategist in ancient China, 
helped Liu Bei to settle long-term and short-term objectives, as well as the general and 
concrete means achieving these objectives. In ancient Chinese architectural history, there 
is another interesting example. Several years ago, a senior economist visiting the RAND 
corporation was told that the history of cost-benefit analysis techniques could be traced 
back to an ancient Chinese, Ding Wei, who was in charge of rebuilding the Bian Palace 
in the early 11th century (Wu, 1983). At the beginning of the project, Ding Wei asked 
the labourers to dig many canals which linked to the Bian River outside Bian city. The 
soil got from digging canals was used to build the foundation of the Palace. Then a great 
quantity of materials needed by the project was directly transported into the construction 
site by water, thus saving manpower. After the Bian Palace had been rebuilt, the debris 
and remaining soil was used to fill up the canals, which later became avenues. So, it 
appears more appropriate to infer that Chinese people have a different way of decision 
making, rather than to accept Watson and Buede’s (1987) suggestion that the fatalistic 
legacy of Chinese philosophies provide a stark and incompatible contrast with the 
Western humanist tradition. The specific features of Chinese decision tasks and 
intellectual environment were developed from the peculiar experience of Chinese culture, 
and were reinforced by isolation from generation to generation, as of course did Western
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thinking. Indeed, Griffith (1963) has pointed out, "Sun Tzu’s realism and moderation 
form a contrast to Clausewitz’s tendency to emphasize the logical ideal and ‘the 
absolute’, which his disciples caught on to in developing the theory and practice of ‘total 
war’ beyond all bounds of sense." Perhaps it is the cultural differences in decision making 
that create the resistance to Western decision approaches. What could be more serious, 
than that cultural differences may cause a technological decision to fail in the Western 
sense, is that ignorance of cultural differences and the inappropriate copying of Western 
decision methods could mislead, rather than effectively guide Chinese decision makers.
Clearly, the validity of Western approaches to decision making is a fundamental issue 
which should be painstakingly inquired into, when it is being introduced into a non- 
Western culture, such as that of China. I consider, in a narrow sense, that decision 
making itself is a culture, which involves the values that decision makers appreciate, the 
beliefs that they hold, and the instruments and language they are used to employing. The 
disagreements between the requirement of properly applying Western decision methods 
and the observable behaviour of Chinese decision makers, thereby, could be a reflection 
of various subtle and deep-seated incompatibilities between Chinese and Western 
cultures, and they certainly cannot be superficially explained away. However, until now, 
the validity of Western approaches to decision making in Chinese culture has not been 
seriously questioned nor deeply investigated, especially within China, although some 
cultural clashes between Western decision techniques and Chinese decision makers have 
been noted, as mentioned before. The deficiency has already led to simple negation of, 
or conversely blind use of, Western decision techniques in China. Based on the 
recognition that Chinese and Western decision cultures are probably quite different, such 
differences can have significant impact on the success of the introduction of Western 
decision approaches to China, I, therefore, decided to make a serious inquiry into this 
issue with my dissertation.
This raises the question of exactly how to make this inquiry. One way was to make a 
general investigation about the cultural clashes and agreements between Chinese and 
Western decision cultures, and then analyze their impact on the application of decision 
approaches. It was in this way that many early cross-cultural studies were undertaken,
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and these could have served as a guide to my study. For example, Northrop’s (1946) "The 
Meeting of East and West" is representative of the studies in philosophy, in which 
Western and Eastern philosophies have been compared from many aspects, with Chinese 
philosophy as a major representative of those from the East. In the field of the history 
of scientific thought, Needham (e.g. 1956) has made a profound comparison between the 
developments of Chinese and of Western science and civilization. However, few studies 
have made a thorough comparison between Chinese and Western management and 
decision cultures. In fact, to my knowledge, Chinese decision culture as a whole has not 
been systematically explored, although relevant discussions are scattered everywhere, in 
historical records, philosophical books, and military works. Such a study really is a 
challenge and is very attractive. Obviously, it is also very difficult, as it demands the 
collection of rich data and a deep and general understanding of both Chinese and 
Western decision cultures. Following such a research path, I need to investigate and 
compare various aspects of these two cultures.
Nevertheless, I finally choose to concentrate my research on a particular aspect of 
decision making, and to dig deeply into it. Although I seem to "hold a too short rope to 
reach the deep well water", I believe that with this approach I will be able to 
demonstrate more clearly some specific cultural differences between Chinese and 
Western decision makers and to explain more convincingly their significant effects on the 
process of decision making and thus on the application of Western decision approaches. 
Making this choice is particularly encouraged by an important recent finding of Phillips 
and Wright (1977) in a cross-cultural calibration study, which showed that when being 
asked to answer general knowledge questions in terms of probability, Chinese and British 
people responded quite differently. As the adequacy of probability judgments can be 
directly related to one of the fundamental assumptions of modern Western decision 
theory, it inspired me to consider that it may also be a good way of identifying and 
exposing problems in the application of decision approaches through an empirical 
investigation of cultural differences in probabilistic thinking. Therefore, in the 
methodology, this study is mainly empirical, but it will not ignore the relationship 
between individual phenomena in decision making and the whole decision culture, and 
will explain particular findings as deeply as it can.
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This study starts from two research lines. One is early general cultural comparisons 
between Chinese and Western cultures in philosophy, science, military, and particularly 
in the way of thinking. The other is the recent investigation of probabilistic thinking in 
Chinese and in Western decision makers. This study attempts to incorporate and expand 
these two kinds of study in the final inquiry. Following early cross-cultural studies of 
calibration of probability judgment, the experimental investigation will concentrate on 
the human cognitive process in making probability judgments. Cultural differences and 
similarities of probabilistic thinking between Chinese and Western decision makers will 
be examined, revealed and explained against the general background built up from 
previous cross-cultural studies. In particular, in comparison with early studies, this study 
will move forward in several aspects. First it will compare and explore Chinese and 
Western decision cultures in more detail, especially focusing on the way of dealing with 
uncertainty. The differences between the approach promoted by Western decision 
theorists, and the "natural" way that Chinese decision makers actually follow in dealing 
with uncertainty, will be highlighted, based on both general cultural comparison and 
experimental investigation. Second, it will extend the early cross-cultural study of 
probabilistic thinking by using less artificial tasks to observe the behaviour of Chinese 
decision makers. The subject will also be extended from college students or overseas 
Chinese to other decision makers inside the People’s Republic of China. Third, the 
dissertation will propose a more general cognitive model in an attempt to present a 
better explanation of the cultural differences in probabilistic thinking, and their 
implications for the application of Western decision techniques in China.
In the rest of this chapter, I will first examine the principle of Western decision 
approaches, in order to understand its fundamental assumptions, especially the way in 
which it advocates dealing with uncertainty. Following that, I will show that people who 
were born and bred in the Chinese decision culture probably take a different way from 
Western people in dealing with uncertain decision problems, and this way so easily leads 
them to violating the fundamental premises which Western decision approaches demand. 
Finally, I will simply summarize the structure of this study, its main topics, content and 
implications.
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The second chapter is a review of early calibration studies, which will help us to 
understand its method, measures, and analysis techniques. Several early cross-cultural 
studies were given particular attention. The results of three experiments will be reported 
and analyzed in chapter 3 and in chapter 4. A general cognitive model of making 
probability judgments will be proposed and described in the final chapter. At the same 
time, I will also attempt to make a deeper discussion about the validity of Western 
decision approaches on culture, through generalizing the cultural differences into a 
confrontation of rationality between Chinese and Western decision cultures.
1.2. Western approaches for dealing with uncertainty
One of the most important tasks in decision making is to deal properly with uncertainty. 
Almost all modern Western decision theorists have stressed its difficulty and devoted a 
great deal of effort to developing effective methods for coping with uncertainty in order 
to make better decisions. The importance is due to two major reasons. First, uncertainty 
is ubiquitous. In the real world, it is hard to discover a decision which does not involve 
at least slight uncertainty. All of us have experienced hesitation when facing a difficult 
decision. For example a manager, in deciding whether or not to launch a new product, 
would probably worry whether this product could open up a potential market. A complex 
decision environment can bring even more uncertain factors. When making a decision 
about international investment, an oil company may face a variety of uncertainties: 
geological and technological risks, stability of the government of the resource country, 
possibility of changes of taxation, currency exchange rates, even the oil price policy of 
OPEC countries; all have to be considered carefully. In policy making, heads of 
government have similar problems. An economic policy of tax reduction, for example, 
may be expected to encourage investment, but whether the population prefer investment 
to consumption is difficult to foresee. The development of modem science and 
technology has made situations of decision making even more uncertain. Today’s business 
world has been described by Peters (1987) as chaos. Managers confront tremendous 
change, which is exacerbated by swift development of information technology. In this 
chaotic world, predictability has become history. New competitors emerge and old ones 
disappear overnight, with the merging and demerging of companies. The values of
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currencies and commodities may rise or fall by 5 per cent per week, and by 50 per cent 
or more per year.
Secondly, uncertainty is not only widely present in decision making, but also almost 
impossible to eradicate. The common post-decisional complaints, such as "If I had known 
X", seem to suggest that people often attribute their feelings of uncertainty to the lack 
of information about events or relations between events. It is supposed that if people 
know enough about the present states of events, they have a basis to predict the future, 
and if people know enough about the relations between events, they can follow a way to 
infer future states of events from the present states of events. Unfortunately, in many 
situations, it is impossible to search for all the information. For example, under time 
pressure, there is the barest possibility to collect enough information. In competition, one 
can’t get relevant information, simply because rivals deliberately conceal data. With 
limited knowledge about nature, people sometimes find it too difficult to unfold the 
whole cause-effect network linking the events concerned. In some situations, historical 
data may reveal a law behind a series of random events, but it still tells us little about 
a particular case. Furthermore, cross-cultural implications can introduce new layers of 
uncertainty. Thus, many decisions have to be made in the face of irreducible 
uncertainties, and the ability of dealing with uncertainty to a great extent decides the 
quality of decision making.
Emphasizing that uncertainty is hard to eliminate, however, doesn’t preclude its 
reduction. In some situations, information collection and analysis can be the first step to 
overcoming uncertainty. The increase of applications of information technology in 
decision making has mirrored the demand. In the past decades information technology 
has been brought into play in an attempt to collect relevant information and conducting 
effective data analysis. For example, management information systems claim to make the 
information needed by decision makers more accessible and easier to understand. With 
the sophisticated processing capability and modelling assistance of decision support 
systems, it is possible to carry out more effective information analysis, and besides to 
predict possible consequences and thereby give feasible alternatives. Through data 
communication networks, relevant information can be found more quickly and more
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widely, and also knowledge and experience can be shared, which may be found useful 
in dealing with uncertainty. For some repetitive and well-structured decision problems, 
expert systems can also provide expertise and procedural advice. Indeed, present decision 
makers who are armed with information technology may have some advantage over their 
predecessors or those without. For example, in the oil industry, the uncertainty of 
geological structure, which the managers of risk investment are faced with, may be 
reduced more or less, as the high-speed processing capacity of computers today is able 
to deal with a huge amount of seismic survey data of three dimensions in an acceptable 
operating time. Government policy makers may benefit from the forecasts of 
computerized econometric models which contain up to several hundred simultaneous 
equations and variables. The trouble-shooters within a nuclear power station may have 
more confidence in handling an emergency, after consulting other’s experience through 
a network built between theirs and many other stations. Information technology is a 
powerful weapon for fighting uncertainty, however, the claims made for the automation 
of decision making under uncertainty have so far fallen far short of expectations, perhaps 
because it introduces further complexity and uncertainty.
A main difficulty in automating a decision making procedure is that many decision 
problems are too complicated and uncertain to be handled by a prefabricated computer 
program. Most of the models, such as operational research models, on which computer 
programs are usually based, can only be an approximate representation of implied 
decision problems in the real world, and so the simplification of structure and elements 
cannot be avoided, no matter whether it is due to technical or knowledge limitations. Ob­
viously, unpredictable changes in the open decision environment can easily deny what 
usually could be considered as optimum decisions: the outputs of computer systems. For 
expert systems, although they may include a representation of the judgments previously 
made by decision makers in the decision task at hand, they too have the same problem, 
as the judgments may be only effective in certain predictable situations, but not in open 
unpredictable environments. Even though some computer systems may continue to prove 
useful in coping with repetitive decision problems, decision making under uncertainty 
really cannot be expected to be automated for a long time, if at all. Computer systems, 
such as decision support systems and expert systems, can be good aid tools, but poor
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substitutes. Moveover, it is difficult to see how culturally driven intuition, or insight, of 
decision makers, which is evoked in dealing with a particular uncertain decision problem, 
can be previously coded into computer programs. Therefore, in dealing with uncertain 
decision problems, we cannot expect computers to automate this process and provide 
certainty, and the direct participation of human decision makers is necessary for handling 
the irreducible uncertainty, and their subjective judgment also has important role to play 
in both constructing models and interpreting outputs of a model. Before they act, 
decision makers must think clearly about their intangible, subjective feelings, and 
hunches that the model does not include. These are incompatible with the logic of the 
decision model and there still exists a subjective judgmental gap between the output of 
models and real world (Raiffa, 1968). Indeed, serious researchers don’t reject the input 
of subjective judgment in attempting to model complicated systems in the real world. For 
example, Klein and Young (1980) has stressed the role of subjective judgment in 
adjusting the Wharton model. Through regular Wharton conferences, the subjective 
judgments of experts in many fields are incorporated into economic forecasts. He 
believes that judgment and quantitative modelling methods can do better. In short, 
information technology can be helpful in dealing with uncertainty, but it is not enough. 
Because the subjective judgment of decision makers is unavoidable, other techniques 
must be developed, which can assist decision makers to handle their intuition or opinions 
about uncertainty.
In dealing with uncertainty, people generally adopt an intuitive approach, often steeped 
in cultural symbolism. That is, in deciding a course of action, the information about 
uncertainty is not explicitly separated from the information about the outcomes of 
alternatives, and a preferred choice is somehow reached on the basis of the information, 
preferences, and feelings of uncertainty. Today the potential and scale of human activity 
have been greatly extended, and social organizations have also become 
mutually-dependent and more and more complex. Acceleration of change and intricate 
relationships have made decision environments and tasks too uncertain and complicated 
to be dealt with by human intuition alone. Recently, in response to the need of decision 
makers to handle uncertainty more effectively and to narrow or cross the subjective 
judgmental gap, decision analysis, as a normative, formal and quantitative technique has
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arisen as the times require. In the West, it has recently been extensively applied in many 
fields. In an effort to arrive at a rational choice, instead of trying to automate the process 
of decision making, the decision analysis technique attempts to trade off uncertainties 
against various value aspects of the outcomes. According to decision theory (Lindley, 
1985; Raiffa, 1968; Gardenfors & Sahlin, 1988), information should be first decomposed 
into two types: the information about the decision maker’s wants and desires which can 
be extracted and expressed as utilities of possible outcomes of alternative; and 
information of decision maker’s beliefs about states of the world in a given situation, 
which can be extracted and represented by a unique probability measure defined over 
the states. Using the concepts of utility and probability, preferences, intuitive judgments 
and feelings of decision makers about uncertainty are directly introduced into a formal 
and quantitative analysis of a decision problem. A preferred course of action may be 
revealed through a process of recomposition of the information about decision makers, 
following certain rules. It is believed that in balancing between uncertainty and potential 
gain and loss, a rational and logical way, which over the long run pursues a maximal 
expected utility of outcomes, is superior to the intuitive way alone.
As the term "uncertainty" has been used so widely in our everyday life and literature, I 
have not given any interpretation when using it in the above discussion. However, I must 
pause to add it now, when I want to explain why and how a certain mathematical 
description of uncertainty is introduced into the modern decision theory, and its 
assumptions and limitations. In fact, the main theoretical dichotomy between different 
schools stems from their differences in interpreting the uncertainty.
How has this word been defined for common use? The new edition of the Oxford 
English Dictionary states that uncertainty can be used to describe both the quality or the 
state of being uncertain, or not being definitely known, or perfectly clear, and the state 
or character of being uncertain in mind. For example, we can say, "the uncertainty of 
weather, or colour", to describe the external world, or "I suppose, he was full of 
uncertainties" (Oxford English Dictionary, Carlyle, 1851), to express our inner feelings. 
Even in the same situation, people can use both ways without difficulty. For example, 
with the adjectival form, they complain about the "uncertain weather", and also say "I am
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uncertain whether we will get as much sunshine next year as we did this year." It suggests 
that in common language, uncertainty sometimes is described as the property of 
something outside ourselves, and sometimes as the property of the inner feelings. 
However, this kind of mixed usage is problematical in establishing a theory to represent 
uncertainty, because theorists must decide what type of uncertainty they want to define 
and to measure, if indeed it is definable and measurable, before they actually develop 
their theories.
According to the dictionary definitions, uncertainty can be used in almost any situation, 
as long as it involves some events whose outcomes cannot be exactly predicted. However, 
in early studies, this term was more closely related to random phenomena, which was 
often differentiated as an antithesis to certainty. The game of dice is an over-used 
textbook example of a random event, which shows that when a die is thrown, each side 
of it, labelled with an integer between 1 and 6, has equal possibility of coming up. The 
flow of customers arriving at a service till, or the day’s sales volume, are more practical 
examples. In such studies, uncertainty is generally observed as a property of a random 
event, like length or colour, which has nothing to do with human subjective perception. 
However, in recent decision theory, it is more often interpreted as ignorance of decision 
makers. For example, von Winterfeldt and Edwards (1986) point out, "uncertainty is a 
property of your knowledge about these events, not of the events themselves." So, if you 
attribute the uncertainty to an event, for example, tossing a coin, Hogarth (1987), who 
has the same point of view as von Winterfeldt and Edwards, would argue in this way, 
"What does it mean to say that the coin has 1 chance in 2 of coming down ‘heads’ and 
1 chance in 2 of coming down ‘tails’? The meaning is simply that we are uncertain 
whether it will be heads or tails on any particular throw. Furthermore, the chances of 1 
in 2 reflect that uncertainty. Note that this statement does not mean that there are no 
causes for the coin to fall on one side or the other on a particular throw. Indeed, there 
must be causes. The statement simply implies that we are unaware of the relative forces 
of the various causes and so are prepared to assess chances of 1 in 2. The probabilistic 
statement expresses our degree of knowledge and is not a property of the coin per se 
(although the statement can be made in light of the coin’s properties, e.g. it is not bent)."
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The fundamental distinction between the two points of view is that with the concept of 
uncertainty, one describes the outside world, whereas the other describes human mind. 
The former treats uncertainty as objective existence which is independent of human 
subjective perception, whereas the latter only admits the uncertainty perceived in human 
mind. In the two different ways, uncertainty is located at the two ends of the 
objective/subjective spectrum of the human perception process. In deciding whether or 
not uncertainty exists in a given situation, inconsistency between them is unavoidable. 
Some events which could be considered as certain in the objective sense may be 
perceived as uncertain. For example, the emergence of the Hailey’s Comet can still be 
perceived as an uncertainty by an observer who doesn’t know the fact that the Comet 
approaches the Earth once about every 75 or 76 years. Similarly, some events which 
could be considered as uncertain in the objective sense, may be perceived as certain. For 
example, in tossing a fair coin, after seeing heads coming up 20 times successively, one 
may perceive this event as certain, but the tails may come up in the 21st toss! It is also 
why we sometimes get surprised. However, more often, events which are considered as 
uncertain in the objective sense are also perceived as uncertain, as with most of the 
decision problems we often face. Even so, the degree of uncertainty is a very personal 
experience, and will vary substantially between different individuals. It should be noted 
that perceived uncertainty can only be personal or private.
There are also some scholars who do not take either of the two extreme positions. For 
example, Kahneman and Tversky (1982), who are engaged in the study of human 
intuitive judgment, have made a distinction between external uncertainty and internal 
uncertainty. The uncertainty which can be attributed to a causal system in the real world 
is classified as external uncertainty. Such causal systems may be associated with the 
tossing of a coin, the drawing of a hand of cards from a pack, the outcome of a football 
game, and the behaviour of the St. Helens volcano, which have dispositions to produce 
different events. In contrast, if an uncertainty is attributed only to ignorance or the state 
of knowledge, it is classified as internal uncertainty or more specially, ignorance. For 
example, the uncertainty which is reflected in such statements as, "I think Mont Blanc 
is the tallest mountain in Europe," or, "I hope I spelled her name correctly," can only be 
internal, as it is attributed to one’s mind rather than to a mountain or a woman.
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Uncertainty can be represented in many ways. Probability theory is the most common 
approach employed in modern decision theory. Other alternatives have also arisen, such 
as fuzzy set theory (Zadeh, 1978), the Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence (Shafer, 
1976). Why should probability theory be chosen? Watson and Buede (1987) supposed 
that the only reason for using it is that the notion is so well imbedded in Western 
scientific culture that we do not stop to question if it is the only possible, let alone the 
correct, calculus to employ. Nevertheless, von Winterfeldt and Edwards (1986) further 
argued that in comparison with other theories, probabilities (here he means subjective 
probabilities, as we will see) are powerful in presenting how people think, and they are 
easier to use because of their additive property.
Probabilities simply are numbers between 0 and 1 that obey the addition and 
multiplication laws governing the "or" and "and" relationships between events. However, 
when relating them to observations about the real world, probabilities are not interpreted 
in the same way in different schools of thought. Weatherford (1982) has divided 
probability theories into four categories: classical, logical, relative frequency and 
subjective probability theory. The most important conflict is between relative frequency 
and subjective probability theories, which originates from their divergence in the 
conception of uncertainty. Probability of an event, in the relative frequency probability 
theory, is defined as a limit of relative frequency with which the event occurs in an 
infinite repetition of an experiment. For example, in the case of tossing a fair coin, a 
probability of 1/2 of heads coming up means that if the coin can be tossed an infinite 
number of times, the times of heads coming up is about the same as that of tails coming 
up. Frequentists establish initial probability through an experimental or statistical 
sampling process. In this theory, probability is seen as an objective property of the real 
world. However, the objectivity of probability has been criticized as spurious from both 
its definition of probability and the way it establishes initial probability by subjectivists 
or Bayesians as they are often called for their fancy in using the Bayes’ theorem as 
human judgment model. De Finetti (1974) says, "PROBABILITY DOES NOT EXIST." 
By this he means that probability does not exist outside of a person, that is, it does not 
exist objectively, which is directly deduced from that uncertainty does not exist 
objectively. In his point of view, probability is a description of a person’s uncertainty
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about the world. So, the Bayesian school (Ramsey, 1931; de Finetti, 1974) defines 
probabilities as degrees of belief which an individual has in an event or a proposition. 
In this theory, probability is seen as a property of the individual’s subjective perception 
of the real world. Initial or prior probabilities, in subjective probability theory, are 
generally established by psychological investigations, for example, using a reference 
wager to determine a probability from the expression of preferences (Wright, 1986).
The decision analysis technique employs subjective probability to measure the perceived 
uncertainty of decision makers, and there are at least two main reasons for this choice. 
First, from previous discussion, we have seen that direct participation of decision makers 
and their subjective judgments are indispensable in decision making under uncertainty. 
It is simply because people have to make decisions on the basis of their intuition or 
hunches about uncertainty, and intuitive judgment cannot be ignored or replaced, de 
Finetti (1972) has stressed, "Because, whatever the explanation of the uncertainty might 
be..., the sole concrete fact which is beyond dispute is that someone... feels himself in a 
state of uncertainty, and has to decide on and adopt some point of view as a basis for 
previsions and related decisions." From this realization, decision theory aims to provide 
a framework to guide decision makers to cope rationally with uncertainty. The scientific 
ideology of quantitative analysis then drives decision theorists to find some means of 
measuring and handling decision makers’ opinions about uncertainty. As we have seen, 
only subjective interpretation of probability can satisfy these requirements. Subjective 
probability must be used in decision theory. Otherwise, the intellectual justifications for 
the procedures of decision analysis are much weakened (Watson & Buedue, 1987).
Another reason for choosing subjective probability is argued as that it has an advantage 
of being able to be used to describe uncertainty of a unique event; relative frequency 
probability is only applicable to events that can, in principle, be repeated. This increases 
the utility of decision theory, since many decision problems in the real world do not have 
this property of repetition, they are not even imaginable a priori.
From the above discussion, we have understood why and how human intuitive judgments 
about uncertainty as subjective probabilities are introduced into decision theory, or more
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exactly, Bayesian decision theory. The disputes between different schools regarding the 
conception of uncertainty and probability have also been illustrated. As the topic of this 
study is not to appreciate the advantages or disadvantages of the various approaches, the 
discussion here simply serves as an explanation which highlights the reasons behind the 
selection of probability theory. Even so, it is apposite to clarify what these conceptions 
mean before engaging in further discussion. As this study is mainly concerned with 
human probabilistic thinking and the process in which people make probability 
judgments in face of perceptions of uncertainty, it will mostly concentrate on perceived 
uncertainty. It is the feelings that people have when they cannot make a certain judgment 
about the outcome of an event or when they cannot make their mind about whether a 
proposition is true or false. Such uncertainty could be associated with the incompleteness 
and inadequacy of information, random events, and even the failure of our or other’s 
memory. From the same reason, in this study, probability is used as an instrument to 
measure subjective or perceived uncertainty.
It is clear that with probability theory, the decision analysis technique attempts to provide 
decision makers with a way of expressing their opinions about uncertainty, which can 
then be incorporated into a quantitative process of trade-off with the values of outcomes. 
However, it has been criticized for being arbitrary, because different individuals are 
allowed to have different probabilities for the same event, and because Bayesian decision 
theory is based on subjective judgments: for any state of the world, the whims of the 
decision maker can let him choose any probability value between 0 and 1 and thus he 
can reach almost any kind of decision, and still be "rational" according to the principle 
of maximizing expected utility.
For this, Bayesian decision theorists make two points in their defence. The first is that 
decision analysis accepts only consistent or coherent subjective probabilities. It means 
that decision makers must express their opinions in a rational way, that is, their intuitive 
judgments should obey several laws of probability theory. For example, if one thinks that 
event A is more likely than event B, and event B is more likely than event C, he or she 
should think A is more likely than C. The second point argued is that this criticism does 
not take the Bayesian theory of learning into account (Gardenfors & Sahlin, 1988). It is
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argued that although the "prior" probability values can be selected arbitrarily, new 
information, obtained from experiments or by other means, will adjust the "subjective" 
probability distribution. One of the fundamental results in Bayesian theory, de Finetti’s 
(1937) representation theorem, entails that even if two decision makers start out from 
widely different initial distributions - for example, concerning the probabilities of the 
outcomes of tosses with a particular coin - they will end up arbitrarily close to each 
other, given sufficient time to experiment with the coin. Even though de Finetti does not 
believe that there are such things as "objective" probabilities, subjective probability 
distributions would converge toward an inter-subjective probability distribution, given 
more and more information about what the world actually is like.
Much more recent studies nevertheless have shown in the context of psychological 
experiments, that the likelihoods expressed by subjects do not satisfy the coherence 
properties that are necessary for the existence of subjective probabilities. For example, 
human heuristic strategies in making probability judgments were found to be very 
vulnerable, and thus insensitive to some statistical information, and so to be easily misled 
by worthless evidence (e.g. Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Also subjects seemed to follow 
an updating process akin to that described by Bayes* theorem, but they did not utilize 
information obtained efficiently. People seem to have no intuitive idea of how to revise 
their beliefs in the light of new information (e.g. Phillips, Hays & Edwards, 1966; Phillips 
& Edwards, 1966). In calibration studies, various experiments have repeatedly 
demonstrated the overconfidence phenomenon, that is, when people are asked to assess 
probabilities about a series of propositions or events, the correct proportion of their 
assessed probabilities is less than their assessed probability (Lichtenstein, Fischhoff & 
Phillips, 1982). These findings remind us that when we give way to human intuitive 
judgment, judgmental illusions may also come in.
The deficiencies of unaided human intuition in making probability judgments shown in 
these studies have led some serious decision makers to doubt the applicability of decision 
analysis (Von Winterfeldt & Edwards, 1986), as these findings directly undermine the 
basic assumption that people can make disaggregated judgments about probabilities, such 
as when assessing prior probabilities or likelihood ratios. However, some researchers
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argue that it should be no surprise to find that human beings have very little inherent 
ability to handle uncertainty (eg. Howard, 1980). They believe that a more important 
problem is whether people can be helped to perform these tasks of probability judgment 
well. Von Winterfeldt and Edwards (1986) also assert that intellectual tools can 
transcend human cognitive limitations. They have argued that in order to deal with 
intuitively difficult arithmetic tasks, people have developed and used numerous, diverse, 
and effective intellectual tools and their embodiment in physical tools, so why can’t they 
design intellectual tools to overcome human cognitive limitations in dealing with 
uncertainty? They believe that the problem is not whether people can perform 
probability judgmental tasks, but how they can be helped to do them better. Phillips 
(1984) stressed that the empirical findings in descriptive studies tell us only what people 
actually do, and give us no idea of their potential. Effort, he considered, should be 
devoted to finding the circumstances in which people are "intellectual athletes" and not 
"intellectual cripples". Howard (1980) further asserts that just like a pilot flying in bad 
weather needs the help of instruments, in dealing with uncertainty, the human being 
needs an instrument — probability theory, and he will never be able to perform well in 
an uncertain environment without his instrument.
These arguments seem to be convincing in the sense that the findings of deficiencies of 
human intuition in dealing with probabilistic tasks only strengthens the necessity of 
designing and using intellectual tools like decision analysis and information technology. 
However, these findings did convey to us an important message that the validity of 
intellectual tools, whether computerized or formal analytic ones, cannot be taken for 
granted and they do remind us that there are many traps which can confound our efforts. 
Information is assumed to be essential for overcoming uncertainty, but information 
overload may bias human judgments about uncertain events. Decision analysis can 
enhance wise trade-off between uncertainty and benefit. However, human beings are not 
natural statisticians, and their failure in making disaggregated probability judgments can 
collapse a whole decision tree. The empirical method of deriving probabilities for system 
failure rates of individual technological components cannot make a success, if 
probabilistic dependencies are treated improperly (Angell & Smithson, 1991). Therefore, 
the validity of these intellectual tools are, at best, conditional on, among other things, the
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adequacy of human probability judgment. Providing intellectual tools to help people deal 
with uncertainty is a rather subtle task, unequivocally tied into cultural experience. An 
intellectual tool is just like a pole or an umbrella in the hands of an acrobat walking on 
a wire, which not only can help him keep balance, but also can make him more likely 
fall down. Perhaps it is why Phillips (1984) offered a requisite decision model and was 
very cautious and careful when explaining its development and application in assisting 
decision making. Indeed, some researchers are developing methodologies and 
professional practices to help people keep their "balance” and to avoiding them falling 
into traps. For example, Phillips (1987) has proposed several conditions under which 
people can make precise, reliable, accurate probability judgments. A study by 
Lichtenstein and Fischhoff (1980) also showed that training can improve calibration. The 
development of the influence diagram (Howard & Matheson, 1979) has proved helpful 
in making both analysts and decision makers sensitive to the issue of dependence. From 
the results of study, people may gain fresh confidence, but it is still far from a guarantee. 
These technologies are only valid conditionally, and a panacea for managing uncertainty 
can never be found.
1.3. An alternative way
There are numerous examples which contrast the development of Chinese science and 
technology with that of the West. The Chinese don’t use alphabetic writing. Every 
Chinese character has its own form, meaning and pronunciation, that is, it is a whole 
thing. In ancient Chinese, the subject-predicate relationship was not defined rigidly by 
grammar, as it was in ancient Greece. Traditional Chinese doctors actually consider 
human body as a system, in which, they believe, there is a network of passages, through 
which vital energy circulates and along which the acupuncture points are distributed. 
They don’t even try to allocate the particular place causing diseases as Western doctors 
do. It may be hard for a Western doctor to believe there are so many acupoints in 
human body, unless they can be shown physically. Some Chinese medicines are banned 
in the United States, as they were found to contain poisonous ingredients. However, 
these medicines have been used for several hundreds, even thousands of years, "To use 
poison as remedy for malignant disease" was quintessential to Chinese medicine. Western
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artists pay more attention to the law of perspective, geometrical arrangement of objects, 
while Chinese traditional paintings are characterized by vivid expression and bold outline 
— freehand brushwork.
Many scholars have observed that there are remarkable differences between Chinese and 
Western peoples in the way they comprehend the world, and how they reach judgments 
and decisions. The Chinese mind has been described as non-analytic (Northrop, 1946). 
It is argued that the Chinese, in contrast to Westerners, have less interest in abstract 
reasoning. Their way of thinking is more concrete and is confined solely to the realm of 
the immediately apprehended, and remains on the periphery of the visible world. It is 
also suggested that the Chinese perceive the world as based on a network of 
relationships, that is they are socio-oriented, or situation-centred, in contrast to Western 
self-oriented, or individual-centred (Hsu, 1970). The Chinese way of thinking is described 
as utilitarian and pragmatic (Nakamura, 1960). Moore (1967) has suggested that the 
synthetic way of thinking may be an application of the Chinese spirit, or principle of 
harmony in the realm of the intellect. In this spirit, the Chinese tend to be highly 
sensitive to outside conflicts and inconsistencies, and they usually manifest a strong 
tendency to find some way to reconcile the incongruities in a higher integrated 
framework. Hang (1966) believed that one of the Chinese characteristics was a concrete 
and global orientation of observing things and phenomena. Chinese also tend to reason 
by intuitive analogy rather than by rational analysis, that is, they first find the truth by 
their intuition, and then strengthen it by employing various of concrete comparisons and 
vivid, especially historical examples. This way of thinking was described as circular, as 
it puts a theme in the centre and then interprets, and strengthens the theme by different 
comparisons. In fact the theme does not need to be verified, as from the beginning its 
truth is self-evident. In contrast, Western thought was described as a straight line, as it 
starts from a superficial point and then goes into an unknown field. So, Hang quoted 
Pascal’s words that the Chinese way of thinking is more like the "esprit de finesse”, while 
the "esprit de geometric" is more suitable to describe Western way of thinking.
Several previous findings in cross-cultural studies also partly confirmed the above 
observations and analysis. Abel and Hsu (1949), in their Rorschach study, found that the
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Chinese perceive "ink-blot" pictures as a whole much more frequently than did the 
Caucasian American sample of de Vos’ study (1966). Chiu (1972) found, in a cognitive 
style test, that the dominant response mode for Chinese children was 
relational-contextual, while the dominant modes for the Americans were 
inferential-categorical and descriptive-analytic. Singh, Hung and Tompson (1962) found 
that Chinese students scored significantly higher in aesthetic value than the American 
students, and the American students obtained higher scores in theoretic value than the 
Chinese students, although the Chinese students’ score in aesthetic value is not as high 
as that in theoretic value.
It is obvious that the development of Western techniques for dealing with uncertainty, 
as well as other modern Western science and technology, follows a rational, logical and 
analytic tradition, which can be found in the ancient Greek formal logic and in the 
systematic experimental methods of the Renaissance for seeking cause-effect 
relationships. Decision theorists in the West are fond of developing models, building 
inference rules and measurement. Decision environments and tasks are being measured 
and modeled, human intuition and judgment are being modeled as well. Decision making 
is formalized as a process of decomposition and recomposition, which has been 
emphasized. Quantitative methods are widely used to describe objectivity, and even 
subjective feelings of uncertainty are measured. This approach was hardly developed in 
Chinese culture, and this fact must have a major effect on the application of decision 
approaches in China. However, much earlier, on the other side of the world, another 
way, the Chinese way had evolved.
According to their recent findings in cross-cultural comparison studies of probabilistic 
thinking, Phillips and Wright (1977, and Wright & Phillips, 1980) have suggested that the 
Chinese may adopt a different way from the British in dealing with uncertainty. In 1977, 
they carried out the first cross-cultural comparison between Chinese and British groups 
of students, nurses and businessmen. They found that British people have a greater 
tendency to view the world in terms of uncertainty than do Hong Kong Chinese. British 
people are more likely to ascribe different degrees of uncertainty to events, and they can 
express the uncertainty meaningfully as a numerical probability in response to general
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knowledge questions. These findings also have been confirmed by the recent experiments 
undertaken with the students of Japan, the United States, and the People’s Republic of 
China by Yates and his colleagues (1989).
Phillips and Wright (1977) suggested that an individual’s world-view of causality 
influences the tendency to adopt probabilistic thinking. They distinguished a Laplacean 
world-view and a fatalistic world-view, and believe that British people are more familiar 
with the Laplacean view, that is, "events do not just happen through the action of 
mysterious forces, but are caused by previous events acting according to natural laws that 
can be discovered by systematic investigation and enquiry", whereas most of the Hong 
Kong Chinese may tend to accept a fatalistic view, that is, "individuals should seek to 
behave in accordance with the predictable cycle of events and not attempt to influence 
events to their advantage". The British (Laplacean) probabilistic world-view, it was 
argued, tended to cultivate probabilistic thinkers, while the Hong Kong Chinese fatalistic 
world-view, in contrast, tended to foster non-probabilistic thinkers. Holding this 
world-view, Hong Kong Chinese are more likely to remain flexible in dealing with 
uncertainty, but not to make fine differentiation between uncertainties.
Many Western scholars may have deep impressions about Chinese "fate-orientation", and 
often connect them with Chinese Taoism. However, the impact of Taoism on the 
development of Chinese science and technology does not allow an easy interpretation. 
In fact, even today Chinese scholars still argue the meaning of Lao Tzu’s Tao (Zhan, 
1986). Even a simple sentence of Lao Tzu’s "Tao Te Jing", may have three or more quite 
different interpretations in ancient Chinese books. The barrier of language makes it even 
more difficult for Western scholars to understand Tao. Needham (1956) pointed out, "It 
is necessary to say that, for one reason or another, Taoist thought has been almost 
completely misunderstood by most European translators and writers. Taoist religion has 
been neglected and Taoist magic has been written off wholesale as superstition, Taoist 
philosophy has been interpreted as pure religious mysticism and poetry. The scientific 
or ‘proto’-scientific side of Taoist thought has been very largely overlooked, and the 
political position of Taoists still more so." Needham believed that the deepest scientific 
insights of Taoism were their profound awareness of the universality of change and
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transformation. Zhan (1986) praised Lao Tzu’s philosophy as a hymn of nature, and 
believed that "Tao is nature, and nature is Tao" and what Lao Tzu advocated was "living 
in accordance with nature, and acting in accordance with natural laws." With the concepts 
of Yin and Yang representing opposites, he comprehended change as a process of a lack 
of balance between Yin and Yang, and a transformation from one to the other. Similar 
but more simple thought resulted in the I-Ching. This has led to the development of 
traditional science and technology of a unique form and application in ancient China.
Many years ago, Hsu (1949) presented a vivid description of the "fate-orientation" of the 
people living in a remote Southwest community in China, West Towners. The West 
Towners often said "Medicine can cure disease, but cannot cure fate". Undoubtedly it 
expresses a strong fatalistic tendency. However, they said this only after trying every way 
they could find to save a patient’s life. They asked the help not only of the traditional 
Chinese doctors, but also of the doctors who were trained in Western medicine. So, Hsu 
concluded, "The average West Towner is no more fatalistic than the early American who 
prayed to God and kept his powder dry."
We are not trying here to deny that from today’s point of view, Taoism might have had 
some unappreciated influences on the development of the thought and the way of deci­
sion making in Chinese history. In fact, in comparison with ancient Western philosophers, 
Taoists "failed to reach any precise definition of the experimental method or any 
systematisation of their observations of Nature. So wedded to empiricism were they, so 
impressed by the boundless multiplicity of Nature, so lacking in Aristotelian classificatory 
boldness, that they wholly dissociated themselves from the efforts of their contemporaries 
of the Mo and Ming schools to elaborate a logic suitable for science. Nor did they realize 
the need for the information of an adequate corpus of technical terms." (Needham, 
1956). Also, probability theory, which Howard called the indispensable instrument in 
dealing with uncertainty, did not emerge within China, and the first Western book on 
probability theory was only published in Chinese in 1896 (Li, 1984). However, what we 
would like to argue here is that the process by which people make probability judgments, 
or translate their feelings of uncertainty caused by incomplete or ambiguous data into 
information about the future, is very complicated. This process may vary when dealing
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with different decision tasks, and many cultural and social factors can affect to some 
extent this process in ways other than "fate-orientation”. In the formation of the Chinese 
way of decision making or dealing with uncertainty, perhaps not only Taoism but also 
Confucianism and Buddhism have played important roles. Indeed, to explain the cultural 
differences in probabilistic thinking, a variety of causal relationships, such as Chinese 
social orientation (Yang, 1981), socialization and upbringing (Hoosain, 1986) and its 
socio-economic situation (Yates et al., 1989), have also been suggested, which will be dis­
cussed in detail in Chapter 2.
1.4. Summary
From the above discussion, we have seen the disharmony between Chinese decision 
culture and Western decision methods. In the first section, I have questioned the validity 
of Western approaches to decision making in China and argued that a simplistic 
interpretation is untenable. In section 2 and 3, I have discussed the characteristics of 
Western decision approaches and Chinese culture and suggested that decision makers, 
as an important component part of decision approach, perhaps have been ignored in the 
rush to import techniques. Information technology can be helpful in dealing with 
uncertainty, but it should be remembered that what information is to a Western decision 
maker may be uninformative to his Chinese counterpart. Some of the tasks implicit in 
decision analysis, such as making probability judgments, which is confused even in the 
West, may be totally alien to Chinese decision makers. The effort made with decision 
analysis techniques can easily be doomed to fail if the probability judgments input are 
inappropriate for Chinese decision makers.
Since differences in decision making between the Westerners and Chinese, especially the 
overseas Chinese (e.g. Redding & Wong, 1986), have been supposed, it is important that 
empirical studies are carried out, which try to find out the cultural factors concerned, and 
how they affect the development and application of information technology and decision 
analysis techniques. Of course, a major difficulty hindering a deeper investigation is that 
the human information process in making decisions is itself so complicated and hard to 
describe clearly. This present study was aroused by a recent important finding of Phillips
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and Wright (e.g. 1977) in a calibration study, which showed that when facing uncertain 
situations, Chinese and British people make probability judgments differently. As the 
study is directly related to one of the basic assumptions in modern Western decision 
theory, it inspires the present study to concentrate on a specific aspect of decision 
making, and to compare particularly the characteristics of Chinese and British people in 
dealing with inconclusive information, making probability judgments and taking decisions 
when consequences are uncertain. It thus allows a deeper examination of the validity of 
applying Western decision approaches in China and the cultural influence on decision 
making. The present study aims to examine whether there are any systematic differences 
in dealing with uncertainty between Chinese and British people, and to investigate the 
cultural factors underlying the differences. For this purpose, a series of experiments will 
be designed and carried out, with subjects chosen from Chinese and British people, in 
which probability judgments will be measured. A direct implication of this study is to 
inform that there is a cultural dimension which should be carefully considered in the 
development and application of Western decision approaches. Without this we cannot 
expect Western approaches to produce effective decision support systems or to enhance 
better decisions in Chinese decision makers. Moreover, cultural interpretation about 
these differences can be helpful in making better use of Western decision methods in 
China and developing more suitable techniques for Chinese decision makers, as it may 
reveal both advantages and disadvantages of the Chinese way in dealing with 
uncertainties. It is also hoped that this study can promote mutual understanding between 
Chinese and Western decision makers, which is considered as very important by Hofstede 
(1980): "The survival of mankind will depend to a large extent on the ability of people 
who think differently to act together. International collaboration presupposes some 
understanding of where others’ thinking differs from ours."
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Chapter 2. Cultural Differences in Probabilistic Thinking
In the first chapter, I have explained why this study will focus only on the way of dealing 
with uncertainty and have suggested the cultural differences between Chinese and 
Western decision makers from recent cross-cultural studies of calibration. In this chapter, 
I will first discuss calibration study in general, including its concept, method, measure, 
and main findings from previous studies. Then, I will give a detailed analysis of the 
results reported in earlier cross-cultural studies of calibration. Various causal factors for 
the cultural differences in probabilistic thinking will also be discussed.
2.1. A review of calibration study
Measures
Subjective probabilities are decided in an intuitive fashion, in which there are no clear 
involvement of inference and analysis. The processes of deciding a probability are 
influenced by people’s knowledge, experience, and even their emotional state when they 
are making probability judgments. Of course, relative frequencies stored as mental 
records can also become one of the inputs to the processes. However, fundamentally, 
what subjective probabilities describe are entirely a person’s internal feelings of 
uncertainty about the world, and hence it seems to be fallacious to talk about objective 
correctness of subjective probability. The axioms of probability may be seen as imposing 
certain restrictions on the arbitrariness of subjective probability, and thereby can lead 
people to make and use subjective probabilities consistently, but a group of subjective 
probabilities still cannot be evaluated as correct in any objective sense, even if they 
conform to the axioms of probability. If probabilities were confined solely to be the 
expressions of personal feelings of uncertainty, it would be unnecessary to worry about 
their quality. However, subjective probabilities are introduced, as crucial inputs, into the 
processes of decision making, and thus the quality of probabilities must generate direct 
impact on the making of a final decision. As there are real possibilities that the judgment 
of subjective probability can be biased by various internal and external factors as we will
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see, decision theorists, analysts, and decision makers themselves are very concerned 
about the quality of probability judgments other than the logical consistency of 
probability judgments.
It is meaningless and impossible to appreciate the correctness of individual probability 
judgments, but in many circumstances people’s probability judgment can be and is 
actually being verified in the light of a series of subsequent events. For example, a 
surgeon should not be blamed after he has predicted that an operation would have a 
success chance of 90 per cent, but it actually failed. However, if the surgeon has made 
such poor predictions over a long period of time, patients would be very worried in 
making their mind whether or not to accept his suggestion to take an operation. In early 
study, the quality of probability judgments have been evaluated in several ways. Winkler 
and Murphy (1968) have proposed normative goodness to measure the degree to which 
the probability judgments conform to the axioms of probability and substantive goodness 
to measure the amount of knowledge of the topic area contained in the probability 
judgments. More recently, Lichtenstein, Fischhoff and Phillips (1977) described a further 
aspect of the quality of probability judgments, calibration. Calibration measures a group 
of probability judgments against facts or reality. A group of probability judgments made 
for uncertain events can be evaluated as calibrated if, over the long run, for all the 
uncertain events assigned the same probability, the proportion that they actually occur 
is equal to the probability assigned. Calibration can be defined in the same way for a 
group of probability judgments which are made for propositions. Calibration is not a 
logical standard of probability judgments. It measures how accurate a group of 
probability judgments are in the long run and against reality or facts. It is different from 
normative or substantive goodness (Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, & Phillips, 1977). Calibration 
is an important aspect of the quality of probability judgments, which has drawn much 
research attentions. With calibration as a main measurement, calibration study aims to 
examine whether human beings have the ability of making calibrated probability 
judgments. If they have, or at least are able to develop such an ability, we will be more 
confident in using decision analysis techniques, otherwise, we will feel very 
uncomfortable.
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Figure 2.1. Calibration curves
The ability of human beings in making calibrated probability judgments are often tested 
when they perform two kinds of probabilistic task: using discrete and continuous items. 
Several different techniques and measures have been developed to elicit and evaluate 
people’s probability judgments. In a typical calibration study of using discrete items, 
people are asked a number of general knowledge questions like, "Which is longer (a) 
Panama Canal or (b) Suez Canal ?". Respondents are requested to select the answer 
which they think is correct, and to write a probability to indicate how sure they are of 
the correctness of their selection. For a respondent (or a group of respondents) 
answering these questions, an experimenter may group together all the questions for 
which the respondent (or respondents) assigned the same probability, and get the 
percentage of questions they answered correctly in the group. The calibration of
.5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1.0
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probability judgments of a respondent (or respondents) then can be demonstrated with 
a calibration curve, which is drawn with percentage correct and probability judgment, for 
all groups, as two variables. Perfect calibration is represented by the diagonal line in 
Figure 2.1. The curve lying below the diagonal reflects overconfidence: when the 
percentage correct is less than the correspondent assessed probability. While the curve 
over the diagonal reflects underconfidence: when the percentage correct is more than the 
correspondent assessed probability.
There are also several numerical measures of calibration. Murphy (1972) designed a 
partition of the Brier (1950) score which could be used as a basic measurement of 
overall accuracy of probability judgments. The smaller the score, the better the 
performance in a probabilistic task. When only one response per item is scored, 
Murphy’s partition can be expressed as:
Brier -  Knowledge + Calibration -  Resolution
1 m  1 M
Brier = c (l-c ) + —£  ni(rr c,)2 -  - ^ I > , ( c , - c)2
Where N  is the total number of responses, nt is the number of times the response r, was 
used, Cj is the proportion correct for all items assigned probability r, and M  is the total 
number of different response categories used (e.g. M = 6 for subjects who limit their 
responses to the single digits 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, and 1.0). c is the overall percentage 
correct.
Calibration measures the mean weighted distance between the calibration curve and the 
identity line (diagonal). The smaller the calibration score, the better. If in the calibration 
measure, the differences between q  and rt are not squared, then a negative score 
indicates overconfidence, and a positive score underconfidence. Resolution measures the 
ability of the respondent to discriminate different degrees of subjective uncertainty by
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sorting the items into categories whose respective percentages correct are maximally 
different from the overall percentage correct. The higher the resolution score, the better.
Apart from discrete items, people can also make probability judgments about uncertain 
continuous quantities, such as, stock price, temperature, etc. There are two techniques 
which are commonly used for eliciting people’s probability judgments about uncertain 
quantities in calibration study. One is called the fractile method (Alpert & Raiffa, 1969), 
which presents subjects with several predetermined fractiles of the probability 
distribution (e.g. 0.01, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75, and 0.99) and asks them to assess values of the 
uncertain quantity to the fractiles. For the 0.50 fractile, for example, the subject should 
assess a value of the quantity which he believes that the actual value is equally likely to 
lie above or below the assessed value; the 0.01 fractile is a value such that there is only 
1 chance in 100 that the actual value is smaller than the assessed value. The probability 
method (Seaver, von Winterfeldt, & Edwards, 1978), in contrast, requires subjects to 
estimate probabilities for several values of an uncertain quantity, which are specified in 
the one-alternative questions, such as, "What is the probability that the inflation rate of 
China in 1992 will exceed 5%?", "What is the probability that the inflation rate of China 
in 1992 will exceed 10%?", etc. Usually, five such questions are asked for each quantity.
The calibration of the probability judgments about uncertain quantities is measured by 
two indices. The first one is interquartile index which indicates the percentage of the 
times when the actual value falls between the 0.25 and the 0.75 fractiles. Calibrated 
probability judgments, in the long run, should have an interquartile index of 50. The 
second one is the surprise index which is defined as the percentage of times when the 
actual values fall outside the most extreme fractiles assessed. If the most extreme 
fractiles are assessed between 0.01 and 0.99, calibrated probability judgments are 
expected to have a surprise index of 2. So, a large surprise index indicates 
overconfidence, as it shows that the value intervals decided by the subjects are often too 
narrow to contain enough of the actual values. However, if the subjects often set the 
value intervals to be too wide, they may obtain an interquartile index greater than 50 and 
a low surprise index, which indicates underconfidence. In comparison with fractile 
method, the probability method is found to lead to a better surprise index. However, it
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could be argued that in the fractile method, the subject’s judgments may have been 
affected by the values selected by the experimenter (Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, & Phillips, 
1982). Stael von Holstein and Matheson (1979) have also developed an encoding 
procedure which asks subjects themselves to decide the range of uncertain quantities and 
to divide it into several subranges. Then like the probability method, subjects assign a 
probability for every value point so that the real value will not exceed the value. At the 
end of encoding a cumulative probability curve is produced. This method has some 
advantages in comparison with previous two methods and has been applied in one of my 
experiments. I will describe its details later.
Many early calibration studies have investigated the ability in various kinds of subjects 
by using different probabilistic tasks. Several studies also intended to explore how people 
really make their probability judgments and to find some way to help people develop 
such ability.
Overconfidence phenomenon
How good can people be in making probability judgments? Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, and 
Phillips (1982) have reviewed a number of experimental studies on calibration. An 
important conclusion from their review is that people are overconfident with probabilistic 
tasks of moderate or extreme difficulty. With general knowledge questions, Fischhoff, 
Slovic, and Lichtenstein (1977) used a variety of methods (no alternatives, one 
alternative, and two alternatives with half range and full range) to test the college 
students’ ability at assessing probability. They found that of the items which were 
assessed at probability of 1.0, only 72% to 83% were correct. Phillips and Wright (1977, 
and Wright & Phillips, 1980) found the same overconfidence in British undergraduate 
students and civil servants, and in Asian students and business managers.
Pitz (1974) also found that very difficult judgments produced most overconfidence. 
Lichtenstein and Fischhoff (1977) had asked subjects to do some essentially impossible 
tasks, such as discriminating between European and American handwriting, Asian and 
European children’s drawings, and rising and falling stock prices. They found that
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calibration curves did not rise at all; for all assessed probabilities, the proportion of 
correct alternatives chosen was close to 0.5. After using various other stimuli and 
manipulations that made the discriminations easier, they found much better performance. 
Christensen-Szalanski and Bushyhend (1981) reported nine physicians’ judgments of the 
probability of pneumonia for 1,531 patients who were examined because of a cough. 
They found that the calibration curve rose so slowly that for the highest confidence level 
(approximately 0.88), the proportion of patients actually having pneumonia was less than 
0.20. The similar overconfidence was also found by Lusted (1977), with diagnoses of skull 
fracture and pneumonia, and by Desmet, Fryback, and Thombury (1979), with diagnoses 
of skull fracture. In a much recent study, Yates, McDaniel and Brown (1991) have asked 
undergraduate and graduate students in finance courses to make probabilistic forecasts 
of the quarterly changes in the stock prices and earnings of publicly traded companies 
and found surprisingly inaccurate performance, which is consistent with the early result 
obtained by Stael von Holstein (1972). The graduates made even worse judgments than 
the undergraduates.
However, many encouraging results which showed good calibration were also reported. 
Murphy and Winkler’s study in weather forecasting is perhaps the most remarkable 
example (Murphy & Winkler, 1974). They found average deviations of only 0.028 from 
perfect calibration for credible interval temperature forecasts, more recent results (e.g. 
Murphy & Winkler, 1977) are even better. Sieber (1974) and Pitz (1974) found good 
calibration for students taking tests on the subject matter of their courses. Dowie (1976), 
studying the forecast prices printed daily by a sporting newspaper in Britain, reported 
good calibration of the forecasts for 29,307 horses with slight underconfidence. Fischhoff 
and Beyth (1975) asked 150 Israeli students to assess the probability of 15 then-future 
events, possible outcomes of President Nixon’s trip to China and Russia (e.g. "President 
Nixon will meet Mao at least once"). The resulting calibration curve was quite close to 
the identity line. Recently, Wright and Ayton (1986) also found that people could do 
better with future events than with general knowledge questions. Lusted et al. (1980), 
reporting a very large field study of probability judgments by emergency room attending 
physicians, found generally good calibration. Consensus judgments of probabilities that 
R & D projects would succeed show reasonable calibration (Balthasar, Boschi & Menke,
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1978), while probability distributions generated by groups of banking experts about future 
interest rates turned out to be nearly well calibrated, with some tendency toward 
underconfidence (Kabus, 1976). More recently, Keren (1987) found that expert bridge 
players were almost perfectly calibrated whereas amateurs were overconfident in 
assessing the likelihood that a final contract would be made (reached during the bidding 
phase). Vertinsky et al. (1986) asking members of a women’s field hockey team 
participating in a championship series to forecast scores, found that players generally 
attained a high level of calibration in their judgments.
The investigation about the human ability of making calibrated probability judgments still 
seems to be inconclusive. People sometimes can make perfectly calibrated probability 
judgments, but at other times they can also make very poor ones. The inconsistent 
experimental results have led researchers to speculate on the conditions under which 
people are able to make good probability judgments. Several aiding techniques have also 
been developed and tested aiming to assist people in making probability judgments. 
Recently, Phillips (1987) has identified several conditions which are required for the 
making of good probability judgments. For the maker of probability judgment, experts, 
or a group of experts if possible, should be employed. The characteristic of task should 
also be considered, and calibration could be better for some tasks, e.g. the future events. 
People’s probability judgments should also be elicited with proper techniques according 
to the situations. Training can help better probability judgments. Giving feedback 
(Lichtenstein & Fischhoff, 1980), or asking to provide clear reasons for judgments 
(Koriat, Lichtenstein & Fischhoff, 1980) can improve calibration. Even so, poorly 
calibrated probability judgments are still being reported from time to time, and the 
effectiveness of present aiding techniques is also far from being fully certified. Most 
importantly, the big obstacle in advancing calibration study remains: we still know little 
about the human cognitive processes in making probability judgments. There are only 
a few of researchers who have made efforts to explore this issue in previous study.
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Cognitive processes
From the experiments on calibration reviewed above, we could conclude that 
overconfidence is a pervasive bias of unaided intuitive probability judgment and under 
some conditions, human ability at assessing uncertainty can be improved. However, the 
underlying psychological processes are still unclear. To explain the results of these 
experiments, some researchers have explored how people develop and express feelings 
of uncertainty and certainty. Tversky and Kahneman (1974) argued that, as a result of 
limited information processing abilities, people rely on simplifying rules or heuristics. 
Although generally quite useful, these heuristics sometimes can lead to severe and 
systematic errors. For instance, when people are asked to make an estimate, they 
frequently anchor on an obvious or convenient number (e.g. the mean, the mode) and 
then adjust upward or downward if they feel it necessary to do so. The authors found 
that in probability judgments people frequently underadjust and thereby produce predict­
able biases in their numerical estimates. Inability to adjust estimates properly from the 
anchor values could lead to overconfidence. Overconfidence may also result from the 
availability effect, that is, people tend to estimate a higher probability for those events 
for which they can easily generate or recall instances. In the most familiar real world 
examples, extensive publicity about some atrocious crime or unusual disaster enhances 
lay judgment of the probability of the event.
Fischhoff, Slovic and Lichtenstein (1977), in explaining the "certainty illusion", have 
suggested two possible pathways to overconfidence. One is that people may be 
insufficiently critical of their inference processes. For instance, when people draw a few 
instances of a category from memory to get an idea of the properties of the category, 
they may not realize that readily available examples need not be representative of the 
category (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). They may also ignore the distinction stressed by 
Collins and colleagues (Collins et al., 1975) between open worlds where knowledge is 
incomplete, and closed world where the complete set of objects and relations is known, 
and apply the procedures and rules of inference which have been developed for dealing 
with closed worlds to produce an answer to a question of open world. Pitz (1974) also
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supposed that people tended to treat the results of inferential processes as though there 
was no uncertainty associated with the early stages of the inference.
Another pathway to overconfidence is that people believe that they are answering 
directly from memory without making any inferences. People commonly view their 
memories as exact (although perhaps faded) copies of their original experiences. 
However, considerable evidence has demonstrated that memory is more than just a 
copying process (e.g. Neisser, 1967). In his classic studies of reconstructive processes in 
memory, Bartlett (1932) first found that subjects not only created new material but were 
often highly certain about that which they had invented. According to this view, people 
reach conclusions about what they have seen or what they remember by reconstructing 
their knowledge from fragments of information, much as a paleontologist infers the ap­
pearance of a dinosaur from fragments of bone. During reconstruction, a variety of 
cognitive, social, and motivational factors can introduce error and distortion into the 
output of the process. The problems with eyewitness testimony indicate the generality 
and strength of this "certainty illusion" in memory recall (e.g. Loftus, 1974).
Therefore, if people are unaware of the reconstructive nature of memory and perception 
and cannot distinguish between assertions and inferences (Harris & Monaco, 1978), they 
will not critically evaluate their inferred knowledge. In general, any process that changes 
the contents of memory, unbeknownst to people themselves, will keep them from asking 
relevant validity questions and may lead to overconfidence.
Phillips and Wright (1977) proposed a three-stage serial model to distinguish people who 
tend naturally to think about uncertainty in a probabilistic way from those who respond 
in a more black-and-white fashion. According to this model, the cognitive processes of 
a person in answering a question follow three stages: first, he searches his memory to 
determine whether or not he knows the answer. If he thinks he knows, a certainty 
response (i.e. either a "Yes" or "No" answer or a probability estimate of 0 or 1) is given 
and the processes stop at Stage 1. If the answer is not known or he is not sure, possibly 
a non-probabilistic set is adopted leading him to a response consequent on a refusal to 
respond probabilistically (i.e. either a "Don’t know" answer or a 0.5 probability estimate)
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and the cognitive processes stop at Stage 2. While a probabilistic set is taken, this 
requires some discrimination of the degree of uncertainty, which may lead to a truly 
probabilistic response (i.e. either a probability estimate between 0 and 1 or a 
corresponding verbal expression) at Stage 3. Overconfidence which people showed when 
answering general knowledge questions may be accountable for failing to elaborate 
judgments to the third probabilistic processing stage (Wright & Wisudha, 1982).
Koriat, Lichtenstein and Fischhoff (1980) also took an information-processing approach. 
They conceptualized the confidence judgment task as having two cognitive stages. The 
first stage involves searching one’s knowledge; this stage ends when an answer is chosen. 
During the second stage the evidence is reviewed and confidence in the chosen 
alternative is assessed. They also suggested two biases in how people elicit and use their 
own knowledge. In the first stage, people tend to favour positive rather than negative 
evidence. Their subjects produced more positive reasons than negative, positive reasons 
also were given higher strength ratings. The bias against negative evidence found here 
is similar to the difficulties people have in accepting the relevance of negative evidence 
in logical inference tasks (Johnson-Laird & Wason, 1977) as well as the neglect of 
negative examples in judgments of correlation (e.g. Smedslund, 1963). In the second 
cognitive stage, people tend to disregard evidence inconsistent with (contradictory to) the 
chosen answer. They found that asking subjects to write a supporting reason did not 
affect their calibration (presumably because they were already thinking of these reasons), 
whereas asking them to write a contradicting reason did improve the realism of subjects’ 
confidence assessments. These two cognitive stages could be more clearly explained as 
three stages (Lichtenstein, Fischhoff & Phillips, 1982). First one searches one’s memory 
for relevant evidence. Next one assesses that evidence to arrive at a feeling of certainty 
or doubt. Finally, one translates the certainty feeling into a number.
Keren (1987), too, assumed that the process of generating confidence ratings, or 
probability judgments, is composed of two subprocesses. One is the process of (semantic) 
inference where a person builds a mental model of a situation based on a knowledge 
base (usually derived from his own experience), and uses this model to generate non- 
numerical feelings of certainty (e.g. Beyth-Marom, 1982). For instance, these feelings can
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be expressed as the plausibility of various conflicting scenarios that lead to different 
outcomes. The nature or quality of this process is mainly determined by two factors: one 
concerns the extent to which the initial mental model that is constructed is the proper 
one, and similarly that the appropriate inferential processes are employed. Proper mental 
model here means that a correct suitable "problem space" (Keren, 1984; Newell & 
Simon, 1972) for a given situation is adopted. The second factor affecting this process 
concerns the amount of data, based on experience, that is fed into the mental model. 
The second subprocess is one in which these feelings of plausibility and uncertainty are 
translated into numerical estimates, that is, into probabilities. Finally, Keren further 
assumed that for a subject to be "well calibrated" both processes must be "well tuned."
Levi and Prayor (1987), to identify the cognitive processes mediating the "availability 
heuristic", proposed two potential mediators, (1) imagery of the event itself and (2) 
perceived reasons or causes for the event. By using the 1984 presidential debate in the 
United States as a to-be-predicted event, they showed that debate predictions were 
affected by the availability of reasons but not by imagery of the outcome, i.e. Reagan or 
Mondale would win.
In the Einhom-Hogarth ambiguity model (Hogarth, 1987), people are also assumed to 
assess ambiguous probabilities by first anchoring onto some value of the probability and 
then adjusting this figure by mentally simulating or imaging other values that the prob­
ability could take. The net effect of this simulation process is then aggregated with the 
, anchor to reach an estimate. The assessment of uncertainty in conditions of ambiguity 
therefore involves a compromise between "what is" (i.e. the anchor which could be 
data-based) and "what might or could be" (i.e. the product of imagination). In practical 
situations, the anchor could be a figure suggested by experience, a third party (e.g. an 
expert), or simply one that is available (e.g. based on media reports). Two factors are 
assumed to affect the mental simulation process: (1) the amount of perceived ambiguity; 
and (2) one’s attitude toward ambiguity in the circumstances. Situations likely to be 
perceived as ambiguous are those where, for example, there is little causal knowledge 
about the process generating outcomes, data are scarce, or opinions conflict. Attitudes 
toward ambiguity in the circumstances is reflected in the mental simulation process by
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the extent to which probability values greater than the anchor are weighted in 
imagination more or less than those below. This attitude could, in turn, reflect personal 
factors, such as tendencies towards optimism or pessimism, as well as situational 
variables, e.g. the sign and size of outcomes or whether the context of the choice 
situation induces caution (as insurance) or playfulness (as in some forms of gambling).
22, Cross-cultural comparison of probabilistic thinking 
Cultural differences
In order to distinguish different cognitive processes in dealing with uncertainty, Phillips 
and Wright (1977) have proposed a conception of probabilistic thinking. By probabilistic 
thinking they mean the tendency to adopt a probabilistic set for the discrimination of 
uncertainty, and the ability to express the uncertainty meaningfully as a numerical 
probability.
In the recent years, some studies have compared accuracy of probability judgments 
between people raised in different cultures. In chapter 1 ,1 mentioned the cross-cultural 
comparisons made by Phillips and Wright between several groups of Hong Kong Chinese 
and British people. In their first experiment, Phillips and Wright (1977) found systematic 
cultural differences between the Chinese and the British in responding to general 
knowledge questions. It was reported that British were less extreme and better calibrated 
than the Chinese. For example, the British students used the probability of 100% about 
13 times. However, the average Chinese subjects used it 24 times. A few Chinese subjects 
even used only 100% and 50%. In the comparison of hit rate of 100% probability 
judgments, all the Chinese groups fell behind the British students by at least 10 per cent. 
Calibration curves for the pooled data of subjects in each group are shown in Figure 2.2. 
According to their three-stage serial model (see above), they supposed that the cognitive 
processes of the Chinese which were involved in answering a question generally stopped 
at the first or the second stage, thereby greater overconfidence emerged. Later they
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Figure 2.2. Calibration curves: British and Chinese people 
(Phillips & Wright, 1977)
found similar cultural differences between British and other Asian students, Malaysian 
and Indonesian (Wright et al., 1978).
In order to test the generality of these findings of cultural differences in probabilistic 
thinking, Wright and Phillips (1980) collected more data in a wide variety of Asian and 
British samples including Malaysian students, Indonesian students, British civil servants, 
Hong Kong managers, Indonesian managers and company directors. Their major 
conclusion from the study is that strong differences on the measures of probabilistic 
thinking exist between people raised within British and Asian cultures: these differences 
outweigh any influence of sub-culture, religion, occupation, arts/science orientation or 
sex, at least within the contexts studied. From the calibration curves showed in Figure
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2.3 and Figure 2.4, we can see similar cultural differences between the British civil 
servants and Indonesian and Hong Kong managers and between the British students and 
three Malaysian sub-cultural student groups. These Asian subjects also made much more 
extreme and less calibrated probability judgments than did their British counterparts. For 
example, in responding to the total of 75 general knowledge questions, the Hong Kong 
managers, on average, used 100% probability 37.9 times and the Indonesian businessmen 
37.05 times. However, the British civil servants made 100% probability judgments only 
20.9 times. From Figure 2.3, it can be seen that the percentages correct for the 100% 
probability judgments of the Hong Kong managers and the Indonesian businessmen are 
well below that of the British civil servants.
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Yates et al. (1989), in a rather recent study, also found similar cultural differences 
between Chinese, American and Japanese college students. Their experiments showed 
that Chinese students were more overconfident than American and Japanese students. 
In answering general knowledge questions, the Chinese made much more extreme 
probability judgments (approximately 48%) than other student groups. The calibration 
curves of these three student groups are shown in Figure 2.5. Moreover, they have 
generalized the findings to probability distribution judgments for various quantities, such 
as, the length of the Yangtze River, minimum temperature recorded in Guangzhou (or 
Miami) a few days hence, and so on. The most important new finding, as the researchers
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stated, was that the calibration difference was complemented by a discrimination 
difference according to the overall accuracy of probability judgment. In particular, the 
Chinese students’ judgments about their answers to general knowledge questions were 
fairly good with respect to their ability to distinguish occasions when those answers were 
correct from occasions when they were not.
Lichtenstein and Fischhoff (1977) have considered that a flat (horizontal) calibration 
curve shows no resolution (or discrimination as Yates et al. used); a steep curve shows 
good resolution. However, in Figure 2.5, even though the calibration curve of the 
American students is steeper than that of the Chinese students, the discrimination score
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of the American students is less than that of the Chinese students. In fact, there are two 
factors deciding a discrimination score: hit-rate (proportion correct) and weight (n/N), 
while a calibration curve describes only the relation between hit-rate and assessed 
probability. When the overall hit-rate c is fixed, the more extreme and calibrated 
probabilities are given, the greater the discrimination score is. Therefore, the higher 
discrimination score of the Chinese students to a great extent is a result of giving more 
extreme probability judgments and not bad hit-rate (see the resolution score explained 
above). Strictly speaking, the cultural difference found in the study of Yates et al. is that 
Chinese had a tendency to make extreme probability judgments in comparison with their 
American counterparts. Actually, provided the Chinese make less extreme probabilities 
(100% judgments), even randomly, the differences would disappear.
From the experiment results of cross-cultural comparison studies reviewed above, it could 
be supposed that the Chinese and American students have different preferences for two 
characteristics of probability judgment: extremeness and calibration (von Winterfeldt & 
Edwards, 1986). Extreme probabilities could give far more useful guidance about what 
to expect, whereas calibrated probabilities may allow more subtle comparison and 
balance among possible outcomes. Unfortunately, calibration and extremeness pull in 
opposite directions. It could be supposed that a stronger desire for extremeness probably 
may lead the Chinese students to obtain higher discrimination between extreme states 
at the cost of decreasing calibration, whereas a stronger desire for calibration may lead 
the British and the American students to be better calibrated at the cost of losing more 
useful information.
It is also worthy of mention that in the study of Yates et al., the Chinese students still 
showed more overconfidence when making probability judgments about various 
quantities, of which a half are then-future items. However, when Wright and Wisudha 
(1982) asked Indonesian undergraduates to answer 10 two-alternative future event 
questions designed by content to be specifically relevant to the Indonesian samples (e.g. 
"When will the Cengkareng airport be operational? (a) before the end of 1978, (b) after 
the end of 1978"), they found that these students obtained a great improvement in
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calibration. The inconsistency may account for that they used different experiment 
material (quantity and event) and eliciting techniques.
Cultural interpretations
To explain the cultural and individual differences, some researchers have supposed a 
variety of causal relationships between people’s performance in dealing with probabilistic 
tasks and their cultural backgrounds. In chapter 1, I discussed the point of view of 
Phillips and Wright, which is representative of research in the West. In their early studies 
(Phillips & Wright, 1977; Wright et al., 1978), they strongly suggested a causal relation 
between non-probabilistic thinking and the "fate-orientation" of a culture, and supposed 
that the Chinese fatalistic world-view than the British Laplacean probabilistic world-view 
were more likely to lead to overconfidence in making probability judgments. It is very 
natural to suppose such a relation. Indeed, Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (1961) have 
pointed out, harmony with nature rather than subjugation of nature seems to have been 
the dominant orientation in many periods of Chinese history. And, Zhuang Tze, a 
Chinese ancient philosopher argued, "The winds as they blow differ in thousands of ways, 
yet all are self-produced. Why should there be any other agency to excite them?" In 
Chinese Taoists’ opinion, nature means what is spontaneous. However, for the reasons 
given in the previous chapter, I have questioned general soundness of such explanation.
Wright and Phillips (1980) have also supposed that an adoption of Kluckhohn and 
Strodtbeck’s (1961) value orientation concept into a questionnaire form might be one 
way to test whether these cultural differences in probabilistic thinking are accountable 
in terms of the relatively general "fatalism" of Asian culture. However, the results of 
several previous studies using Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck’s original questionnaire or a 
newly derived one (Chang, 1959; Lin, 1978; Liu, 1966; Yang & Chang, 1975) provided 
little supportive data. Yang (1986), in a recent review, has argued that the value 
orientations of Chinese students have become rather similar to those of American 
students as reported in studies by Green (1979) and Nordlie (1968). In Taiwan and Hong 
Kong, it was found that the Chinese students’ dominant value orientations on relational 
and time were individualism and future. These orientation patterns are at variance with
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the traditional image of Chinese as a people who typically had a collectivistic and 
hierarchical (linear) emphasis in human relationships and a past emphasis in time 
perspective.
As for the man-nature value orientation, Liu (1966) reported that most students in Hong 
Kong valued a submission-to-nature orientation. However, more recently, Lin (1978) and 
Yang and Chang (1975) found that Chinese students were predominantly inclined toward 
a mastery-over-nature orientation. It seems that Lin’s 1962 Hong Kong students were 
distinctly traditional in this regard, whereas, more than ten years later, Liu’s and Yang 
and Chang’s Taiwan students tended to be moving away from this traditional 
characteristic to such an extent that their dominant man-nature orientation was rather 
similar to that of American students (Nordlie, 1968). It is not clear, however, whether 
this disparity should be attributed to differences in the type of Chinese society or to 
social changes over a period of more than ten years.
Bond (1980) and Hoosain (1986) suggested that the findings of cultural difference in 
calibration study could be understood in terms of the socialization and upbringing of the 
Chinese, related to other aspects of cognitive style, such as field dependence. Field 
independence is the ability to separate a perceived item from its context (Witkin et al., 
1962). A field-dependent person tends to be global. For instance, in the Rod and Frame 
test, the ability of subjects to see the rod as horizontal or vertical, without being affected 
by the orientation of the surrounding frame is measured (see Dawson, Young, & Choi, 
1973). Witkin et al. (1979) found that field independence is related to socialization. 
Societies that encourage autonomy from societal and parental authority in young children 
tend to produce people who show more differentiated functioning, whereas 
encouragement of obedience and parental authority are associated with the development 
of less differentiated functioning. In general, Chinese socialization patterns are 
considered as conforming to the strict authoritarian variety. It has been reported that 
Chinese parents exercise more severe discipline than Americans (Scofield & Sun, 1960). 
The Chinese also emphasize mutual dependence within the family more than American 
(Ando, 1965). Chinese children are taught to see things in terms of interrelations, more 
tradition oriented, and live under their ancestors’ shadow (Hsu, 1967).
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Yang (1981) distinguished between self or individual orientation and social orientation 
societies. He proposed that Americans may be taken to represent self-orientation and 
the Chinese social orientation. The Chinese are brought up to remain an integral part 
of their families throughout their lives, instead of being trained to function independently 
of the family network. Authoritarianism, parental control, and norms of loyalty would be 
characteristics of the socially oriented society, with its related cognitive styles. The lower 
differentiation of uncertainty can be related to social orientation. In such cultures, there 
is less initiative to act independently and less perceived capacity to influence events and 
therefore less opportunity to exercise the capacity to assess the outcome of such events.
Boey (1976) investigated the relationship between cognitive complexity and rigidity, and 
at parental attitudes amongst Chinese subjects studying at a post-secondary college in 
Hong Kong. Cognitive complexity refers to the number of differentiated dimensions a 
person has in perceiving or constructing the stimuli in a given domain. A person with 
greater cognitive complexity is able to see more aspects and relations in any perceptual 
situation. Rigidity, on the other hand, refers to the persistence of a response or a 
response set when the demands of the situation have already been changed. Three 
domains of performance were included: interpersonal, physical and numerical. Subjects 
were also asked to complete a Filial Piety Scale, which measured authoritarian control. 
With the Parental Attitude Scale, it was found that overprotection and overcontrol by 
the mother were related to cognitive simplicity in the interpersonal domain, but not 
related to the other two domains. Overcontrol and harshness by the father, and the 
extent to which the father emphasized hardship and repayment of the parents’ kindness, 
were also related to cognitive simplicity in the interpersonal domain. The father’s rigid 
orientation and discouragement of contradictory opinions were related to cognitive 
simplicity in the physical domain. The parents’ attitudes towards filial piety, particularly 
that of the father, were all positively correlated with rigidity of the subjects as well as 
cognitive simplicity in the various domains. Not all of these correlations were statistically 
significant, but they were consistent in the direction indicated. There was some tendency 
for the subjects’ own attitude towards filial piety to be related to cognitive simplicity, but 
these relations were not significant. In sum, Boey’s findings showed that the father’s at­
titudes and authoritarian control have a marked influence on the development of rigidity
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in the subject’s personality and the related lack of cognitive complexity. The general 
findings of Boey were collaborated by Chan (1979). He examined performance in four 
areas (verbal, non-verbal, numerical, and general intelligence), and found similar 
correlations with parental control as rated by the subjects.
Yates et al.(1989), according to their findings, argued that the results for the Japanese 
subjects indicated that a simple cultural explanation might be untenable. Instead, the 
differences perhaps rest equally, if not more heavily, on the subject’s current 
socioeconomic situation. For instance, technologically oriented societies, such as those 
in Britain, Japan, and the United States, might demand more attention to the kind of 
precision represented by good calibration. They supposed that the good discrimination 
which the Chinese had in making probability judgments is a reflection of the pervading 
demands of the society. Good discrimination is possible only if the person reporting 
judgments fundamentally "knows” what is or is not going to happen. It is conceivable that 
the reward structure in Chinese society is more generous for outstanding discrimination 
than it is for proper numerical labelling, e.g. calibration. However, this interpretation 
perhaps is also untenable for the case of Hong Kong students, because Hong Kong is a 
developed economic area and is one of the "four Asian little dragons".
Several studies (Wright, 1985) suggested that some personality traits are related to 
people’s probability judgment. Personality as defined by Guilford (1959) is "the 
interactive aggregate of personal characteristics that influence the individuals’ response 
to the environment." For instance, the people who are high scorers on scales measuring 
authoritarianism, and intolerance of ambiguity tend to see the world in "black and white", 
and more likely to make extreme responses (Souief, 1958). As Bochner (1965) notes, the 
primary characteristics of an individual who is intolerant of ambiguity are "premature 
closure" and "need for certainty". Rokeach (1960) also noted that there was "relatively 
little differentiation within the disbelief system" of the high Dogmatism-scale-scoring 
person.
From these orthodox conceptualizations of the personality/cognitive measures, Wright 
and Phillips (1979) anticipated strong relationships with their own measures of
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probability judgment that evaluated the tendency to use numeric probabilities or 
certainty judgments in response to questions concerning uncertain situations and the 
realism or calibration of the numeric judgments used. They found that high-scale scoring 
authoritarianism was related to poor calibration with 100% judgments and to a less fine 
discrimination in probability assessed numerically, which is shown by small usage of 
intermediate probabilities. Also, dogmatic individuals were less likely to say that they did 
not know the answer.
In several comparative studies, it was found that the Chinese people had higher 
authoritarian tendency than their Western counterparts. Singh, Huang, and Thompson 
(1962) in their comparative study of Chinese, American, and Indian students found that 
Chinese scored much higher than their American counterparts on authoritarianism as 
measured by Sanford and Older’s (1950) Authoritarian/Equalitarian Scale. In another 
study, Meade and Whittaker (1967) gave the English version of the California Fascism 
Scale to 62 Chinese university students from Hong Kong and five other groups of 
students of comparable sample size from India, Brazil, Arabia, Rhodesia, and the United 
States. The Chinese also gave much higher scores than the Americans. Relevant data 
were also reported in a study by Earl (1969), who administered Rokeach’s (1960) 
Dogmatism Scale in both Chinese and English to 101 Chinese students at the University 
of Hong Kong and an English version of the same scale to 82 British university students. 
The results revealed that the Hong Kong mean scores on both language versions were 
higher than the British mean score. Since dogmatism is conceptually and empirically 
related to authoritarianism, Earl’s finding may be interpreted as indicating that the 
Chinese group was higher on authoritarianism than the British. All three studies support 
its view.
The Chinese authoritarianism may also be inferred from a study by Ho and Lee (1974) 
with 135 Taiwan teachers as subjects. These researchers gave adult Chinese not only a 
Chinese version of the Fascism Scale but also a scale of attitudes towards filial piety, and 
obtained a moderately positive correlation between authoritarianism and filial piety. 
Since Chinese people have long been known for their extremely strong sense of filial 
piety, it may be inferred from this substantial correlation that they are also high in their
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authoritarian attitudes. Furthermore, since both authoritarianism and filial piety 
presumably involve traditionalism, Ho and Lee’s finding seems to suggest that 
socialization factors responsible for the formation of attitudes of filial piety might also 
be responsible for the formation of authoritarian attitudes.
"Uncertainty avoidance", is also possibly related to people’s different preferences for 
extreme or calibrated probability. Uncertainty avoidance has been identified by Hofstede 
(1980) as a dimension of national culture, which is concerned with "the extent to which 
a society feels threatened by uncertain and ambiguous situations". Hofstede’s study 
showed that the British subjects have lower UAI (Uncertainty Avoidance Index) score, 
that is, they have less difficulty in accepting ambiguity. The UAI for each of the 40 
countries was compiled on the basis of the country mean scores for three question about 
rule orientation, employment and stress. However, according to the results, Philippines, 
Hong Kong and Singapore all have lower UAI scores, this fact couldn’t be used to 
explain the finding that the students and managers of those countries or region have 
lower calibrating ability than the British students and mangers in previous studies 
(Wright & Phillips, 1980). It would be interpreted as that the three questions were 
designed for the international management research, yet are not suitable to the research 
of probabilistic thinking.
It was suggested that Chinese culture is a cautious culture, whereas ambiguity is related 
to risk, thus "risk absorbing" or "uncertainty avoidance" probably is a characteristic of 
Chinese society. They attach more attention to existing conditions, concrete information 
and flexible response. For example, Sun Tzu (Griffith, 1963) believed that skilful warriors 
first should make themselves invincible and await the enemy’s moment of vulnerability, 
because invincibility depends on one’s self; the enemy’s vulnerability on himself. It 
follows that those skilled in war can make themselves invincible but cannot cause an 
enemy to become vulnerable. This seems to be a strategy to avoid losing. Also, from the 
points of view of some Western scientists mentioned above, the Chinese don’t seem to 
be accustomed to take decisions under uncertain conditions. A demand for certainty 
would lead to the preference of extremeness of probability judgment, almost either 
totally certain or totally uncertain. Yet, the Western way of making decisions,
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decomposition and recomposition, careful balanced between outcomes and possibility, 
certainly needs calibrated probability judgments.
2.3. Discussion
Most of the studies reviewed above illustrate that making probability judgments is a 
rather difficult task and people’s performance is far from perfect. Reaching a probability 
judgment from a person’s feelings of uncertainty basically depends on the person’s 
intuition. It is still unclear how people differentiate the degree of their feelings about 
uncertain events or quantities and translate the feelings of uncertainty into probabilities. 
For instance, even though after being given several training sessions, Lichtenstein and 
Fischhoffs subjects were still rarely able to describe their cognitions in detail 
(Lichtenstein & Fischhoff, 1980). A typical report was:"I don’t know how to verbalize it, 
but there’s some kind of a compartmentalization trip that’s happening in my head about 
those categories. I’m beginning to feel the categories more than I did before, rather than 
just a blur from 0.5 on." It seems to suggest that translating feelings of uncertainty into 
numbers is not a spontaneous process for human beings. In spite of this, some studies 
have described several probable cognitive subprocesses that may be involved in making 
probability judgments. Seeking relevant evidence, assessing the evidence and translating 
feelings of uncertainty into a number may be three major steps which people often follow 
in probability judgment. Overconfidence can come from any of these three steps. 
Overestimating accuracy of memory, applying inappropriate inference rules and inability 
to translate feelings of uncertainty meaningfully into numbers, all can cause overcon­
fidence. The results of some studies also suggested that overconfidence might result from 
people’s underestimating the degree of difficulty in probabilistic tasks. A  glaring example 
is perhaps Lichtenstein and Fischhoffs task of discriminating between European and 
American handwriting and European and Asian children’s drawings. To the subjects, 
these tasks might seem very simple and the judgments easy to make at first glance. 
However, they were much more difficult than the subjects had perceived. If people 
cannot perceive difficulty of a task as it appears to them, then overconfidence is 
obviously unavoidable. The studies about people’s psychological processes of developing 
and expressing feelings of uncertainty are very significant for improving probability
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judgment. However, studies are still limited in this aspect. It is farfetched to speak of that 
we have understood how people make probability judgments.
Some of the studies also revealed that the cognitive mechanisms involving probability 
judgment also differed with the characteristics of tasks. To be able to evaluate the 
probability judgments immediately, most of the calibration studies used general 
knowledge questionnaires. An important characteristic of a general knowledge 
questionnaire is its form of choice. As there is certainly a 100 percent correct answer in 
the two (or more) alternatives, subjects need only recall and seek probable evidence to 
affirm or negate one of the answers. Overconfidence about the accuracy of memory 
recall and the guessing strategy may be major factors that lead people to be 
overconfident in answering general knowledge questions. As there is no certain correct 
answer when subjects answer questions in a future event questionnaire, "only a fool or 
a clairvoyant tries to predict the future with total confidence" (Wright & Wisudha, 1982). 
In answering a future event question, the accuracy of memory recall is less important. 
The imagination of possible outcomes and reasoning about cause-effect relationships are 
explicitly involved. Some studies have showed that people were better calibrated in 
answering future event questions than in answering general knowledge questions. It 
suggested that results of studies of probability judgments that have utilized general 
knowledge questions may not be generalised to the probability judgment about future 
events.
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Chapter 3. Probabilistic Thinking and Decision Making Style
3.1. Introduction
In the previous chapter, I have reviewed several recent cross-cultural studies in 
probabilistic thinking and argued that the main differences demonstrated in the 
experiments are that some groups of Western and Asian people have different 
preferences for the two characteristics of probability: extremeness and calibration. In 
making probability judgments, Asian people may feel extreme probabilities more useful, 
while Western people may consider calibrated probabilities more valuable. In chapter 
1 ,1 have stressed their consequences for the application of decision analysis techniques 
and information technology. From the discussion in chapter 2, we also have seen that 
several scholars have attempted to relate the differences in probabilistic thinking to some 
cultural aspects which are believed to have major influence on shaping the manner of 
probabilistic thinking, such as social orientation, value orientation and socialization 
patterns. Individual socioeconomic situations are also argued to have parallel influence 
on probability judgment. However, there are still many questions which need more 
intensive study. The finding of cultural differences in probabilistic thinking between 
Western and Asian people in the case of the People’s Republic of China has, until 
recently, been based on only a small number of samples, and so this should be examined 
further. It is also not clear whether and how cultures influence people’s probabilistic 
thinking, even though some possible cultural explanations have been suggested. More 
theoretical and experimental studies are required and they will be helpful in revealing 
certain relationships between culture and probabilistic thinking. In most of the previous 
experiments, general knowledge questionnaires were mainly used as instruments to create 
a feeling of uncertainty among the subjects. The generalization of the findings of cultural 
differences in probabilistic thinking from such an artificial environment cannot be taken 
for granted. Cultural differences must be investigated in other uncertain situations. In 
this chapter, I will begin to examine some of the problems and a series pf results of 
experiments will be presented and explained.
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Culture and cognition
The lack of an adequate definition of culture is one of the methodological problems in 
cross-cultural research of probabilistic thinking. Culture has been defined in so many 
ways that one can find 164 definitions in Kroeber and Kluckhohn’s (1952) review of 
concepts, and new ones still keep on appearing. However, many of these definitions, as 
argued by Ronen (1986), are not precise enough to allow adequate operationalization 
of culture, although they may capture the essence of what culture is and how it influences 
behaviour. Various explanations for the cultural differences in probabilistic thinking is 
evidence of the confusion in definitions of culture. Thus, a general definition is 
insufficient when a study focuses on the specific context of behaviour of dealing with 
uncertainty. Even though some cultural variables can be drawn from such definitions of 
culture, their relationships with decision behaviour under uncertainty may be remote or 
indirect. For a specific variable, it may also be more or less important under varying 
situations of uncertainty. Redding and Wong (1986), in the similar line of argument, 
point out that many anthropological definitions of culture are too all-embracing, and may 
not be very fruitful in identifying the basic differences between cultures, nor for studying 
their impact on managerial behaviour. They suggest that recent rethinking on culture has 
tended to confine this concept within cognitive domain, and argue that confining culture 
here, within Keesing’s (1974) "rules of the game" or Hofstede’s (1980) "collective 
programming of the mind", permits theoretical progress as it may sponsor more focusing 
of research.
Cognition, as an important aspect of culture, should not be ignored and many cultural 
differences in decision making behaviour could expect to be explained clearer in this 
more basic layer. Redding and Martyn-Johns (1979, and see also Redding, 1980) consider 
that in constructing and understanding reality, people develop paradigms, or cognitive 
systems, which then affect their managerial process. They propose a three-stage model 
to describe the development process of paradigms. According to this model, information 
is selected and interpreted in the first cognition process - the perception process. The 
information extracted through perception then enters into the second cognitive process 
of imagination, thinking, reasoning and decision making. The results of this stage are a
60
set of paradigms which are relatively stable over time. In consequence, cultural 
differences in managerial behaviour may be due to the fact that people in different 
cultural circumstances tend to develop different paradigms. By following Maruyama 
(1974), they further distinguish between a uni-directional causal paradigm and a mutual 
causal paradigm and argue that the former is typically found in Western societies while 
the latter is characteristic of Oriental society. They emphasize that one of the important 
differences between the two paradigms is that Oriental cultures have a less-differentiated 
view of reality than Western culture. They also speculate on the causal factors leading 
to the different paradigms of probability, and argue that the logical Western mind values 
predictions by extrapolation and believes that the future can be "calculated” to some 
extent, while the Chinese mind might well take a "fatalistic" view of the future and, 
consequently, be less prone to fine calculation.
In calibration studies, the cognitive processes have also drawn research attention for a 
number of years. In a review, Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, and Phillips (1982) have recognized 
that a striking aspect of much of the literature in the field of calibration study is its "dust- 
bowl empiricism" and stressed the importance of studying the cognitive process of making 
probability judgments. Some researchers have also proposed several information- 
processing models to describe the cognitive processes of making probability judgments, 
which are similar to Redding and Martyn-Johns’ three-stage model (see Chapter 2). So, 
in this sense, Redding and Martyn-Johns’ model may be seen as an extension to the 
cross-cultural study of probabilistic thinking. For cross-cultural study, this model may be 
more helpful as it emphasizes the cultural effect on shaping the paradigm of probability 
and enhances better understanding of how culture influences probabilistic thinking. 
However, Redding and Martyn-Johns did not further describe how culture influence the 
development of paradigms of probability using their own model, and simply accepted 
Phillips and Wright’s (1977) tentative speculation of a fatalistic causal system within 
Chinese culture. As it has been argued, fatalism may be one of the factors which affect 
probabilistic thinking, but its relationship is not very obvious or direct, especially for the 
case in which a general-knowledge questionnaire is used as a probabilistic task. Even so, 
these arguments do suggest that cultural influences on probabilistic thinking should be
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further investigated in a more basic layer, the cognitive processes in making probability 
judgments to see how culture affects the development of the paradigm of probability.
In a recent study, Tricker (1988) has stressed the cultural impact on the process of 
transformation from data to information on the basis of the studies of Chinese and 
Western cultures. It was argued,"... Chinese and Western perceptions of business differ. 
Consequently the information perceived by decision makers differs; and so must the need 
for data to inform. In other words, information is culturally influenced: perceptions are 
culturally determined. In the vernacular - \vhat one believes affects what one sees’. Even 
the data we choose to capture, store, and retrieve is not value-free; our paradigms 
determine the patterns we preserve - and those we choose to ignore". Here, Tricker 
emphasizes cultural impact more on information acquisition; that is, people obtain 
information of value from a stream of data which is influenced by the cultural context. 
However, in this study I argue that Chinese and Western cultures may have cultivated 
and shaped dissimilar patterns of information processing. Chinese and Western people 
are accustomed to their own patterns of comprehending reality and solving problems. In 
the comparative study of culture, many scholars have identified a number of differences 
between Chinese and Western people in their way of thinking, which strongly suggest 
that there are cultural differences in the patterns of cognition or information processing 
(see chapter 1). Therefore, if we look at making probability judgments as an information 
process, the cultural differences found between the Chinese and the Western people in 
probabilistic thinking should be reflected in their patterns of information processing.
Cognitive style method
Several recent investigations have suggested that exploring some specific psychological 
factors of cognitive processes in making probability judgments is one way of examining 
the cultural differences in probabilistic thinking. For example, Fischhoff, Slovic and 
Lichtenstein (1977) have explained that the overconfidence phenomena revealed in 
calibration studies might be produced from reconstruction of memory and inference 
processes. Koriat, Lichtenstein and Fischhoff (1980) have demonstrated the effects of 
positive or negative evidence on evaluation of the knowledge which subjects search for
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in their memory when answering general knowledge questionnaires. Levi and Prayor 
(1987) have also made an effort to identify the cognitive processes mediating the 
availability heuristic and showed that probability judgments were affected by the 
availability of causally significant reasons or information, rather than imagery of the 
outcome. Apparently, a cross-cultural study can follow a similar way to inspect whether 
cultural differences in probabilistic thinking are related to the characteristics of some 
particular cognitive aspects involved in making probability judgments, such as, memory, 
reasoning, imagination, and so on.
Nevertheless, the growing interest in the study of cognitive style may also suggest an 
alternative way to trace the behaviourial differences in dealing with uncertainty to the 
habitual approaches which people may employ consciously or unconsciously in making 
judgments or decisions. The cognitive style method emphasizes the decision making 
process and observes the decision making behaviour mainly as a personality variable, 
namely cognitive style (Keen & Scott-Morton, 1978). Ramaprasad (1987) has also 
featured the differences between cognitive process and cognitive style research and 
expounded, "Cognitive process research focuses on specific influences on a person’s 
cognitive information processing. Its focus is micro on the elements of a person’s 
cognitive information processing, these are, for example: perceiving and recognizing 
stimuli, remembering and searching information, inducing rules, recognizing patterns, 
formulating concepts, and applying all these in sensing, formulating, and solving 
problems. Cognitive style research, on the other hand, focuses on general influences on 
a person’s cognitive information processing. Its focus is macro, on the architecture of a 
person’s cognitive information processing.” Similarly, Haley and Stumpf (1989) have 
contended, "Studies on personality types also bypass some problems that traditional 
cognition studies may pose: personality-type preferences provide more integrated views 
of the behaviour of executives than studies focusing on single psychological dimensions." 
As it has been argued, the processes in which people make probability judgments still 
remain veiled and presumably people’s judgment can be biased by diverse factors in 
many ways. So, previous arguments intimate that the cognitive style method may have 
an advantage as it attempts to capture the habitual ways which people may employ in 
traversing the whole cognitive processes when approaching a probability judgment, rather
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than to concentrate on single cognitive aspects. To understand the cognitive style 
method, a brief review is given in the following paragraphs.
Review of cognitive style study
Many researchers in different disciplines have developed various frameworks to capture 
the dispositions of decision makers in perceiving information, generating alternatives, and 
making a choice between available alternatives. In management research, an early 
classification of cognitive style can be found in Barnard’s (1938) essay "Mind in Everyday 
Affairs", published as an appendix to his Functions of the Executive. Barnard contrasts 
the logical and non-logical processes in decision making, and expounds, "By ‘logical 
processes’ I mean conscious thinking which could be expressed in words or by other 
symbols, that is, reasoning. By ‘non-logical processes’ I mean those not capable of being 
expressed in words or as reasoning, which are only made known by a judgment, decision 
or action." In Barnard’s view, an executive relies on intuition or judgment as well as on 
rational analysis to make decisions. Although Barnard characterized the differences 
between logical and judgmental styles of decision making, he did not further explicate 
how to make a formal distinction.
Huysmans (1970) has distinguished between two cognitive styles according to the "way 
of reasoning", which are called "analytic" and "heuristic", in an experiment aiming to 
examine whether the cognitive style of the adopting manager constrains the actual use 
or implementation of management science recommendations. Individuals of analytic 
reasoning tend to simplify problem situations to a set of underlying causal relationships 
in order to model a decision problem. An explicit model, often in a quantitative form, 
built up on the basis of these causal relationships and other decision parameters, is used 
to choose among alternative courses of action and find an optimal solution. Individuals 
of heuristic reasoning emphasize pragmatic solutions to total problem situations rather 
than optimal solutions to simplified problems. They rely on searching for analogies with 
familiar solved problems to find solutions. Common sense, intuition, and unquantified 
"feelings" about future developments play an important role for the heuristic decision 
makers. Huysmans measured the cognitive styles of the subjects through observing their
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behaviour in solving two analytic puzzles and a business case with no strict analytic 
solution.
McKenney and Keen (1974) have also developed a model of cognitive style to classify 
individuals along two dimensions: information gathering and information processing. 
Information gathering concerns the perceptual processes by which the mind organizes 
verbal and visual stimuli. At one extreme of this dimension, perceptive individuals focus 
on relationships between data items and look for cues in attempt to grasp the pattern of 
the problem. Data are filtered by their preconceptions. At the other extreme, receptive 
individuals focus on details of data rather than relationships. They are sensitive to the 
stimulus itself and tend to examine directly the attributes of the information.
Information evaluation refers to individual’s sequence of analysis of data. At one 
extreme, systematic individuals tend to follow a structured approach which leads to a 
likely solution. At the other extreme, intuitive individuals do not commit themselves to 
any one single method and tend to use trial-and-error strategies. They respond to the 
cues that they may not be able to identify verbally.
Adopting the notion of an "information complex", Driver and Mock (1975) have 
proposed a cognitive style model of two dimensions in terms of the amount of 
information used and the use of a single or multiple focus. A minimal data user is 
satisfied with just enough data to make a decision. A maximal data user, on the other 
hand, tends to process all the data which are perceived to be of use for the decision. 
There are also two extremes of focus dimension. At one extreme are individuals who 
view all data leading to a single solution, whereas at the other extreme are individuals 
who view solutions as multiple. Combining these two dimensions, Driver and Mock 
derived four independent styles: decisive style (single focus, low usage), flexible style 
(multiple focus, low usage), hierarchic style (single focus, high usage) and integrative 
style (multiple focus, high usage).
In the research of cognitive style, a more widely accepted framework perhaps is the 
Jungian typology (Jung, 1971). Following Jung, several researchers have developed
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similar models of cognitive or decision style and the instruments which operationalized 
Jungian typology, particularly the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator - M BU  (Myers & 
McCaulley, 1985), have also been extensively applied to the investigation of cognitive 
style.
Jung’s (1971) psychological type theory, in essence, is based on the belief that much 
apparently random variation in human behaviour is actually quite orderly and consistent, 
which is due to the basic differences in the way that individuals perceive or acquire 
information and make decisions or judgments. Information acquisition and decision 
making form two fundamental dimensions in Jung’s categories. Jung characterized two 
opposite preferences in information acquisition, sensation (S) and intuition (N). 
Individuals who prefer sensation perception apprehend realities of a situation or a 
problem as they actually are in the present moment. They search for facts, evidence, and 
detailed information. Their perception primarily relies on the five senses. In contrast, 
individuals who prefer intuition perception focus on possibilities, relationships and 
insights which go beyond what is actually perceived. While sensing individuals 
concentrate on particularity of a situation, they concentrate on its totality. They value 
imagination, inspiration and holistic information.
Jung also identifies two opposite ways of making decisions or judgments after 
information perception, thinking (T) and feeling (F). Thinking individuals tend to 
approach a decision or judgment along the way of logical analysis. They prefer to make 
decisions objectively and on the basis of cause and effect. Feeling individuals, on the 
other hand, consider social and personal values as more important and tend to decide 
subjectively.
As the two ways of acquiring information and the two ways of making decisions are 
considered to be independent, they can be combined into four basic styles: Sensation- 
Thinking (ST), Sensation-Feeling (SF), Intuition-Thinking (NT), and Intuition-Feeling 
(NF). Jung also emphasized that each style had its own strengths and limitations and this 
classification did not, in any sense, imply superiority or inferiority of cognitive style.
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In addition to the two major dimensions, Jung has also described two opposite 
preferences according to the world where people like to focus their attention, called as 
extraversion (E) and introversion (I). Extravert individuals tend to focus on the outer 
world of people and external environment, while introvert individuals concentrate on 
their inner world of ideas and concepts. In developing the MBTI, Myers and Briggs also 
made explicit differentiation between two preferences for the way of dealing with the 
external world: judgment (either thinking or feeling) and perception (either sensation or 
intuition), which were implied in Jung’s work. Individuals taking a judgmental (J) 
attitude, are thought to tend to make a decision quickly and clearly. Their perception is 
shut off as soon as they believe they have got enough information. In contrast, individuals 
adopting a perceptive (P) attitude, prefer to adapt to observed notions of reality. They 
like to keep their options open, aiming to miss nothing.
Most of the studies using the MBTI employed only the two basic dimensions in their 
models of cognition style, perhaps because it was believed that the two, information 
acquisition and decision making, were that was mostly needed to understand the 
cognition processes and because of the need of simplicity in experimental study. Mason 
and Mitroff (1973), for example, suggested a model to categorize cognitive style of a 
person along the two basic dimensions of Jung’s system. However, Nutt (1986a) argued, 
"Traditionally, management theorists have used the MBTI scales that measure 
preferences for acquiring and processing data to define what can be termed a ‘choice 
frame’. The choice frame provided a window through which to view the cognitive make­
up of managers, which has proved to be insightful in its ability to illuminate distinct styles 
of choice making. This formulation, however, excludes half of the classification categories 
that Jung considered important, fails to deal with the sequential nature of choice making, 
and does not account for implementation preferences implicit in Jungian theory." Nutt 
proposed a model of two frames, choice and action frames, which draws on all of the 
Jungian categories. The choice frame concerns individual’s preferences for the way of 
information perception (Sensation or iNtuition) and information evaluation (Thinking 
or Feeling), while the action frame pertains to an individual’s predisposition for action 
focus (Extraversion or Introversion) and preferred action type (Judging or Perceiving). 
By combining the four dimensions, Nutt derived 16 decision making styles in total:
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procedural (ESTJ), evaluative (ENTJ), ordered (ISTJ), intellectual (INTP), political 
(ESFJ), mediator (ENFJ), flexible (ISFP), committed (INFP), traditional (ESTP), 
relational (ESFP), empirical (ISTF), anecdotal (ISFJ), visionary (ENTP), proselytizing 
(ENFP), iconoclast (INTJ), and cooperative (INFJ) styles.
Many investigators have made efforts to relate some differences in decision behaviour 
to the cognitive style of decision makers. The performance of people of different 
cognitive styles have also been compared. In such studies, the MBTI was often used to 
measure the cognitive or decision style of the decision makers. Casey (1980) used the 
abridged version of the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator to discriminate decision styles. He 
considered that individuals categorized as "sensors” preferred to analyze isolated, 
concrete details in making a decision, whereas "intuitors" focused on relationships, or 
gestalt. In Casey’s study, bank loan officers made "predictions" of the possible corporate 
failure for each of 30 firms based on the information contained in sue financial ratios, 
such as net income/total assets for each firm. The ratios were real ones, belonging to 15 
firms that had already filed for bankruptcy and to 15 randomly chosen non-bankrupt 
firms. Casey confirmed his hypothesis that Jung’s information-processing styles were 
related to the performance on his task as he found significant association between overall 
accuracy and subject classification on the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator. As expected, 
intuitors performed better than subjects classified as sensors.
Davis (1982) also utilized the Myers-Briggs instrument to differentiate individuals’ 
performance on a computer simulation of a production function. Individual decision 
makers acted as operations managers. One of the tasks faced by his subjects was to 
develop a production plan for a 5-week production period with the objective of 
minimizing the firm’s total costs. Davis found that sensing subjects obtained significantly 
lower costs than intuitive subjects. He argued that this was because his decision task was 
analytical and moderately well structured, and hypothesized that other tasks involving 
tactical and strategic decisions would tend to favour good performance by intuitive types 
as they are less well structured.
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Recently, Nutt (1986b) has expanded an earlier study (Henderson & Nutt, 1980), to 
investigate the influence of decision style on strategic decisions of top executives. He 
used all of the four scales of the MBTI to make a finer distinction of decision style and 
divided 137 top executives into 16 types along his model of two frames (Nutt, 1986a). 
The subjects were presented 8 capacity-expansion scenarios, which were systematically 
manipulated in the uncertainty level (low or high range of return of investment), 
environment (compatible or incompatible to the cognitive style of executive) and 
information source (model or interaction) and then were asked to indicate their 
likelihoods of adopting each scenario and their perception of risk in this action.
The results of analysis by the ANOVA (analysis of variance) and ANCOVA (analysis of 
covariance) techniques showed that the decision style was a significant factor in 
explaining the adoptability and perceived risk for strategic decisions. For the choice 
frame, it was found that the ST executives tended to reject all the projects, while SF 
executives were likely to adopt these same projects. The NT and NF executives took 
nearly identical and intermediate positions. The typical ST executive found considerable 
risk in the projects, the NT and NF nominal risk, and the SF little risk. However, the 
influence of the action frame was less than the experimenter’s expectation. After 
combining the choice and action frames, Nutt also found that executives with a STEJ 
style took the most conservative posture toward strategic action. Executives with SFEJ 
and SFEP styles were action oriented, but SFEP style saw far more risk in strategic 
action-taking than did the SFEJ style. The SFIJ executive was distinctly different from 
the other SF styles and made decisions that were nearly as conservative as the ST. 
Executives with a NF style were inclined toward action except for the NFIP who were 
undecided about whether to act. Executives with a NTEJ style had a proactive posture 
that was viewed as having less than the typical level of risk. Executives with a NTH and 
a NTTP style were somewhat action oriented, but saw more risk in the decision than did 
the NTEJ.
Decision style-uncertainty and decision style-environment interactions were also found 
to be significant. When uncertainty was low, nearly all of the executives, regardless of 
their styles, were prepared to act. When uncertainty was high, however, the SF executive
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still leaned toward adopting the high-uncertainty projects, the ST executive wanted to 
reject them, and the NT executive leaned toward rejecting. The action frame added still 
more insights. The STEJ executive seemed paralysed when uncertainty was high. 
Executives with a NFIP and a NTEP style also become quite conservative when 
uncertainty was high. The SFEJ executive, however, was inclined to act no matter what 
the level of uncertainty. It was also found that environments consistent with decision 
maker’s style seemed to encourage action taking by executives with a ST style, and 
incompatible environments appear to encourage action taking by the other styles.
More recently, Haley and Stumpf (1989) have tried to build the connections between 
some decision heuristics and biases, and personality type of manager measured by the 
MBTI. Based on the proposition that managers’ personality types connote implicit 
decision heuristics and biases, they made a series of hypotheses: STs tend to use 
anchoring heuristics, and succumb to functional-fixedness and regularity-and-structure 
biases; NTs tend to use perseverance heuristics, and succumb to positivity and 
representativeness biases; SFs tend to use availability heuristics, and succumb to social- 
desirability and fundamental-attribution biases; NFs tend to use vividness heuristics, and 
succumb to reasoning-by-analogy and illusory-correlation biases. These hypotheses were 
tested in a pilot study. The participants were 43 managers from four corporations. They 
took part in four runs of a simulation revolved around hypothetical, commercial bank 
with assets of $1.5 billion. After selecting managerial roles, participants received 
information on the financial service industry, the bank, their roles, and policy issues. 
Then, participants managed the bank as they saw it. The results of this experiment 
provided some preliminary support for their hypotheses. For the two dominant types, ST 
and NT, chi-square tests were conducted. One chi-square test, asymmetric lambda, with 
anchoring as the dependent variable, revealed an association of 50 per cent with 
personality type. The second chi-square test, asymmetric lambda, with perseverance as 
the dependent variable, revealed an association of 53 per cent with personality type. For 
the SF and NF managers, although small numbers of subjects precluded further tests, the 
results of descriptive statistics were consistent with the hypotheses about the associations 
between these two personality types and heuristics and biases.
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White (1984) has also used MBTI to explore the influence of team composition on team 
effectiveness. There were two project teams participating in the experiment. The 
homogeneous team consisted of only ST and NT members, and the heterogeneous team 
all four MBTI types. Both teams were asked to complete an unstructured task of 
developing an order-entry system and a timed programming task considered as 
structured. White found that no one team was always suoerior to the other and 
concluded that heterogeneous teams were "optimum" when solving unstructured tasks 
while homogeneous teams were "optimum" when solving structured tasks.
Apparently, the major concern of most of the researchers in the literature reviewed 
above, is individual characteristics in process behaviour. Their research pursuits are to 
conceptualize the distinct approaches which individuals may follow consciously or 
unconsciously in dealing with information and in making judgments or decisions; to 
develop instruments that can measure individual preferences for the different 
approaches; and finally to explore whether individual characteristics have influences on 
decision behaviour. Can the methodology of cognitive style, which is mainly developed 
for the study of individual differences, be extended to examine cultural differences? 
Although it is naive to say that all Chinese people take completely different approaches 
from Western people in perceiving and evaluating information, the previous comparisons 
between thought processes of Western and Chinese people do suggest that Chinese and 
Western people do not perceive reality nor make decisions in the same way (see chapter 
1). Thus, whether the methodology of cognitive style can be used in this study depends 
on two conditions. First, the conceptual characterizations of distinct cognitive styles 
should also depict some of such cultural differences between Chinese and Western 
people. Second, there are available instruments which can be used validly in both 
Chinese and Western cultures.
Indeed, Taggart and Robey (1981) have traced the basic distinction between the rational 
and holistic ways of information processing back to the different philosophical traditions 
of East and West. They argued, "The philosophy of Wu Wei contrasts sharply with the 
Western attitude that some action must be taken to achieve a desired result. 
Conceptually, the Western stress on action aligns with the left hemisphere rational
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processing style. Conversely, the Eastern acceptance of things as they are corresponds 
to the right hemisphere.” The authors considered that the Taoist symbol of overlapping 
light and dark (yin and yang) suggested a holistic, integrated information processor. 
Taggart and Robey’s arguments imply that there are similarities between the distinctions 
of individual and cultural characteristics of process behaviour, and some of the available 
instruments also can be used to probe the preferences of Chinese and Western people 
for the ways of perception, analysis and interpretation of information in decision making.
In Chapter 1, I have mentioned Chiu’s (1972) work in cross-cultural comparison of 
cognitive style between Chinese and American children. In the study, Chiu followed the 
categorization of cognitive style developed by Kagan, Moss, and Sigel (1963) to examine 
the cultural differences in cognitive style through observing how Chinese and American 
children deal with tasks of conceptual classification. The Chinese and American children 
were given 28 items of three pictures representing human, vehicle, furniture, tool, or food 
categories and were asked to select any two out of the three objects in a set which were 
alike or went together, and to state the reason for his choice. It was found that in 
comparison with the American children, the Chinese children scored higher in the 
relational-contextual style, but lower in the descriptive-analytic style and in the 
inferential-categorical style. That is, the Chinese children preferred to categorize external 
stimuli on the basis of their interdependence or relationships, while American youngsters 
preferred to differentiate or analyze the components of the stimulus complex as well as 
to classify stimuli on the basis of inferences made about the stimuli which are grouped 
together.
Most of the cross-cultural studies of cognitive style have adopted the perception tests 
such as the Embedded Figures Test (EFT) and the Rod and Frame Test (RFT), to 
contrast the "field-independent" and "field-dependent" styles (Witkin, Dyk, Paterson, 
Goodenough, & Karp, 1962). In chapter 2, it has already been illustrated how the 
cultural differences between Chinese and Western people in probabilistic thinking are 
related to the different cognitive styles of Chinese and Western people exhibited in such 
tests. However, for most of the cross-cultural studies on field-independence, the main 
research interest was not in the cultural differences itself, but in the cultural influences
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on cognitive style, such as socialization, acculturation, social attitude and so on. Many 
researchers on field-independence in both Western and non-Western cultures have tested 
the theory of Witkin and Berry (1975) about culture and cognitive development, which 
hypothesizes that the more dependent cognitive style is widespread in structurally tight 
societies which enforce social conformity, whereas the more independent style is 
prevalent among societies which encourage autonomy. Most of the results of these 
studies supported the hypotheses (Werner, 1979). However, it was not confirmed in 
Japanese children, as Bagley, Iwawaki, and Young (1983) found that the scores of the 
children’s version of EFT for the Japanese children were significantly higher than their 
English counterparts, but Japan is thought to be a tight and group-oriented culture. They 
speculated that the EFT might be better interpreted as an ability test rather than a 
measure of socialized cognitive style.
In the Hong Kong Chinese, Dawson, Young and Choi (1973) found that field- 
independence was also related to social attitude. Those who held a more traditional 
attitude tended to be field-dependent, whereas those who had a more modern attitude 
were more likely to be field-independent. Yet, there were few studies which made direct 
comparisons between Chinese and Western people or related field-independent or field- 
dependent styles with decision behaviour, although Bond (1980) presumed an indirect 
relationship between probabilistic thinking and field dependence in terms of the 
socialization and upbringing of the Chinese.
This study
The previous review has shown that cognitive style is one of the factors which can heavily 
influence decision makers’ behaviour. A variety of connections between decision 
behaviour or performance and cognitive style of decision makers have already been 
found in many experimental studies. However, to my knowledge, there are no 
comparable studies yet in the field of probabilistic thinking, neither theoretical or 
empirical, which have made an attempt to investigate human probabilistic thinking from 
the angle of cognitive style. Although cross-cultural comparisons of cognitive style have 
demonstrated that people raised in different cultures do not perceive reality and deal
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with problems in the same way, few efforts have been made to examine cultural 
differences in probabilistic thinking by relating to the ways of perceiving information and 
making judgments. As argued before, making probability judgments has often been 
presumed as an information process passing through several subprocesses of cognition. 
Cultural differences in probabilistic thinking could be traced to some particular aspects 
of information processing, but it is at least equally reasonable to conjecture that people 
make probability judgments differently is partly because they follow different ways, as 
revealed in the study of cognitive style, to perceive and analyze information in 
approaching a judgment. Conspicuous differences between Chinese and Western thought 
processes illustrated by many scholars have strongly suggested that Chinese and Western 
people have different preferences for the way of perceiving information and making 
judgments. Every preference thus may lead people to deal with uncertainty in some way 
that is different from others. This present study starts an examination of the relationship 
between people’s probabilistic thinking and their style of information processing. It is 
hoped that the method of cognitive style, in comparison with the study of concentrating 
on single psychological factors, can provide a more integrated view of understanding how 
people develop their own probability paradigms and why they make probability 
judgments differently. It is also hoped that this study can give better explanations of how 
culture influences people’s probabilistic thinking than does the study of seeking specific 
cultural factors connected with probabilistic thinking. This experiment may provide some 
clues for seeking particular cultural factors which have impact on the development of 
probability paradigms.
To examine cultural differences in probabilistic thinking and their relationship with 
cognitive style, an experiment was conducted in the United Kingdom and the People’s 
Republic of China. Jungian classification of cognitive style was adopted in this study to 
measure the preferences for the ways of perceiving information and making judgments. 
This experimental study firstly aims to make a comparison of probabilistic thinking 
between Chinese and British people in a larger sample of subjects, and secondly to 
investigate whether cultural differences in probabilistic thinking can be traced to a more 
basic level, the ways of perceiving information and making judgments in terms of
74
cognitive style. In the rest of this chapter, I will first report the results of the experiment 
and then discuss their implications.
Before stepping into detailed explanation, I would like to give a reminder that this study 
is concerned with an examination of the differences in behaviour when dealing with 
uncertainty. That is, only what people, raised in different cultures, actually do is 
observed, rather than what they could do. So, no suggestions about cultural inferiority 
or superiority in capacity can be derived from this study. Each way of dealing with 
uncertainty may have its strength and weakness.
Hypotheses
The hypotheses of this study were proposed as follows:
H I. It is first hypothesized that probabilistic thinking will be related to cognitive style. 
The dimension of information perception is perhaps most closely related to probabilistic 
thinking. Sensation perception has been characterized as focusing more on hard facts and 
the particularity of a situation, while intuition perception as leading to seek possibilities 
and the totality of a situation. Sensing individuals may tend to be more uncomfortable 
with uncertainty and less tolerant of ambiguity. Sensing managers were found to make 
decisions more clearly. When facing capital expansion projects, they adopted or rejected 
them (Henderson & Nutt, 1980; Nutt, 1986b). Hellriegel and Slocum (1980) also found 
that sensation type managers dislike coping with unstructured problems that contain 
considerable environmental uncertainty more than do the intuitive-thinkers. So, it is 
expected that the subjects who prefer sensation perception will tend to make more clear- 
cut distinction in uncertainty and thus use less probability vocabulary and make more 
extreme probability judgments, while the subjects who prefer intuition perception will 
tend to make a finer distinction in uncertainty and thus employ a richer probability 
vocabulary and make better calibrated probability judgments.
For the dimension of information evaluation, it is expected that the subjects of thinking 
type make finer distinctions in uncertainty in both words and numbers than those of 
feeling type, as it is believed that the way used by thinking individuals in approaching a
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judgment, is more likely lead to logical, rational, quantitative analysis and thus finer 
distinction in uncertainty; and numerical expressions of uncertainty are more meaningful 
for them. It is also expected that a judgmental attitude will reinforce the subjects in 
making more extreme probability judgments, as it tends to lead people to make 
judgments clearly and quickly, than does a perceptive attitude which is more likely to 
guide people to keep their options open. In fact, it has already been reported that 
sensing individuals tend to take a judgemental attitude in making judgments or decisions, 
and intuitive individuals are more likely to be perceptive (Myers & McCaulley, 1985). 
However, this study does not expect that probabilistic thinking has any significant 
connection with Extraversion-Introversion. Indeed, Wright and Phillips (1980) have found 
strong similarities between Moslem and Christian Indonesians in the differentiation of 
numerical probability, although the former is presumed to be more passively external 
than the latter.
H2. It is also hypothesized that the Chinese and the British people will show different 
preferences for ways of perceiving information and making judgments. It has been argued 
that the Chinese way of thinking tends to be concrete and single dimension oriented, 
with less interest in the imaginary, abstraction, and logical reasoning. In contrast to 
Westerners, the Chinese concentrate their attention more on what is immediately 
apprehended through the senses, and on particular instances (Northrop, 1946; Nakamura, 
1960; Hsu, 1970; Zhang & Wang, 1988). So, it is expected that the perception of the 
Chinese tends to be more sensing, and that of the British people more intuitive. 
"Sensation perception" will be the dominant type in the Chinese, while "intuition 
perception" will be dominant type in the British. Also, Chinese culture has been 
characterized as socio-oriented in contrast to the individual-oriented of Western culture 
(Hsu, 1981; Yang, 1981). Chinese people tend to see the world from the basis of a 
network of relationships. They may care more for the feelings of other people and attach 
importance on personal value. It is thus expected that, in making judgments, the Chinese 
people prefer feeling and the British people prefer thinking. The dominant type for the 
Chinese people will be "feeling" and for the British people will be "thinking". It is 
appropriate to note here that the Jungian conception of feelings does not refer to 
emotions, but to make decisions based on value judgments. Furthermore, considering the
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positive correlation between "sensation-intuition" and "judgment-perception", it is also 
expected that the Chinese people are more likely to take a judgmental attitude in dealing 
with the external world, whereas the British people are more likely to take a perceptive 
attitude. The "judgment" type will be dominant in the Chinese and the "perception" type 
in the British.
H3. Cultural differences in probabilistic thinking between the Chinese and the British 
people are partly accounted for by the differences in the ways of perceiving, evaluating 
information revealed by conception of cognitive style.
3.2. The experiment
Instruments
Three instruments were administered to all subjects, the View of Uncertainty 
Questionnaire, Probability Assessment Questionnaire, and Myers-Briggs Type Indicator. 
The first two questionnaires were used to measure the probabilistic thinking of subjects. 
The last one identified the cognitive style of subjects. The Chinese subjects were given 
the Chinese versions of these three questionnaires, and the British subjects the English 
versions.
1. The View of Uncertainty Questionnaire (VUQ) asks 20 questions about possible 
future events, such as "Will you catch a head cold in the next three months?". The 
instructions asked respondents to "Write in the space provided a reasonable and 
appropriate response to the following questions." In comparison with an earlier version 
(Phillips & Wright, 1977), the present VUQ does not include the questions about facts, 
such as "Is Baghdad the capital of Iraq?".
Responses on the VUQ were classified into five categories: (1) number of yes/no 
responses; (2) number of don’t know responses; (3) number of probability responses; (4) 
number of different probability responses used by that subject, and (5) catch-all 
responses (e.g. "I hope not").
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2. The Probability Assessment Questionnaire (PAQ), as detailed in Phillips and Wright 
(1977), presented 75 questions with two choice alternative answers, such as:
Which is longer?
(a) Panama Canal
(b) Suez Canal
Subjects are asked to choose the right answer and also to indicate how sure they are by 
writing a percentage between 50 and 100.
To examine extremeness of probability judgments, several measures were taken from the 
PAQ: the number of 100 per cent judgments, percentage correct (hit-rate) for any 100 
per cent judgments given, and the number of 50 per cent judgments, percentage correct 
for any 50 per cent judgments given. An entropy measure, H, was calculated to measure 
the distribution of the 75 probability judgments given on the PAQ. Specifically,
m n{ n,
H = -Y, — log, ( — )N  52VAT
where nt is the number of judgments of a given probability, M  is the number of different 
probability judgments made by the subject, and N= Ih i = 75. The H  measure is 
relatively large when many different judgments are given, and when they are made 
equally often. The H  measure would be relatively small for an individual who gave only 
judgments of 50 per cent and 100 per cent, particularly if most of the judgments were just 
one of those probabilities. To measure the accuracy of probability judgments (Murphy, 
1973), calibration (C) and resolutions (R) scores were also calculated:
1 M
C = — T  nAr.-cS2
N U
Where rt is the probability judgment and c, is the proportion correct for all items 
assigned probability rf. The calibration score is smaller when subjects make more
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accurate probability judgments. A group of perfect probability judgments can make 
calibration reach zero.
Resolution measures the ability of the respondent to discriminate different degrees of 
subjective uncertainty by sorting the items into categories whose respective percentages 
correct are maximally different from the overall percentage correct. The higher the 
resolution the better. Resolution scores are computed by the following formula.
1 Mr  =  —y'«.(c-c)2NtZ , v  ‘ 7 
Where c is the overall percentage correct.
3. Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI)
The Myers-Briggs indicator follows the psychology of types developed by Jung (1971), 
which is primarily concerned with the differences in the ways in which people perceive 
or acquire information and make decisions or judgments with the information which has 
been perceived. MBTI is composed of four indices, Extraversion-introversion (El), 
Sensation-Intuition (SN), Thinking-Feeling (TF), and Judgment-Perception (JP). In this 
experiment, the Form G of the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (Myers & McCaulley, 1985) 
was employed to determine subject’s cognitive type or information-processing style and 
to calculate continuous preference scores.
The MBTI is considered as valid and reliable (Tzeng et al., 1984) and has been widely 
used in many fields. Previously in this dissertation, we have seen many of MBTI 
applications in studying managerial decision making. The MBTI also has been used in 
cross-cultural studies and is also considered as a valid instrument. For example, Carlson 
and Levy (1973) successfully tested Jungian theory with subjects who were black college 
students. Myers (McCaulley, 1977) developed a scale to predict success in medical school 
internships. The scale was developed on mainly black physicians from the Howard 
Medical School and cross-validated on mainly white physicians from the University of
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New Mexico. Ohsawa (1975; 1981) reported on data with the Japanese version of the 
MBTI. In Japan as in the United States ST types are found in production management, 
SF types in sales, and NT types in long-range planning. TJ types are in top executive jobs 
in both societies.
In this study, the MBTI was carefully translated into Chinese by using the 
back-translation method (Brislin, 1970). It was first translated into Chinese from English 
by the author and sent to some Chinese graduate students of an English language 
department in China to seek comments. A Chinese professor in English was then asked 
to translate the first Chinese version of MBTI back to English. Through several 
iterations, the inconsistencies were checked and the Chinese version was finally settled.
Subjects
97 Chinese university students (47 women and 50 men) studying in Peking and 105 
British university students (46 women and 59 men) studying in London volunteered to 
take part in this experiment. They were paid for their contributions. Most of them were 
undergraduate students but a few were graduate students, and they were studying a 
diverse set of major subjects.
Procedure
For convenience, this experiment was administrated in groups. Each subject was first 
given the VUQ and PAQ questionnaires, and then the MBTI. Before answering the 
questions, the subjects were asked to read carefully the instructions, which made no 
reference to probabilistic thinking and its relationship with information-processing style. 
There was no time limit, though the subjects were encouraged not to think too long when 
answering the questions in the MBTI.
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Results
Two Chinese and five British subjects failed to answer the questionnaires in accordance 
with the requirements, and so their data were excluded from the following analyses.
VUQ
The means and standard deviations for measures derived from the VUQ are given in 
Table 3.1. Three significant differences were found between the Chinese students and 
the British students. It can be seen that in responding to the VUQ, the Chinese students 
on average gave more "yes or no" answers than did the British students, whereas the 
British students were more likely to employ their vocabulary of probability than their 
Chinese counterparts. The Chinese students offered "yes or no" answers in over 14 of the 
20 questions in the questionnaire, whereas the British average was just about 10. In 
contrast, the British students used a richer vocabulary of probability to describe the 
degree of uncertainty in their feelings about their choices. The number of probability 
word responses for the British students were twice as many as that of the Chinese 
students. All these differences were statistically significant. However, no significant 
difference was found in the measure of the number of "don’t know" responses between 
the two groups of students, although the British students answered "don’t know" slightly 
more often.
These results replicated the previous findings of Phillips and Wright (1977), that there 
are cultural differences between Chinese and British people in giving verbal responses 
to uncertain events. It seems to be that when facing such uncertain situations, the 
Chinese are more likely to give unambiguous replies and the British more often keep 
their feelings of uncertainty to themselves and tended more to describe them with the 
vocabulary of probability. However, it should be emphasized here that this experiment 
used only the questions about future events in the VUQ, the results show little 
differences from those of Phillips and Wright’s study. These results do not provide any 
evidence to support that time-orientation of questions has obvious impact on the verbal 
responses of subjects to the uncertain events.
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Table 3.1. Comparisons on verbal responses
Sample
Measure
Chinese
Students
(N=95)
British 
Students 
(N=100)
t
l.Number of Yes/No responses
Mean 14.38 10.43 5.56"
Std.Dev. 4.83 5.08
2.Number of Don’t know responses
Mean 0.95 1.12 N.S.
Std.Dev. 1.59 1.66
3.Number of probability word responses
Mean 4.68 7.58 -4.34"
Std.Dev. 4.47 4.85
4.Number of different probability word responses
Mean 1.56 3.30 -7.17"
Std.Dev. 1.53 1.86
Two-tailed significance ** p< 0.01
PAQ
Table 3.2 gives the means and standard deviations for measures taken from the PAQ. 
The results explicitly showed that the Chinese students and the British students made 
quite different probability judgments. In this experiment, the strong tendency to make 
extreme probability judgments was demonstrated among the Chinese sample by the fact 
that they made much more probability judgments of 100% than did the British students. 
Not surprisingly, they were wrong more often when they were absolutely sure about their 
choices. It was also found that the Chinese made less probability judgments of 50%. 
However, a quite different tendency was found among the British student samples. In 
comparison with their Chinese counterparts, they used a wide choice of probabilities 
rather than focusing on one or two extreme probabilities, that is, the British students 
showed finer differentiation in expressing uncertainty. The British students also exhibited
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Table 3.2. Comparisons on extremeness and calibration of judgment
Measure
Sample
Chinese British
Students Students
(N=95) (N =100) t
l.Number of 50% judgments given 
Mean 13.22 17.99 -3.22**
Std.Dev. 9.51 11.16
2.Percentage correct for any 50% judgments given 
Mean 48.9 50.5 N.S.
Std.Dev. 19.9 16.2
3.Number of 100% judgments given 
Mean 38.39 17.04 11.64**
Std.Dev. 14.52 10.71
4.Percentage correct for any 100% judgments given 
Mean 78.62 82.3 -2.16’
Std.Dev. 10.11 13.3
5.Entropy H 
Mean 1.75 2.20 -6.28**
Std.Dev. 0.58 0.40
6.Calibration
Mean 0.0592 0.0396 4.40**
Std.Dev. 0.0332 0.0283
7.Resolution
Mean 0.0272 0.0270 N.S.
Std.Dev. 0.0180 0.0159
Two tailed significance * p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01
a lower (better) mean calibration score than the Chinese sample. The British students 
obtained a higher mean entropy (H) measure which further indicated that they made a 
wider range of probability judgments. All of these differences between the two cultural 
groups were statistically significant. However, no significant differences were found in the 
measures of percentage correct for 50% judgments and the resolution score.
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In the above analysis, the parameters were calculated on the basis of individual data, that 
is, all the parameters were first calculated for every subject, then mean scores were 
obtained. However, in the comparative study, these parameters were more often 
calculated at group level by pooling together all the data of individuals of one group. As 
a comparison with previous results, several group-determined parameters were also 
calculated in this study.
Figure 3.1 shows two calibration curves drawn on the basis of the data from the two 
cultural groups. The gap between the two curves of the Chinese and British groups 
illustrates the same cultural differences in calibration as those revealed in above analysis 
of individual subjects. That is, the British students as a whole made better calibrated 
probability judgments than did their Chinese counterparts. Several group-determined 
parameters also supported above analysis. The calibration measure for the British group 
as a whole was 0.0223, whereas with the Chinese group it reached 0.0414. The H 
measure for the British group was also higher than the Chinese group (2.52 for the 
British and 2.07 for the Chinese). The discrimination of probability judgments measured 
by resolution score for the Chinese group was found better than their British counterpart. 
The resolution score of the Chinese group was 0.0140, which was slightly higher than that 
of the British group, 0.0127. This result was similar to that of Yates et al. (1989), 
although the resolution score for the Chinese group in this study was not as good as 
theirs (0.0205). The higher resolution score of the Chinese group meant, as Yates et al. 
(1989) argued, that the Chinese people had better capability in discriminating between 
right and wrong alternatives. However, this difference was not corroborated by the 
analysis of individual subjects which was completed earlier, since there the students of 
the two groups had almost the same mean resolution scores. It should be emphasized 
here that both the two Chinese student groups in the study of Yates et al. and the 
present one showed the same patterns in making probability judgments. Their group- 
determined calibration curves are similar and the distributions of their probability 
judgments are also almost the same. These results also confirmed earlier findings of 
Phillips and Wright in the English and the Hong Kong Chinese students, although there 
are slight differences between the two Chinese groups in calibration of probability 
judgments.
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Figure 3.1. Calibration curves: British and Chinese students
ANOVA tests were performed for all the measures of the VUQ and the PAQ to see if 
the sex of the subjects had a more significant effect on probabilistic thinking than their 
cultural background. However, the results presented in Table 3.3 showed that the sex of 
the subject was not significant for most of the measures derived from the VUQ and the 
PAQ. The sex of the subject was found to have a significant effect only on the number 
of yes/no responses, the number of probability word responses, and the number of 50% 
judgment given. However, even for all three of these measures, the effect of sex was 
apparently less significant than that of culture. In comparison with sex, culture achieved 
a much higher F value and reached a higher significance level. Also, for all the measures, 
the interaction effect of culture and sex was not statistically significant. Therefore it 
suggests that the differences found in this study should be mainly explained as the effect
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Table 33. Effect of culture and sex on probabilistic thinking
Culture
Effect
Sex
Effect Interaction
VUQ
l.Number of Yes/No responses
F 33.99** mm m m sm .**7.72 N.S.
2.Number of Don’t know responses 
F N.S N.S. N.S.
3.Number of probability word responses 
F 21.19** 8.50“ N.S.
4.Number of different probability word responses 
F 52.47** N.S. N.S.
PAQ
l.Number of 50% judgments given
F 11.61** 4.75* N.S.
2.Percentage correct for any 50% judgments given 
F N.S N.S. N.S.
3.Number of 100% judgments given
F 135.17“ N.S. N.S.
4.Percentage correct for any 100% judgments given 
F 4.4’ N.S. N.S.
5.Entropy H
F 38.77“ N.S. N.S.
6.Calibration
F 19.11“ N.S. N.S.
7.Resolutions
F N.S. N.S. N.S.
Two-tailed significance * p<0.05 ** p<0.01
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of culture. In other words, they are mainly the differences between different cultural 
groups of people, but not the differences between male and female groups. As expected, 
there was no interaction effect between culture and sex.
To examine if the verbal and numerical response processes are related, I looked at 
intercorrelations between the two sets of the measures which were respectively derived 
from the VUQ and the PAQ. From the correlation matrix given in Table 3.4, we can see 
that the number of yes/no responses for the VUQ were associated with more frequent 
use of the probability of 100% and less use of different probabilities for the PAQ. 
Correspondingly, the number of probability word responses, and particularly the number 
of different probability word responses, were associated with less use of the probability 
of 100% and more use of different probabilities. These results are inconsistent with the 
previous study of Phillips and Wright (1977), as they found no correlations between the 
two sets of measures. However, neither study found any correlations between the number 
of "don’t know" responses and any measure for the PAQ.
The correlations between the VUQ and the PAQ seems to suggest that people have a 
consistent habitual way of dealing with uncertainty, no matter if it concerns future events 
or not. It is also consistent with the early analysis about the results of the VUQ which 
showed that, excluding for the present-oriented, questions about facts have no evident 
effect on the subjects’ verbal responses to uncertain events. Wright and Wisudha (1982) 
have found that people improved the calibration of their probability judgments in 
responding to then-future events. It is not clear whether better correlations could be 
found between future-oriented VUQ and future-oriented PAQ, and so further study is 
needed.
The same procedure of analysis was also separately performed for the data of the two 
cultural groups. Similar interrelations between the two sets of measures of the VUQ and 
the PAQ were revealed in both the Chinese and British groups. Although some of them 
were not statistically significant, they were consistent with the above results, at least in 
the directions of correlation.
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Table 3.4. Correlations between VUQ and PAQ.
1
VUQ 
2 3 4
PAQ
1 -.1079 -.0408 .1202 -.0704
2 -.0010 -.0673 .0341 .0284
3 .3729** -.0644 -.3152” -.4072”
4 -.1020 -.0161 .0837 .1798
5 -.2799*’ .0651 .2516” .3099”
6 .1225 .0079 -.0952 -.2208*
7 -.0530 -.0903 .0952 .1282
Two-tailed significance * t < 0.01 ** t < 0.001
To verify the first hypothesis that cognitive type or information-processing style is related 
to probabilistic thinking, the correlation analysis between the continuous scores of 
cognitive type and the measures for the VUQ and the PAQ was carried out. Several 
moderate correlations can be found in the correlation matrix presented in Table 3.5. For 
the measures of the VUQ, the SN score shows a negative correlation with the number 
of yes/no responses and positive correlations with both the number of probability word 
responses and the number of different probability word responses. For the measures of 
the PAQ, SN has a negative correlation with the number of 100% judgments and a 
positive correlation with the measure of the entropy H. Similarly, the JP score exhibits 
a positive correlation with the number of different probability word responses in the 
measure of the VUQ and a negative correlation with the number of 100% probability 
judgments in the measure of the PAQ. Surprisingly, no significant correlations were 
found between the TF scores and the two sets of measures for probabilistic thinking. As 
expected, the El scores were not correlated with any measure of probabilistic thinking.
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Table 3.5. Correlations between cognitive types and VUQ and PAQ
El
MBTI
SN TF JP
VUQ
1 .0902 -.2612** -.0289 -.1002
2 -.0405 .0319 .0609 .0670
3 -.0777 .2126’ -.0071 .0316
4 -.0130 .3543** .0852 .2219*
PAQ
1 -.0097 .0550 .0128 .0552
2 -.0874 -.0010 -.1233 -.0611
3 -.1068 -.3417” -.1185 -.2956”
4 .0770 .0876 .0426 .0927
5 .0803 .2220* .1206 .1553
6 -.0361 -.1634 -.0891 -.1724
7 .1218 -.0707 -.0127 -.0876
Two-tailed significance: * t < 0.01 ** t < 0.001
These results suggest that the differences in probabilistic thinking which were exposed 
between the subjects in this experiment are in some way associated with their preferences 
in information perception and decision making. The preferences for the way of 
information-perception have a major influence on probabilistic thinking. The subjects 
who preferred intuitive perception and perceptive attitude were more likely to make fine 
differentiation in face of uncertainty. They tended to employ a wider vocabulary of 
probability in the verbal responses and to use a range of probabilities in the numerical 
expressions. In contrast, the subjects who preferred sensing perception and judging 
attitude were more likely to make clear-cut discrimination to eliminate their feelings of
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uncertainty. They tended to offer unambiguous answers in the verbal responses and to 
focus on extreme probability judgments in the numerical expressions. The tests also 
suggest that the subjects’ preference in information perception were more closely related 
to their performance in facing probabilistic tasks as the SN score was more systematically 
correlated to the measures of probabilistic thinking than the JP score.
Because normally classification of the type of subject is considered by Myers-Briggs to 
be more important than their continuous scale, the measures of probabilistic thinking 
were also calculated for individual cognitive types. Table 3.6 gives the means and 
standard deviations by grouping the S, N, J, and P subjects. It shows that there are 
noticeable differences between the S and the N subjects or between the J and the P 
subjects. They are consistent with the previous results of correlation analysis using 
continuous scores. Furthermore, the differences between the S and N subjects in the H 
and calibration measures are also statistically significant (at least, p < 0.05), as well as 
those included in the previous correlation analysis.
By combining differences in information perception (S and N) and the use of perception 
or judgment (P and J), four cognitive types can be partitioned: SJ, SP, NJ, and NP. From 
previous results, it is reasonable to expect the SJ and NP subjects to have greater 
differences in probabilistic thinking, and this was confirmed by further analysis. Table 3.7 
gives the means and deviations by the four cognitive types. For the VUQ, the greatest 
difference in the number of different probability words was found between SJ and NP 
types. The SJ subjects on average used only 1.75 different probability words, much less 
than did the NP subjects (3.17). Similarly, for the PAQ, SJ and NP had the greatest 
differences in all the measures except the percentage correct for any 50% judgments 
given. In comparison with NP subjects, SJ subjects on average made more extreme 
probability judgments and used less different probabilities and had a better ability to 
discriminate both the wrong and correct occasions. The probability judgments of NP 
subjects were better calibrated and less extreme. It is easily seen that these differences 
are more significant in the corresponding measures than those given in Table 3.6 
between S and N types, or between J and P.
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Table 3.6. Results by cognitive types: S and N, J and P.
S N J P
(N=79) (N = 116) (N = 105) (N=90)
VUQ
l.Number of Yes/No responses
Mean 13.47 11.59* 12.88 11.74
Std.Dev. 5.15 5.34 5.53 5.04
2.Number of Don’t know responses
Mean 1.10 0.99 0.88 1.22
Std.Dev. 1.64 1.62 1.49 1.76
3.Number of probability word responses
Mean 5.18 6.84* 6.03 6.33
Std.Dev. 4.77 4.86 5.08 4.67
4.Number of different probability word responses
Mean 1.82 2.88** 2.13 2.82*
Std.Dev. 1.55 2.02 1.79 1.99
PAQ
l.Number of 50% judgments given
Mean 14.62 16.38 14.58 16.93
Std.Dev. 9.79 11.16 10.84 10.31
2.Percentage correct for any 50% judgment given 
Mean 0.49 0.50 0.50 0.49
Std.Dev. 0.18 0.18 0.20 0.16
3.Number of 100% judgments given
Mean 33.05 23.62** 31.19 23.07**
Std.Dev. 17.18 15.09 16.91 15.15
4.Percentage correct for any 100% judgments given 
Mean 0.79 0.81 0.80 0.81
Std.Dev. 0.10 0.13 0.11 0.13
5.Entropy H
Mean 1.88 2.06* 1.93 2.05
Std.Dev. 0.55 0.53 0.57 0.50
6.Calibration
Mean 0.056 0.044* 0.053 0.047
Std.Dev. 0.033 0.031 0.032 0.033
7.Resolution
Mean 0.0284 0.0262 0.0287 0.0252
Std.Dev. 0.0175 0.0165 0.0186 0.0145
** pc.O l * p<.05 otherwise, non significant
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Table 3.7. Results by cognitive types: SJ, SP, NJ, and NP.
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SP
(N=26)
type
NJ
(N=52)
NP
(N = 64)
VUQ
l.Number of Yes/No responses
Mean 13.36 13.69 12.38 10.95
Std.Dev. 5.63 4.09 5.44 5.21
2.Number of Don’t know responses
Mean 0.81 1.69 0.94 1.03
Std.Dev. 1.53 1.72 1.45 1.75
3.Number of probability word responses
Mean 5.75 4.00 6.31 7.28
Std.Dev. 5.33 3.11 4.83 4.87
4.Number of different probability word
Mean 1.75 1.96 2.52 3.17
Std.Dev. 1.59 1.48 1.90 2.07
PAQ
l.Number of 50% judgments given
Mean 13.66 16.58 15.52 17.08
Std.Dev. 9.60 10.06 11.99 10.48
2.Percentage correct for any 50% judgments given 
Mean 0.50 0.48 0.51 0.50
Std.Dev. 0.18 0.19 0.21 0.15
3.Number of 100% judgments given
Mean 35.94 27.15 26.35 21.41
Std.Dev. 17.31 15.61 15.17 14.77
4.Percentage correct for any 100% judgment given 
Mean 0.79 0.80 0.81 0.82
Std.Dev. 0.10 0.11 0.13 0.13
5.Entropy H
Mean 1.80 2.03 2.05 2.06
Std.Dev. 0.61 0.33 0.51 0.55
6.Calibration
Mean 0.060 0.048 0.046 0.043
Std.Dev. 0.032 0.033 0.029 0.033
7.Resolution
Mean 0.0291 0.0270 0.0283 0.0244
Std.Dev. 0.0189 0.0144 0.0186 0.0146
Therefore, the first hypothesis has been confirmed by both the descriptive statistics along 
cognitive styles and correlations between the continuous scores of cognitive style and the
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measures of probabilistic thinking. People’s probabilistic thinking is partly affected by 
their way of perceiving information and reaching a judgment.
Sensation perception and intuition perception, and judgmental attitude and perceptive 
attitude seem to push people in opposite ways of making probability judgments. 
However, the dimension of information evaluation was found to have no significant effect 
on probabilistic thinking. Perhaps, a preference for a logical, rational, and quantitative 
way of decision making does not definitely lead to calibrated probability judgments, and 
similarly a preference for making judgments more on the basis of personal value does 
not assuredly result in extreme probability judgments.
The same procedure of analysis was also performed for each cultural group. Similar 
patterns were found in both of the Chinese and the British groups. In the correlation 
analysis, similarities emerged between cognitive type and the measures of probabilistic 
thinking in the British group. However, with the Chinese group, the coefficients for the 
SN score and the three measures of the VUQ were nearly zero. The results of cognitive 
type analysis also showed the same differences between the S and the N subjects and 
between the J and the P subjects. Similarly, in the Chinese group, no significant 
differences were found between the S and the N subjects or between the J and the P 
subjects in responding to the VUQ. Perhaps it is because the PAQ more easily inspired 
the Chinese students of particular cognitive types to differentiate uncertainty as it 
suggested a probabilistic space by asking them to give a probability between 50% to 
100%, but there was no such suggestion in the VUQ.
The second hypothesis predicted that the Chinese and the British subjects would show 
different preferences in the way of perceiving information and making judgments. Table 
3.8 gives the means and deviations of continuous scores for all the MBIT scales. Two 
significant differences in SN and JP scales were found between the Chinese and the 
British students. The Chinese students on average obtained much lower SN and JP scores 
than did the British students. The statistics of cognitive type show that sensation type 
(53) were dominant in the Chinese group, while intuition type (74) were dominant in the
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Table 3.8. Comparisons on MBTI.
Sample
Continuous 
score of
Chinese
Students
(N=95)
British 
Students 
(N = 100) t
E l
Mean 102.54 103.16 N.S.
Std.Dev. 17.05 22.97
(E:40 1:55) (E:43 1:57)
SN
Mean 95.93 115.54 i ©
• *
Std.Dev. 17.63 21.34
(S:53 N:42) (S:26 N:74)
TF
Mean 88.29 92.16 N.S.
Std.Dev. 19.71 20.15
(T:65 F:30) (T:64 F:36)
JP
Mean 88.37 110.64 -6.42"
Std.Dev. 22.43 26.00
(J:68 P:27) (J:37 P:63)
Two-tailed significance ** p < 0.001
British group. Also much more judgment type students were found to be Chinese and 
much more perceptive type students were found to be British. However, no significant 
difference was found between the two cultural groups in the TF scores. It is a surprise, 
because the observations of many scholars about the Eastern and Western cultures have 
consistently predicted that Chinese are more socially oriented than Westerners. It is not 
clear whether it is due to the fact that all the Chinese subjects were university students 
and following the recent "open-door" policy of Chinese government, had become more 
westernized than general Chinese populations.
These results partly confirmed the second hypothesis that Chinese and British people do 
not follow the same way of comprehending reality and making judgments or decisions. 
In their self-report, the Chinese students expressed a strong tendency of sensation in 
perceiving information and tended to take judgmental attitudes in dealing with the
94
external world. In contrast, the British students’ perception was more intuitive and they 
were inclined to a perceptive attitude.
To see whether cognitive type has a significant effect on probabilistic thinking in 
comparison with culture, an analysis of variance would be helpful. Unfortunately, in this 
experiment, the distribution of types was so uneven that it became difficult to use this 
analysis technique properly, as balanced design was needed. In the Chinese group, 42 
students were found as SJ types, but only 11 as SP types. In the British group, there were 
48 NP types, but only 11 SJ types.
Even so, considering the connections between cognitive type and probabilistic thinking 
which were shown previously, the results of descriptive statistics given in Table 3.8 still 
present explicit evidence to support the third hypothesis. We have found that SN and JP 
continuous scores were correlated with some measures of probabilistic thinking and there 
were significant differences in some measures of probabilistic thinking between the SJ 
and NP types. So, the marked differences revealed by the MBTI between the Chinese 
and the British students implied that the cultural differences between the two cultural 
groups in probabilistic thinking should be partly accounted for by their basic differences 
in the way of perceiving reality and dealing with the outer world. The extremeness 
orientation of the Chinese subjects in probabilistic thinking could be related to their 
preference for sensation perception and judgmental attitude, and the calibration 
orientation of the British subjects could be partly explained as they preferred intuitive 
perception and perceptive attitude. So, the third hypothesis is roughly established too.
3.3. Discussion and conclusion
This study, in larger student samples, has further confirmed the previous findings that 
there are regular cultural differences between the Chinese and the British. In facing 
uncertain situations, the Chinese wished to make clear-cut judgments, whereas the British 
people were inclined to keep their feelings of uncertainty and were able to make fine 
differentiations. In verbal responses, "yes" or "no" answers were more likely to come from 
the Chinese, whereas answers such as "possibly or probably" were more likely to come
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from the British. In numerical responses, extreme probabilities such as 100% were more 
attractive to the Chinese, whereas the probabilities between the two extremes were more 
appealing to the British. The sharp contrast between the extremeness orientation and 
calibration orientation leads us to conjecture that the Chinese and the British may follow 
different ways to reduce and to deal with uncertainty.
Certain relationships between the measures of the VUQ and the PAQ were also found 
in this study. The unambiguous answer, such as "yes or no" was related to the application 
of extreme probability judgment. The subjects who tended to utilize the vocabulary of 
probability in responding to the VUQ were more likely to assign different probabilities 
to describe their feelings of uncertainty in reacting to the questions of the PAQ. The 
connections between the verbal and numerical responses seems to suggest that the VUQ 
and the PAQ stimulated similar cognitive process and consistently revealed the 
differences in probabilistic thinking.
In the present study, it was also found that there were significant differences between 
certain cognitive types in performing the two probabilistic tasks. Therefore, a preliminary 
conclusion could be derived from the finding of the linkage between cognitive type and 
probabilistic thinking, that is, people’s preferences in information perception and decision 
making may affect their cognitive process stimulated by the VUQ and the PAQ. 
According to the explanation of psychological type theory, persons oriented toward 
sensing perception may tend to focus on immediate experience and often develop 
characteristics associated with this awareness, such as enjoying the present moment, 
realism, acute powers of observation, memory for details, and practicality. In contrast, 
persons oriented toward intuitive perception may become so intent on pursuing 
possibilities that they may overlook actualities. They may develop the characteristics that 
can follow from emphasis on intuition and become imaginative, theoretical, abstract, 
future oriented, or creative. For this study, it suggests that the process of making 
probability judgments may have been affected by cognitive style in several ways. For 
example, in searching for knowledge from memory, the subjects who preferred sensing 
perception may more often overestimate the exactness of their memory, which leads to 
extreme probability judgments. Overconfidence in exactness of memory actually has been
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identified as a bias of causing "certainty illusion" (Fischhoff, Slovic, & Lichtenstein, 1977). 
Whereas the subjects who preferred intuition perception more possibly imagine a 
probabilistic set and avoid focusing on extreme judgments (Phillips & Wright, 1977). 
Similarly, the subjects who were attuned to a judgmental attitude offered more extreme 
probability judgments, probably as their perception tended to be shut off as soon as they 
thought that they knew enough to make a judgment. Whereas, the subjects who attuned 
to perceptive attitude made better calibrated judgments probably because their mind 
tended to be open to more possibilities and were more cautious and did not like to take 
a chance.
The results of MBTI showed significant differences between the Chinese and British 
peoples in information perception and decision making, as SJ types were found to be 
dominant in the Chinese students, whereas NP types were found to be dominant in the 
British. SJ people have been described as realistic decision makers: they tend to solve 
problems by reliance on past experiences and to dislike ambiguity (Myers & McCaulley, 
1985). In comparison with SJ people, NP people tend to focus more on possibilities for 
the future and are unconventional, independent spirits. In fact, many behaviourial 
differences between SJ and NP people described here have been argued as cultural 
differences between Chinese and Western people for a long time by a number of 
scholars in the comparison study of anthropology, philosophy and psychology. To 
illuminate this, a few recent studies are given here. Liu (1986) has observed that Chinese 
children have developed more skills for memorizing than Western children, as Western 
children lack the opportunity which Chinese children have to practise memorizing skills 
in their early childhood. Also, Chen et al. (1982) found that students attending Chinese 
universities and high schools did not give high difficulty ratings to the memory items 
selected from several intelligence tests as did their Australian counterparts. They also 
speculated that the difference was attributed to possible cultural differences in nurturing 
and providing opportunities to practice the different skills. It has also been argued that 
the traditional Chinese way of thinking tended to consider and solve problems from one 
dimension and to seek consistency and unity (Zhang & Wang, 1988). So, if the Chinese 
people were more sure about their memory of knowledge, they may also be more 
overconfident about the correctness of their choices, and hence gave higher probabilities.
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And if they disliked ambiguity, they may try to make clear-cut distinctions between 
possible and impossible or totally certain or totally uncertain. If they preferred to 
concentrate on a particular decision problem, a probability may not be very meaningful 
for them. Similarly, as the British tended to seek possibilities, they may easily imagine 
a probabilistic set in their mind before making probability judgments. They were also 
more likely to appreciate probability theory as it may be valuable in the sense of dealing 
with a series of decision problems.
In consequence, the cultural differences between the Chinese and the British people in 
probabilistic thinking could be partly explained by the fact that Chinese and Western 
cultures cultivate different probability paradigms in the practice of dealing with 
uncertainty. This study of cognitive style reveals that there are many cultural factors 
which have roles to play as they can somehow influence the development of probability 
paradigms, and cultural differences in probabilistic thinking should not be simply 
explained as single factors, such as fatalism or others. Howard (1988) recently 
emphasizes the usefulness of decision analysis and contends, "Accepting decision analysis 
requires a brief in the value of systematic, logical thought as a basis for decision making. 
This cognitive style will not be natural to people who prefer to be guided primarily by 
feelings rather than thought. Research based on the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator shows 
how people differ in the way they like to perceive and the way they like to judge. 
Decision analysts should realize that not everyone sees the world as they do. They should 
appreciate the special insights they provide that can eliminate the ‘blind-spot’ of those 
who rely mainly on feelings." This study may have presented a more complicated picture 
through a cultural comparison, as it reveals more aspects of cognitive style which lead 
the people raised from other non-Western cultures to deal with uncertainty differently 
and thus may reject the validity of some Western techniques, such as decision analysis.
In order to make comparisons with previous studies, this study continues to use the 
general knowledge questionnaire. Thus, it should be emphasized that we must be 
cautious about the generalization of the conclusions of this study. Future study should 
make further investigations in other uncertain situations with less artificial instruments.
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Figure 3.2. Calibration curves: integrated effect of culture and cognitive type
In addition, this study does not suggest that cognitive style is the only factor which is 
related to probabilistic thinking. In fact, the differences between the groups of cognitive 
type are not more than those found between cultural groups, which implies that there are 
other factors that should be considered in future study, such as the type of uncertain 
situations and the degree of uncertainty. Nevertheless, it could still be expected that the 
cultural differences in probabilistic thinking can be highlighted by making a comparison 
between certain cognitive types from different cultures. I end this chapter with Figure 3.2 
which clearly shows the effect of the style of information-processing by the widened gap 
between the two group-determined calibration curves of the Chinese SJ subjects and the 
British NP subjects. The group determined calibration curve of the Chinese SJ students 
apparently became lower and the curve of the British NP students became slightly higher. 
Moveover, group determined parameters for the Chinese SJ students exhibited
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conspicuous changes in expected directions. Their calibration score rose to 0.0462, which 
indicated the decrease of hit-rate of probability judgments. The resolution score rose to 
0.0154, which meant the improvement of discrimination of probability judgments.
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Chapter 4. Cultural differences: A general phenomenon?
4.1. Introduction
In the study reported in chapter 3, the cultural differences in probabilistic thinking 
between Chinese and British students have been further confirmed. By relating them to 
the basic differences in the habitual ways in which people perceive information and make 
judgments or decisions, the present work also makes these findings more convincing and 
easily understood. These results, consistent with many other experiments, leave little 
place to question the reliability of the findings that Chinese people display more self- 
confidence than British and Americans in their judgments under the uncertainty created 
by a general knowledge questionnaire, and that Chinese people tend to make a clear-cut 
discrimination between certainty and uncertainty, between true and false, and between 
possible and impossible. This sharply contrasts with British and Americans who prefer 
fine differentiation about uncertainty. However, even so it is still too early to say such 
findings have completely revealed the cultural differences between Chinese and Western 
people in probabilistic thinking. It may have already been noticed that this study has not 
made any attempt to draw general conclusions from the present findings. Actually, I have 
emphasized many times that these differences should not be regarded as general 
phenomena before more extensive investigations have been undertaken. Similar or 
different patterns of cultural differences may emerge in other uncertain situations or 
among specific groups of people, such as experts in a field. This chapter will discuss 
further some of the issues about the generalization of findings of cultural differences in 
probabilistic thinking, and will make careful investigations through two experiments. The 
relationships between probabilistic thinking and decision making behaviour remain 
unclear, and no direct evidence until now has been provided in previous cross-cultural 
studies. This chapter will also try to examine such linkages (if any exist) with the hope 
that they can lead us to discover how people’s probabilistic thinking influences their 
decision making behaviour and why in different cultures people make decisions 
differently, which is a major concern of this study.
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Although people may be born with different abilities for dealing with uncertainty, they 
mainly develop their probabilistic thinking through learning from experiences and 
interacting with the environments in which they are situated during their lives. Various 
experiences and environments may cultivate diverse ways of dealing with uncertainties. 
It is also true within an individual culture. In the West, it has already been exhibited that 
even for homogeneous groups of people, performances may vary substantially under 
different uncertain situations and some groups of people may be more capable of making 
probability judgments about a specific task than others. For example, weather forecasters, 
the champions in making calibrated probability judgments, showed the same 
overconfidence in responding to a general knowledge questionnaire as did other groups 
(Keren & Varey, 1984). Students who were often overconfident in their judgments when 
answering general knowledge questions could present calibrated probabilities for then- 
future events, like the possible outcomes of President Nixon’s much-publicized trips to 
China and Russia (Fischhoff & Beyth, 1975). It was also found that the same groups of 
people were overconfident in performing an intellectual task and were underconfident 
in performing some perceptual tasks, such as judging the areas of circles and squares 
(Dawes, 1980). Calibrated probability judgments were found more among experts in 
specific fields (e.g. Balthasar, Boschi, & Menke, 1978; Kabus, 1976; Vertinsky, Kanetkar, 
Vertinsky, & Wilson, 1986; Keren, 1987; Tomassini, Solomon, Romney, & Krogstad, 
1982). Certain elicitation techniques may yield better calibration than others; being asked 
to present probability distributions of uncertain quantities, people could give better 
calibrated judgments with a "probability method" than with a "fractile method" (Seaver, 
von Winterfeldt, & Edwards, 1978).
These examples reveal that people cannot be expected to perform consistently well in 
making probability judgments, when they are faced with different uncertain situations. 
Different probabilistic tasks may stimulate quite different uncertain feelings and evoke 
different cognitive processes. People also cannot be expected to perform well when the 
content of a task is far beyond the reach of their knowledge. Previous studies also 
suggest several factors which should be considered in a future cross-cultural study of 
probabilistic thinking. First, the performances of different cultural groups should be 
further investigated in uncertain situations other than those created by general
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knowledge questionnaires. Second, the level of knowledge or expertise of people must 
be considered as a factor which can influence probability judgments. The judgments of 
Chinese experts in a specific field should be compared with their Western counterparts. 
In addition, elicitation techniques should be as impartial as possible for all the cultural 
groups concerned.
The present study, for the reason I have argued before, will investigate the quality of the 
probability judgments made only by subjects who are capable of dealing with the 
probabilistic task given by an experimenter, and elicited only with proper techniques, so 
task characteristics become the major concern of this study. In order to explain my design 
and choice of experimental tasks, first I must discuss the issue of task taxonomy.
Multi-task experiments
For different purposes, a number of studies have utilized a variety of probabilistic tasks 
among the subjects. Adams and Adams (1961), for example, asked their subjects to 
perform several tasks in a period of five days to determine whether transfer of training 
might occur. These tasks included making decisions about the percentage of blue dots 
in a set of blue and red dots and the percentage of total length a blue line is of a blue 
and red line, deciding on the truth or falsity of general statements, lifting weights while 
blind-folded, and deciding upon the original position of the weight in the series, and 
making decisions as to the synonymity, anonymity, or unrelatedness of word pairs. To 
investigate the impact of knowledge of subjects on their accuracy of probability 
judgments, Lichtenstein and Fischhoff (1977) have designed a series of probabilistic 
tasks. They required subjects to choose between two alternative answers of general 
knowledge questions; to decide whether certain paintings were the work of Asian or 
European children; to estimate the closing prices of stocks; and to judge whether certain 
Latin phrases were handwritten by European or by American adults. In these 
experiments, several characteristics of tasks, along with the characteristics of subjects, 
have been tested as the factors which may affect probabilistic thinking. The effect of the 
degree of difficulty of tasks, which is to some extent related to the degree of uncertainty, 
has also been considered.
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However, most previous studies show no attempt to test the characteristics of tasks 
through classifying uncertain situations. Perhaps this is because experimenters were 
influenced by the Bayesian view that all the uncertainties reflect mental states, and thus 
they ignored the impact of differences between uncertain situations on probabilistic 
thinking. As in many previous studies there is no operational taxonomy of uncertainty, 
factors were often confounded and when some factors were controlled by experimenters 
some other factors sometimes were neglected.
Distinction between GKQ and others
Several scholars have made attempts to distinguish the general knowledge questionnaire 
from other instruments, depending on different characteristics of the tasks at hand. 
Wagenaar and Keren (1985), for example, have analyzed the differences between 
almanac-type and meteorology-type questions. They argue that the probability judgments 
made by subjects for the almanac-type questions and for the meteorology-type questions 
are not the same thing. A probability judgment made in answering an almanac-type 
question, like "is absinthe (a) a precious stone; (b) a liqueur?", in fact, expresses the 
confidence of a subject about whether he has chosen the correct answer. However, a 
judgment of the probability of rain is about the uncertainty which resides in the 
probabilistic nature of meteorological models. When a meteorologist assesses a 
probability of 70% of rain, he means that tomorrow belongs to a class of days about 
which nobody knows more than that it will rain in 70% of the cases. Such a probability 
thereby is not a confidence rating about a judgment. Wagenaar and Keren suggest that 
a meteorologist could probably express how confident he is that tomorrow belongs to 
that class by assessing a second-order probability. They argue that it is reasonable to say 
"There is a 70% chance of rain tomorrow, I am 100% certain of it", but people can never 
say that "In outside world absinthe is 30% precious stone, and 70% liqueur." Wagenaar 
and Keren consider that the confidence rating is more like the second-order probability 
in the rain prediction because the uncertainty is only in the heads of the respondents. 
They believe that if overconfidence is caused by some reluctance to admit a lack of 
knowledge, subjects would become less overconfident when responding to meteorology-
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type questions, as for such questions the probabilities reflect lack of system in the 
available information, not a lack of personal knowledge.
The distinction between the two types of questions, by Wagenaar and Keren, actually are 
closely related to a more general distinction between internal and external uncertainties, 
which will be discussed soon. However, one point needs to be added here. In the 
argument of Wagenaar and Keren, a probability judgment made for an almanac-type 
question is interpreted as a confidence judgment, but I cannot see any reason why a 
probability of 70% which a subject has assessed for a judgment (choosing an alternative 
answer) may not mean that the judgment belongs to a class of judgments which he may 
make or has made wrong for around 30% of the cases in similar situations. In fact, such 
understanding is just what experimenters normally expect from subjects, when they use 
general knowledge questionnaires. The problem is that most subjects probably may not 
perceive the experiment in such a way. If they do, overconfidence may reduce. Indeed, 
Gigerenzer, Hoffrage, and Kleinbolting (in press) found that overconfidence disappeared 
in 80% to 90% of the subjects, when they also asked the subjects to estimate the 
frequencies of correct answers which they have chosen after answering every 50, for 
example, questions.
Keren (1987) later also proposes to distinguish between different types of calibration 
tasks based on whether the items are related or not. Keren’s concept of relatedness is 
certainly a subjective one. It is defined according to the extent to which the subjects’ 
mental processes are similar when they react to a series of items. In some situations, it 
is easy to determine the relatedness of a group of items, as similar cognitive processes 
are clearly involved in responding to them. For example, weather forecasts obviously 
form related items. In forecasting rain, a meteorologist quite possibly goes through 
almost the same cognitive processes in making the probability judgments. Present 
weather condition described by barometer readings, wind directions, satellite pictures, 
etc. are considered, previous judgments made in similar situations may also be recalled, 
and somehow, a probability of 70% that it will rain tomorrow is finally decided. Even 
though we are not able to describe very clearly the cognitive processes which a
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meteorologist may go through in making weather forecasts, there seem to be few 
possibilities that the cognitive processes can become very different from case to case.
The general knowledge questions, in contrast, are apparently unrelated, in the sense that 
they do not stimulate similar cognitive processes. Keren argues that in answering the 
questions like "What is the population of Peru?", "What is the capital of Nepal?" or 
"What is the longest river in the world?", the subjects’ knowledge of one item is 
independent of their knowledge of another item, and no information (knowledge) can 
be inferred from one item and transferred to another. For unrelated items, people 
cannot use their knowledge about the occurrence (or nonoccurrence) of some items for 
assessing the probability of other items in the same set. Keren believes that well 
calibrated probability judgments are more likely to be achieved for related items. It is 
argued that with related items, groups, like meteorologists, can benefit from their 
previous experience, as learning may take place. However, with unrelated items, good 
probability judgments become less likely, as each item may require different cognitive 
processes and so feedback is ineffective in calibrating those processes, unlike related 
items, for which there are grounds to develop inferential processes that would lead to 
probabilistic notions in terms of relative frequency and long-run considerations. Keren 
considers that such conditions are necessary (though not sufficient) for subjects to be well 
calibrated.
Most importantly, with this distinction of tasks Keren has revealed how the relationships 
between items can influence the formation and adjustment of cognitive processes in 
making probability judgments. The concept of relatedness of items also seems to be more 
strict than some previous ones, such as homogenous or repetitive items. When Keren 
speaks of the relatedness of items, he probably means that they are diagnostically related, 
that is, he does not mean that there may necessarily be some cause-effect relationships 
between the items. Of course, they could be causally related, or even independent. The 
interpretation of subjective probability, in essence, concerns only individual occasions, 
not a sequence of outcomes. However, in calibration study the human ability of making 
probability judgments is often tested with a group of experimental items which are not 
necessarily associated to a same uncertain event, although they could be perceived by a
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subject as strictly or loosely related in some way. In contrast, the objective interpretation 
of probability is based on a series of outcomes of an uncertain event. Within the concept 
of objective probability, probability is defined on the basis of a sequence of outcomes of 
an uncertain event, which are often viewed as independent. For example, Mises (1964) 
has used the term "collective" to describe a sequence of outcomes obtained from a 
particular experiment which can be repeated indefinitely often. A collective contains all 
the possible outcomes and the occurrence of every outcome in the collective is 
independent from the others. Keren’s unrelatedness between items may be seen as 
subjectively independent and could be more broadly used to describe a kind of 
relationship between a group of quite different items.
Cross-cultural study
Only two cross-cultural studies are found to have utilized more than one probabilistic 
task, which compared the probabilistic judgments of the Asian and Western cultural 
groups when they responded to the questionnaires of general knowledge and then-future 
events. Wright and Wisudha (1982) asked Indonesian and the British students to assess 
probabilities about both general knowledge questions and then-future events, such as 
"When will the Cengkareng airport be operational? (a) before the end of 1978, (b) after 
the end of 1978" for the Indonesian students. The British students were asked equivalent 
but different questions. They found that both the two groups made quite different 
probability judgments in responding to general knowledge questions and then-future 
events. For the then-future events, the calibration curve of the British group changed 
from being overconfident to underconfident, with the exception of the 100% probability 
judgments. The calibration curve of the Indonesians made a similar upward movement 
too, although in most of the cases it was still overconfident. The experimenters concluded 
that the results of studies of probability judgment that have utilized general knowledge 
questions may not be generalised to most real-world decision making where uncertainty 
is located in the future. However, it is very interesting that even for the then-future 
events the gap between the two calibration curves of the Indonesian and the British 
students did not disappear. That is, the Indonesian students, in comparison with their 
British counterparts, were still more confident about their judgments and gave more
107
probability judgments of extremeness. While the British students reduced their 
proportion of 100% probability judgments for the future-events to 21% from 29% for the 
general knowledge questions, the Indonesian students reduced the same proportion to 
30% from 49%.
The authors have also cited two differences between these two tasks. First, they suppose 
that inferences are more clearly involved in predicting a future event than in answering 
a general knowledge question. The uncertainty is explicitly contained in the judgments 
about the likelihood of future events, because there are no answers available to either 
subject or experimenter. However, in responding to a general knowledge question, 
people may regard themselves as searching for the answer directly from memory without 
making any inference. Another difference, which the authors suppose, is that people may 
perceive uncertainty more explicitly when being required to predict a future event than 
when being asked to answer a general knowledge question. It is argued that although for 
a future event question, subjects are also given two alternative answers, they may be able 
to imagine several different scenarios of act and event sequences which could result in 
an outcome presented as an alternative answer. The recognition of equifinality, that 
different paths involving many different causal relationships could produce the same 
outcome, may lead people to have greater feelings of uncertainty, and thereby influence 
their subsequent probabilistic processing for future event questions. The authors 
emphasized that this tendency might be especially reinforced by the culture which has 
a positive social utility encouraging the expression of certainty in situations where there 
is known to be an answer, but viewing those who try to predict the future with total 
confidence as fools or clairvoyants.
The second study was undertaken by Yates et al. (1989), who observed similar 
phenomena among American and Chinese students. Using a fractile method, they elicited 
the distributions of probability for about 20 different quantities from their subjects. Half 
the items concerned quantities about future states, such as the minimum temperature 
recorded in a city a few days hence. For both cultural groups, the 2% surprise indices 
(the percentage of actual values which fall into the predicted value intervals with below 
1% of probability or above 99%) became smaller in responding to the quantities about
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future states, indicating an improvement in making extreme probability judgments greater 
than 99% or less than 1%. However, for the American group, the index was reduced 
substantially, from 53.8% to 41.4%, whereas for the Chinese, the same index was reduced 
only from 59.8% to 53.2%. Clearly, even for the future items there was still a gap 
between the two 2% surprise indices of the Chinese and the American student groups. 
So, these experiments do not indicate the disappearance of cultural differences, in the 
sense that the Indonesian and the Chinese students still made more extreme probability 
judgments. However, they do suggest that the probability judgments of individual cultural 
groups may vary under different uncertain situations, and timing of uncertain events may 
be one of the factors which influences probability judgments. Therefore, cultural 
differences in probabilistic thinking require more systematic investigation.
Task taxonomy
Although several differences between probabilistic tasks, especially in comparison with 
general knowledge questions, have been discussed, classification schemes are still lacking 
in the studies of probabilistic thinking and in cross-cultural studies. Uncertainty is 
ubiquitous and varies dramatically in form and content. It is unnecessary, if not 
impossible, to investigate probabilistic thinking through exhausting all the cases. Proper 
categorization of uncertainties would be very helpful for this study, because we may be 
able to understand people’s decision behaviour under uncertainty in general, with the 
investigations to a manageable size of categories of uncertainty. Although it is badly 
needed, with a few exceptions systematic classification of uncertainty has not drawn 
enough attention in the study of probabilistic thinking.
A theoretical distinction between uncertainties has been made by Kahneman and Tversky 
(1982) in discussing the variations of uncertainty, although their main concern is to 
analyze the linkage between the conceptions of probability advanced by different schools 
of thought. They distinguish internal from external attributions of uncertainty and sketch 
four modes of judgment that people may adopt in assessing uncertainty. The primary 
distinction they refer to are two loci to which uncertainty can be attributed: the external 
world or our state of knowledge. It is argued that we attribute to causal systems in the
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real world the uncertainty associated with the tossing of a coin, the drawing of a hand 
of cards from a pack, the outcome of a football game, and the behaviour of the St. 
Helens volcano. These causal systems have dispositions to produce different events, and 
we judge the probabilities of these events by assessing the relative strength of the 
competing dispositions. In contrast, such statements as, "I think Mont Blanc is the tallest 
mountain in Europe,” or, "I hope I spelled her name correctly," reflect an uncertainty that 
is attributed to one’s mind rather than to a mountain or a woman. The distinction 
between almanac-type and meteorology-type questions made by Wagenaar and Keren, 
as reviewed above, is obviously consistent with the distinction between internal 
uncertainty and external uncertainty. Almanac-type questions clearly fall into the category 
of internal uncertainty, and meteorology-type ones the category of external uncertainty.
Kahneman and Tversky also emphasized that the attribution of uncertainty about an 
event to dispositions or to ignorance depends, among other things, on timing. Uncertainty 
about past events is likely to be experienced as ignorance, especially if the truth is known 
to someone else, whereas uncertainty about the future is more naturally attributed to the 
dispositions of the relevant system. It has been noticed that people exhibit different 
attitudes to the outcome of a coin toss, depending on whether or not the coin has already 
been tossed. These arguments are supported by the findings in several experiments using 
future items, as seen before.
A  more thorough classification of uncertainty perhaps was developed by Howell and 
Burnett (1978) in their proposal of a taxonomy of tasks used to measure cognitive 
uncertainty. Howell and Burnett point out that people depend on a variety of cognitive 
options in making uncertainty judgments, which include reliance on prior generator 
knowledge, use of stored event frequency records, simplification rules or heuristics, and 
systematic biases. They argue that the cognitive basis is heavily influenced by task 
characteristics. In their classification, Howell and Burnett propose several ways, with 
which uncertain events can be fundamentally distinguished according to their differences 
in three basic characteristics. They classify uncertain events into several categories 
depending on whether they are frequentistic or nonfrequentistic, whether they are 
generated from an unknown process or from a process with known stochastic properties,
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and whether the processes which their occurrence relies on are within or beyond the 
control of the observer.
Howell and Burnett first distinguish between frequentistic and nonfrequentistic uncertain 
events based on the characteristic of repetition. Frequentistic uncertain events are those 
which happen in a repetitive fashion. Many examples can be found among well-known 
laboratory and gambling tasks, like drawing colour balls from a bag, tossing a coin, 
throwing a dice, or playing some card games, which can be repeatedly performed. 
Nonfrequentistic uncertain events, according to Howell and Burnett, are those which are 
for all intents and purposes nonrepetitive and unique. A nuclear attack upon the United 
States, for example, should be categorized as a nonfrequentistic uncertain event, as it has 
neither a "track record" nor much promise of future repetition.
The main difference between frequentistic and nonfrequentistic uncertain events is that 
the repetition of frequentistic uncertain events allows the accumulation of historical data 
and may provide people with a normative basis for predicting the future under some 
conditions. When frequentistic events are generated from stochastic processes, for 
example, by following the "strong law of large numbers," it may be assumed that the 
relative frequency of an outcome calculated from the accumulated samples can be 
viewed as the approximate value of its probability with the expansion of samples. Such 
events could simply be produced by chance-based generators as we have illustrated above 
or could involve a measure of (asymptotic) skill.
Obviously, it could be argued that many more real uncertain events, such as the 
movement of stock market and the state of weather, are not generated from such well- 
known processes as cards or dice, although they have frequentistic nature. Howell and 
Burnett, then, make their second distinction depending on the knowledge which people 
may have about the generating processes of uncertain events. With the term "knowledge", 
they do not refer to accuracy, rather to people’s belief in the generator process. It is 
quite possible that people may persist in their erroneous beliefs about generators. 
Indeed, Nicks (1959) has shown how gamblers can persist in erroneous beliefs about 
generators. It is also suggested that to think of known and unknown generators as end
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points on a continuum of belief strength can heavily affect people’s processing of 
evidence (outcome data). Howell and Burnett argue that unknown generators may 
encourage people to focus their attention on the occurrence of each event or piece of 
diagnostic evidence, while known generators may discourage or bias such processing. 
Thus, the distinction of unknown and known would be meaningful for both internal and 
external generators, but it would not be appropriate to make such distinction for 
nonfrequentistic events.
The third distinction is made based on whether the processes are within or beyond the 
control of the assessors of probability. In many situations, people may believe that they 
are able to impose some kind of control on the outcome of uncertain events. For 
example, the performers of some so-called "skill" tasks may hold the belief that the 
possibilities of individual outcomes or level of performances are partly or even entirely 
under their own control. In facing such tasks, people’s inference about generator 
characteristics are mainly dominated by their previous success-- failure experience (or 
historical data), that is how successful they have been in performing similar tasks until 
now. Howell and Burnett, thereby, consider that during the period of skill acquisition, 
"internally generated" events appear more comparable to those produced by unknown 
rather than by known external generators (see, for example, Brown & Bane, 1975). 
However, known external generators would become more appropriate for the situation, 
in which people may have already developed very stable beliefs in their own capability 
for highly practised skills where performance is at an asymptotic level.
Howell and Burnett further stressed that causality parameters, real and attributed, have 
not received sufficient attention in the literature of behaviourial decision theory in 
comparison with that of social psychology and personality theory (see, for example, 
Phares, 1976; Weiner, 1974). They believe that source of control should be treated as an 
important event characteristic in uncertainty judgment.
Following the classification of Howell and Burnett, eight possible kinds of uncertain 
events could be distinguished depending on the three characteristics: repetition,
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Table 4.1. Taxonomy of uncertain events
Parameter Frequentistic Knowledge I-E Causality
1. Frequentistic Known External
2. Frequentistic Unknown External
3. Frequentistic - Internal
4. Nonfrequentistic - External
5. Nonfrequentistic - Internal
generator knowledge, and source of uncertainty. However, as discussed above, only five 
are plausible, which are summarized in Table 4.1.
In addition, Berkeley and Humphreys (1982) have also proposed a classification of 
uncertainty, but their concern is far beyond a classification of the uncertainty of task. 
This classification almost covers all the uncertainties in the processes of decision making, 
the uncertainties about the outcomes of events, about the decision makers, and even 
about the means of making decisions. They have described seven different types as 
follows.
(i) Uncertainty about the probabilities of outcomes of subsequent events, conditional
on what has preceded them in the act-event sequence between immediate acts 
and consequences.
(ii) Uncertainty about the probabilities of subsequent events, conditional on the
occurrence of other events extraneous to the sequences in (i).
(iii) Uncertainty about how to incorporate prior information (e.g. results of prior
sampling, base rate in a reference population) in determining the probability of 
a subsequent event.
(iv) Uncertainty about how to conceptualize the worth of consequences: assessing a
consequence’s utility requires the generation of a single number describing its 
holistic (and entire) "moral value." When more than one criterion of worth is 
involved, uncertainty can arise about how to combine these criteria.
(v) Procedural Uncertainty, which Hogarth et al. (1980) describe as "Uncertainty 
concerning means to handle or process the decision." e.g. specifying relevant
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uncertainties, what information to seek, and where, how to invent alternatives and 
assess consequences, etc.
(vi) Uncertainty about how the decision maker (or the persons he or she is deciding for)
himself or herself will feel, and wish to act having arrived at a subsequent act 
(choice point) after intervening events have unfolded "for real."
(vii) Uncertainty about the extent one possesses agency for inducing changes in the
probabilities of subsequent events (conditional on acts yet to be taken, as in (i), 
above) through being able to alter relations between states of the world (Savage, 
1954).
The choice of this study
The investigation of present study will not go as far as Berkeley and Humphreys have 
suggested, because the major concern here is the task characteristics. Howell and 
Burnett’s classification of uncertain events thus provides more useful guidance for the 
design of experimental tasks. First, this classification suggests that a cross-cultural study 
of probabilistic thinking must consider task characteristics as they may influence the 
cognitive options upon which uncertain judgments are made. Second, it provides us with 
guidance to trace cultural differences in probabilistic thinking between Chinese and 
Westerners to their cognitive options. Following this classification, the probability 
judgment of Chinese and Western people should be compared under five different 
uncertain situations before a general conclusion about cultural differences can be 
reached. Obviously, an ideal design of an experiment is to construct five different types 
of uncertain events and ask subjects to make probability judgments. The similarities and 
differences between the judgments of Chinese and Western cultural groups can then be 
compared and analyzed. Previous cross-cultural studies in probabilistic thinking have 
extensively used general knowledge questions as tasks to stimulate uncertain feelings 
among subjects. According to Howell and Burnett’s classification, a general knowledge 
questionnaire could be categorized into nonfrequentistic uncertain events with internal 
generating processes. So, four other types of uncertain events may require further 
investigations in future cross-cultural study. In the rest of this study, I will focus only on
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external uncertainty to compare the probability judgments made by Chinese and other 
Western cultural groups of people.
Several probabilistic tasks are immediately available as choices. Many laboratory and 
gambling tasks (those involving coins, cards, dice, wheels of fortune, etc.) can be used as 
frequentistic tasks with known or unknown generating processes. However, such tasks are 
hardly capable of being used to stimulate uncertain feelings among subjects, as most 
people may already have experiences and knowledge about the distributions of the 
outcomes of such events. For example, there may be a few persons who believe that the 
chance of heads turning up is higher than the chance of tails when tossing a fair coin. In 
most of real-life decision problems, many different uncertainties can be involved. Even 
for a similar case, such as gambling on horse-racing, several different uncertainties may 
need to be considered. The appearance of a black horse, the weather which may affect 
the field, and the future performances of the individual horses and riders, for which the 
gamblers may still remember their past records, can be categorized into different types 
and are mixed up. It seems to be difficult to find some real probabilistic tasks which 
contain only one type of uncertainty. Another difficulty in designing the experiments 
comes from the knowledge parameter. It seems to be difficult to construct an uncertain 
event which we can identify as one with known or unknown generators, because it 
depends on the beliefs of subjects. Indeed, Howell and Burnett have suggested that we 
should think of known and unknown generators as end points on a continuum of belief 
strength. For these reasons, I will not strictly follow this classification to design the 
probabilistic tasks, although they contain some uncertainties which may have similar 
characteristics with one particular standard type in the classification of Howell and 
Burnett.
In this study, I do not try to construct some standard uncertain situations, for the reasons 
I have discussed above and will confine the investigation to the subjective probability 
judgment about the outcomes of uncertain events. I seek to derive the probabilistic tasks 
from typical decision situations, as I believe people’s probabilistic thinking should be 
investigated in normal decision situations. This will also make it easier to relate decision 
makers’ probabilistic thinking to their decision behaviour.
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Present design of probabilistic tasks is closely related to a general classification of 
decision problems, which depends on the characteristics of the involved uncertainty. 
Generally speaking, decision tasks can be categorized into three types: (a) Risk decisions, 
(b) Competition decisions, and (c) Uniqueness decisions. "Risk" here refers to the 
situations under which a decision maker may have met similar problems for many times 
and may have frequentistic records about them, but still cannot be sure about what will 
happen this time. The uncertainties involved in risk decisions have the characteristics of 
frequentistic uncertainty described in Howell and Burnett’s framework. By "uniqueness" 
I mean the situations in which decision makers have little information about the decision 
problem which they faced, even though they may have some beliefs about what will 
happen. The uncertainties involved in uniqueness decisions are nonfrequentistic and have 
unknown generating processes. In a competitive environment, a decision maker may face 
uncertainties which are deliberately created by rivals. This kind of uncertainty may fall 
into some type of Howell and Burnett’s classification, but this study treats it as a specific 
type as it is so widespread that it makes one kind of decision problem apparently distinct 
from others. In principle, I should construct several decision tasks which involve these 
three types of uncertainty in order to explore cultural differences in dealing with different 
uncertainties. However, within limited time, it is very difficult to extract sufficient 
probability judgments about future unique events and then to measure their accuracy. 
Therefore, this study will concentrate only on the uncertainties involved in risk and 
competition decisions.
42. Two Experiments
42.1. Experiment 1: Playing the game of bridge
The first experiment aims to investigate the characteristics of probability judgments 
under uncertainty involving competition, and to see whether the pattern of cultural 
differences, which has been found in previous cross-cultural studies of probabilistic 
thinking, will vary or not.
116
Probabilistic task
This study supposes that some aspects of decision makers’ behaviour in dealing with 
uncertainty under competition situations may be examined by observing how they play 
competitive games. Indeed, like in the West, in Chinese history there were many famous 
generals and politicians who were fond of playing the game of "Go" and often related the 
tactics developed for dealing with the reality, in particular war, with those for playing the 
game. Of course, it can be argued that such a "perfect information" game is too simple 
to compare with most of the real uncertain competitive situations, as it involves much 
fewer uncontrollable factors. However, the principal characteristics of uncertainties, 
which both players and decision makers face, do have some factors in common and these 
are among the major concerns in this study. For example, such uncertainties all partly 
stem from the existence of a competitor or a rival.
At first glance, there would seem to be many Chinese games which could be used as the 
probabilistic task. For example, the games of "Go", Chinese chess, or "Ma-yong", are all 
still widely played by Chinese, even today. However, after a close look at these games 
I ruled them out, because in such games it is hard to find any occasion when I can ask 
players to present their probability judgments properly in a form suitable for the purpose 
of this study. When these games are being played, uncertain situations can change greatly 
at different times and for different players, and are difficult to control by the 
experimenter.
Keren (1987) recently has used the game of bridge as the probabilistic task in a 
calibration study, which provided the experimenter with a perfect opportunity to extract 
the card players’ probability judgments. In comparison with those Chinese games cited 
above, the game of bridge has a major merit in that it is clearly divided into two phases: 
bidding and playing, and so the card players can be asked to estimate the probability that 
a final contract will be made after bidding but before actually playing the hand. For this 
reason and for making cross-cultural comparison easier, this experiment used bridge, a 
Western game, as the basis of one of the probabilistic tasks.
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To make this clearer and to make the experiment understandable, I need to give a brief 
explanation for some aspects of the game, which are considered relevant to this study. 
Basically, the game of bridge is played by four players consisting of two teams. It starts 
with bidding, by which players follow certain sequences and use a limited vocabulary to 
communicate with their partners and opponents in order to discover more about card 
distributions and then to declare a favourable contract for themselves. A contract is a bet 
made by one team on wining a certain number of tricks (with a particular suit as trumps) 
while playing the game. In the game of bridge, trick means the cards (one from each 
player) won by one team in one round. Through several rounds of bidding, the final 
contract is reached, and the bidding phase is over. The team who declare the final 
contract will play in the offensive position, with the other team in the defensive position. 
After bidding, one of the defenders leads a card, and then the offense player who has 
not declared the contract, lays down all his cards on the table and they become the 
dummy. Finally, the players begin to play. Both teams attempt to take as many tricks as 
possible during play of the game. The offense team tries to take enough tricks to fulfil 
the declared contract, while the defense team tries to prevent the fulfilment of the 
contract.
In the bidding phase, all players attempt to reduce the uncertainty as much as they can, 
but it can never be eliminated completely. Before any trick has been played, the players 
still don’t know the exact card combination of their partners, nor that of their opponents. 
They also still don’t know how their opponents are going to play. Obviously, the final 
outcome of a game is determined by both the card distribution and the way in which the 
two teams play. The task in this experiment is to ask the players to present their 
probability judgments about the outcome of a game before dummy has been displayed, 
which creates the uncertain situation described above.
As the game of bridge was originated in the West, one may doubt if this task is suitable 
for the Chinese subjects. However, this worry is unnecessary, since the game of bridge 
is very popular in China today, and has even become one of the most prevalent hobbies, 
especially among intellectuals.
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Subjects
The subjects were 14 pairs of amateur players from a bridge club in a governmental 
organization of several thousand staff members. Most of them had played the game for 
four or five years, but none of them had experience of national or international 
competitions.
Procedure
The experiment was conducted in a tournament organized by the manager of the club 
and the experimenter. The players were first divided into two groups of 7 pairs. During 
the whole competition, the players in one group would always play in the east or west 
positions, and the others would always play in the south or north positions. Twenty eight 
decks of cards were distributed on seven tables (four decks for each table). Each deck 
of cards constituted a game, which was divided in advance into four "hands" of 13 cards 
each, and remained the same for the entire tournament. So, the 28 decks were divided 
into seven rounds of four games. Each pair from one group played a round (four games) 
against each of the seven pairs from another group according to a predetermined order. 
Each of the 28 players played 28 games. Financial prizes were awarded to the first three 
pairs of each group according to the final scores.
The players were given instructions before the tournament started. They were required 
to estimate the probability that the final contract would be made at every time after the 
bidding ended and before any card had been played. They were allowed to use any 
number between 0 and 100 (percentages) to express their beliefs about the outcome of 
a game. It was suggested that they should use 100 only when they were absolutely sure 
that the contract would be made and should use 0 only when they were absolutely sure 
that the contract would fail. Similarly, low probability meant that they believed that the 
contract was likely to fail and high probability meant that they thought the contract was 
likely to be made. A probability of 50 meant they believed there was an equal chance 
of success or failure of the contract. For recording their probability judgments, each 
player was also given a form with the games numbered 1 to 28 and was asked to provide
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a probability judgment immediately after the bidding phase of each game. The players 
were required to make their probability judgments independently and any exchange of 
information which violated the bidding rules was disallowed. The players were also asked 
to note the position of the declarer (who declared the final contract), so I could get to 
know the role of players (offense or defense). After all the players had completed this 
task, they went on to play. The final score was recorded on a separate form for deciding 
who would be the prize winners.
Analysis of Results
All the 784 probability judgments made by 28 Chinese card players were grouped into 
11 categories: 0-4%, 5%-14%, 15%-24%,..., 85%-94%, 95%-100%. On this basis, the 
calibration curve was drawn and is shown in Figure 4.1. It can be seen that the curve for 
the Chinese group is quite near the diagonal which indicates perfect calibration, 
especially for probability judgments above 40%. The ups and downs in the range of 0- 
40% may be of less importance, as they are due to the small number of observations in 
this range. Less use of probabilities under 40% is quite natural. Generally speaking, a 
player who bets on a contract should think that it is more likely to be made than to fail. 
In fact, of 196 games played, 127 (65%) contracts were finally made. The closeness 
between the calibration curve and the diagonal means that the Chinese players as a 
whole made rather good probability judgments about the uncertainty which they faced 
in playing the game of bridge. Such good performance of these Chinese players is further 
supported by their very small value of calibration (0.0053), which was also calculated on 
the basis of group data (see the definitions of calibration, H and resolution in chapter 
2). From the frequency distribution of probability judgments, it was also found that the 
Chinese players did not concentrate solely on extreme probabilities, but also very often 
used other probabilities. Out of the total of 784 judgments, 100% was used only 115 
times, not more than 15 percent. It also resulted in a high entropy H (3.00) and a good 
resolution score (0.0390), which indicate better discrimination of the probability 
judgments.
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Figure 4.1. Calibration curves: Dutch and Chinese card players
Within the limited time, I could not carry out a similar experiment in a British cultural 
group as was the procedure in the previous study. However, the comparable data 
collected by Keren (1987) among Dutch amateur card players may be borrowed to serve 
the purpose of cross-cultural comparison. To study the cognitive processes of repeated 
probability judgments, Keren collected data from 28 Dutch amateur players who were 
members of a sports club and had been playing the game of bridge for a long time. The 
calibration curve of the Dutch player group is also shown in Figure 4.1. In Keren’s 
experiment, the last 4 games were omitted since the amateur players were not able to 
finish all the games within the arranged time, and so the calibration curve is based on 
a total of 672 observations, not on 784 as in this experiment. One may note that there 
is also a slight difference in the methods of grouping the data between the two studies. 
However, there were few cases in which the Chinese players provided their probability 
to the second decimal place (or unit’s place in percentage) and so actually the two 
methods are almost the same. The two cultural groups are also comparable in the sense 
that they all had played the game of bridge for some time, but had no experience of 
taking part in national or international competitions.
n<D
id
LI+J
£VJ
+JU(DLL0U
C
IDU
L
<Da
121
The pair of curves presents a very different picture from previous cross-cultural studies, 
in which general knowledge questionnaires were employed as probabilistic tasks. From 
Figure 4.1, it can be seen that the Chinese card players as a whole made better 
probability judgments than their Dutch counterparts. Although Keren did not report the 
calibration measure of the performance of the Dutch card players, we still can find that 
in most of the cases the Chinese were less overconfident than the Dutch. The Chinese 
did not show a strong tendency for making extreme probability judgments, in contrast the 
Dutch made more extreme judgments. From the frequency of probability judgments 
made by the two groups, we also can see that the Dutch offered 196 (29%) probability 
judgments of 100%, whereas the Chinese used 100% only 115 (15%) times. Even 
considering all the judgments above 80%, the Dutch still used them more frequently and 
were more often wrong. Another interesting phenomenon is that the Chinese used 50% 
much more often than the Dutch. It showed that in more cases the Chinese liked to 
leave the "door" open, because giving any probability under or over 50% would, to some 
extent, have expressed that they already judged the outcomes, success or failure of a 
contract. The Dutch also used 0, another extreme point, slightly more often.
Besides the cross-cultural comparison, I also compared these results with those obtained 
in our previous experiment which asked the Chinese university students general 
knowledge questions. I have already pointed out the differences between the 
characteristics of uncertainty involved in these two probabilistic tasks and later I will 
provide a further discussion. The two tasks also have some other differences in the form 
and requirement of the experiment. Previous experiments presented a general knowledge 
question with two alternatives from which the subjects could choose and they were 
required to use the probability only between 50% and 100%. However, in this 
experiment the card players had only one alternative, that is, whether a contract would 
be made or not and they were allowed to use any number between 0 and 100% to 
express their beliefs about the outcome of a game. So, in order to make a comparison 
between the two studies, it is first necessary to transform the data collected by this study 
into a comparable form with those from the previous experiment. As we knew at the 
beginning of this experiment, the card players had been instructed that they should use 
0 only when they were absolutely sure that a contract would fail. So, we may transform
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a probability of 0 for predicting a success of a contract into a probability of 100%, but 
for predicting a failure. Similarly, a probability of x less than 50% can be transformed 
into 100%-x. After this transformation, the data of this study can be regrouped into 6 
categories as I did in the previous study. This transformation, of course, can be criticized 
as it assumed that the sum of a card player’s subjective probabilities that a final contract 
would be made and failed equals 1 .1 will make no further defense of this, even though 
I have tried to extract consistent probability judgments from the card players. However, 
since most of the probability judgments in this experiment are not less than 50%, this 
transformation will not have a significant impact on the analysis.
From the transformed data, I drew a new calibration curve for the Chinese card player 
group. It is shown in Figure 4.2, along with the calibration curve obtained in the 
experiment using a general knowledge questionnaire. The two calibration curves form 
a sharp contrast: in answering the general knowledge questions, the Chinese students 
made many more overconfident probability judgments; in playing the game of bridge, the 
Chinese amateur card players made much better calibrated probability judgments. The
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calibration measure for the Chinese card player group is 0.0046, which is much lower 
than the 0.0414 of the Chinese student group in my own study and the 0.0289 in the 
study of Yates et al (1989). Other group-determined parameters also indicate good 
performance of the Chinese card players. In comparison with the student group, the card 
player group made much less extreme but more calibrated probability judgments. The 
H  measure also increases to 2.55 from 2.07 and the resolution measure increases to 
0.0219 from 0.0140, which means better ability in being able to discriminate probability 
judgments into significant different categories of probability. However, in comparison 
with the resolution score of the Chinese student group in the study of Yates et al (1989), 
0.0205, this increase is not impressive.
Similar analysis was also made on the basis of individual data. Table 4.2 presents general 
results. Significant differences were found in five measures between the two groups. The 
Chinese card players on average offered only 16.45 percent of 100% probability 
judgment, whereas the Chinese students used it over half of the time, but it can be seen 
that they were wrong more often. The measures of calibration, H entropy and resolution 
consistently show that the card players on average had made much better probability 
judgments in playing the game of bridge than the Chinese students in answering the 
general knowledge questions. The card player group has a lower calibration measure and 
higher H and resolution measures than the student group, and all of these differences 
are statistically significant. However, no significant differences were found in the 
measures of the percentage of 50% judgments and the percentage correct for any 50% 
judgments.
The differences between the two groups of Chinese people in making probability 
judgments could be related to the characteristics of the probability judgment makers and 
the characteristics of the tasks. In playing the game of bridge, card players made 
repeated probability judgments for a same uncertain event, that is, whether a contract 
would be made, and so they could get the feedback after every game. It may suggest that 
the card players in this experiment may have this advantage over the students. To look 
at the effect of feedback on probability judgment, I divided the 28 games into two 
groups: game 1 to game 14 are in one group, and game 15 to game 28 in the other. This
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Table 4.2. Comparisons between two probabilistic tasks
Task
Measure
General knowledge The game of bridge 
(N=95) (N=28) t
1.Percentage of 50% judgments given 
Mean 17.63 21.30 N.S.
Std.Dev. 12.7 10.4
2.Percentage correct for any 50% judgments given 
Mean 48.85 44.43 N.S.
Std.Dev. 19.9 25.4
3.Percentage of 100% judgments given 
Mean 51.19 16.45 10.84**
Std.Dev. 19.4 13.3
4.Percentage correct for any 100% judgments given 
Mean 78.62 89.19 -2.42*
Std.Dev. 10.11 22.5
5.Entropy H
Mean 1.75 2.22 -6.58“
Std.Dev. 0.58 0.20
6.Calibration
Mean 0.0592 0.0452 2.04*
Std.Dev. 0.033 0.031
7.Resolution
Mean 0.0272 0.0570 -3.92“
Std.Dev. 0.018 0.039
Two tailed significance ** p < 0.01 * p < 0.05
division was more or less arbitrary. Insufficient numbers of observations impede me from 
dividing them into further groups. Nevertheless, a rough analysis may still provide us with 
some clues. The calibration curves for the two groups are together presented in Figure
4.3. Surprisingly, almost no significant improvement can be seen from these two 
calibration curves. The only finding was that the card players became more cautious from 
their less frequent use of 100% and more use of 50%. The number of 100% judgments 
has been reduced to 47 from 68 in the second half of the tournament, but the exactness
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of probability judgments of 100% has not changed. However, the group-determined 
parameter does show certain improvement in calibration of judgments, perhaps as the 
weight, the proportions of probability judgments, has been taken into account in the 
calculation of calibration parameter. In the last 14 games, the calibration measure 
reduced to 0.0063 from the previous 0.0073, but no significant changes are found in the 
other measures. Another factor which I supposed may affect probability judgments is the 
card players’ role in playing the game. To look at this, I separated the probability 
judgments made by the card players when they were in defense position from those made 
when they were in offense. As in previous analysis, I first compared the calibration curves 
which are drawn based on defense data and offense data respectively. From Figure 4.4, 
it can be seen that in some cases, the defense players were more likely to be 
underconfident than the offense players. This is further evidenced by the big difference 
between the two groups of data in overconfidence measures (see chapter 2) after weights 
have been taken into account, -30.10 for the offense data and 1.4 for the defense data. 
A negative sign here indicates overconfidence, and a positive sign underconfidence. More 
careful analysis reveals that when the card players were in the offense position they were
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more overconfident in using the probability above 50% and when they were in defense 
position they were more likely to be underconfident in using the probability under 50%.
4.2.2. Experiment 2
The second experiment aims to examine the characteristics of probability judgments 
made by Chinese experts under a risk decision situation and to see whether there will 
be any cultural differences in probabilistic thinking between Chinese and Western 
decision makers.
Subjects
Twenty one economists working in several governmental departments in Beijing 
participated in this experiment. Their daily work includes making an analysis of the
127
national economic situation, predicting the trend of future economic development and 
finally presenting recommendations on economic policy to the government, to be 
considered in governmental decision making. All this work is closely related to making 
forecasts of economic indices. In doing this work some of the economists depend more 
on econometric models, others depend more on their subjective judgments, which they 
themselves often describe as "striking numbers". All the subjects have a minimum of 
three years’ experience of such economic forecasting.
Task and procedure
A forecast meeting was organized by two officials on behalf of two governmental 
departments in September, 1990. The economists were invited to discuss some issues in 
the forecast of the national economic situation and were told that a new method would 
be introduced. At the beginning of the meeting, the officials and the economists first 
selected 24 economic indices which they considered necessary for further analysis of the 
national economic situation. These indices involve many economic areas, such as 
industry, agriculture, trade, and so on. Then each economist was required only to make 
forecasts of 6 indices which were in his or her everyday survey. Each index was required 
to be forecast for the three months ahead, that is, October, November and December. 
One of the two officials then remarked that a new method would be tried this time to 
see whether it could improve their work in economic forecasting and analysis or not. 
Instead of making "single-value" forecasts, this time they were required to present their 
forecasts with a type of cumulative probability distribution. After that, each subject was 
given a booklet describing the procedure of the new forecasting method (see below). The 
experimenter then explained the method (elicitation technique) and answered the 
questions from the subjects. Following the procedure, every economist made a tentative 
forecast of an index in a warm up session. The economists then started to make their 
real forecasts, until both the experimenter and the economists themselves were confident 
that they could apply this method properly. The subjects were allowed to retrieve 
statistical data and to consult other information as they usually did, but not to exchange 
opinions about the probability judgments they were making. They were asked to return 
their results within one week. There were communications between the subjects and the
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experimenter in that period of time. The experimenter answered further questions from 
the subjects about the method, and consequently he asked several subjects to correct 
their errors in drawing the probability distribution curves.
In this experiment, the uncertainty that the subjects faced is about the value of an 
uncertain continuous quantity, rather than several discrete outcomes of an uncertain 
event. In chapter 2, two widely used methods (the fractile and probability methods), for 
eliciting such probability judgments, have already been briefly discussed. In this 
experiment, the SRI (Stanford Research Institute) method developed by Stael von 
Holstein and Matheson (1979) was followed, although several sub-procedures were 
simplified or modified. In order to collect enough data within limited time, it was not 
possible to elicit the probability judgments through a face-to-face interview with every 
subject for every economic index. Instead, the subjects were taught the method and made 
their own judgments. The subjects were asked to follow five steps in presenting their 
probability judgments about an economic index through drawing a cumulative probability 
distribution curve with a probability scale already drawn on the vertical axis of the graph. 
Each subject was given 18 such probability graphs (six indices for three months).
In the first step, the subjects were asked to decide a range by giving upper and lower 
assessments of an uncertain quantity so that the actual value would fall outside this range 
only in extreme and very surprising circumstances. They were also instructed to make the 
range as small as possible, in order to make the forecast more meaningful. To check 
whether the range was decided as required, the second step asked the subjects to 
construct possible scenarios in which the index could reach the upper or lower 
boundaries. If they were in any doubt, they should make proper changes until they were 
satisfied. Then, in the third step the subjects started to draw the curve of cumulative 
probability distribution in the provided probability graphs (see a sample in Figure 4.5). 
The lower and upper assessments were first plotted on the horizontal axis as the left and 
right ends of the curve. The whole range was then divided into several equal sub-ranges 
with 5 to 7 value points on the horizontal axis. For every point, except the lower end, the 
subjects were asked to assess a probability that the index would not exceed the value. 
After 6 to 8 coordinates were plotted, a smooth curve was drawn freehand in pencil.
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Figure 4.5. Cumulative probability distribution
They were reminded that the curve expressed cumulative probability and so it must 
ascend and reach 100% at the upper boundary. The fourth step was to check the 
consistency of the probability judgments. The subjects were instructed to find the two 
value points in the horizontal axis which corresponded to probability 0.33 and 0.67. These 
two points with the upper and lower boundaries thus divided the whole range into three 
parts. The subjects were asked to think whether they really believed the actual value had 
the same possibility of falling into the three sub-ranges. To test it, it was suggested that 
they suppose that they gamble and bet on the three sub-ranges. If the actual value falls 
into the sub-range they bet on, they will win, otherwise they will lose. They then asked 
themselves whether, or not, they were reluctant to let other people bet before them or 
not. If they were reluctant, it meant that they did not believe that betting on any one of 
the three sub-ranges had the same chance of winning, and so they should recheck the 
already drawn curve and continue the same procedure until they were no longer 
reluctant. In step 5, the subjects were asked to make a final check and refinement for the
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whole cumulative probability curve. For the last result, they should make sure that they 
would like to make their own decisions based on it.
I chose the SRI method because it has some obvious advantages in comparison with 
other methods. First, it does not present subjects with available values as does the 
probability method, but instead asks subjects to determine the range of value themselves. 
So, it can avoid the disliked impact of the experimenter on the subjects’ judgments. 
Second, it stresses the importance of imagining possible scenarios, which can push the 
subjects to think carefully about their forecast. Finally, it provides a simple way of 
checking the consistency of judgments.
Analysis of Results
This task was familiar to the subjects, except now they were required to express their 
judgments in terms of probability. Actually, the subjects who participated in this 
experiment should be considered as experts in economic forecasting, however, their 
performances were not encouraging.
A total 378 (21x6x3) curves of cumulative probability distribution were collected from 
this experiment. The second histogram of figure 4.6 shows the frequency that the value 
actually fell into the 8 intervals of the curves drawn by the subjects. In comparison with 
perfect calibration (indicated by the first histogram), it can be seen that there were too 
many cases (as high as 299 times) where the actual value fell outside, or very nearly 
outside, the prediction range given by the subjects, and only in much fewer cases, the 
actual value fell into the middle of the range. The 2% surprise index reached as high as 
80, which means that when 2 of the predicted values were expected to fall into the two 
extreme intervals for calibrated judgments, 80 arrived. Most surprises happened in the 
interval above 0.99 (277). Perfect calibration results in the subjects’ judgmental interval 
between 0.25 and 0.75 should have contained about 186 actual values, yet in fact 
contained only 21. The basic result of this experiment was that the judgments of the 
economists were "too tight", that is, their judgmental prediction ranges were very often
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too narrow to contain the actual value of the indices. It indicates a very strong tendency 
of overconfidence in the Chinese economist’s judgments.
The results here are quite similar to those obtained by Yates et al. (1989), although the 
subjects and probabilistic tasks of the two experiments are different. In the experiment 
of Yates et al., sixty Chinese university students were asked to make judgments about 10 
quantities about the future, for example, the minimum temperature recorded in 
Guangzhou a few days hence. The two results were compared in Figure 4.7. The first 
histogram indicates the student group and the second the economist group. As the report 
of Yates et al. does not provide individual data, I am not able to make further statistical 
analysis. However, from Figure 4.7, it is clear that there are no conspicuous differences
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Figure 4.7. Comparison between Chinese students and economists
between the two judgmental patterns. Both of their judgments were "too tight" and 
overconfident. Perhaps the only significant difference is that more often the economists’ 
forecasts were far below the actual values, which resulted in very high 1% surprise index 
of above 0.99.
As the subjects were asked to make judgments about the economic indices three months 
ahead, it may be possible to look at the effect of timing on their probability judgments. 
Figure 4.8 shows the separated judgments of the subjects for the three months. No 
obvious differences can be found. There are only slight increases from October to 
December in the 1% surprise index of above 0.99 boundary and corresponding decreases 
in the 1% surprise index of below 0.01. Further statistical analysis confirmed these
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observations. None of the differences between every two month’s data were found to be 
statistically significant. In this experiment, the length of the period of forecast did not 
seem to have any obvious impact on the probability judgments of the economists.
For this experiment, making a proper cross-cultural comparison becomes more difficult. 
First, it is very difficult to have a chance of making a similar experiment with British 
economists. Second, even if it were possible, the comparison probably still could not be 
carried out on a fair basis, because forecasting the Chinese economy and forecasting the 
British economy have great differences. Perhaps this is the price of my choosing such a 
real task. Finally, inconsistent results are still being reported in Western cultural groups, 
although good performances were sometimes found, and this makes a cross-cultural 
comparison more complicated. Nevertheless, I have found a few experimental results
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Figure 4.9. Comparison between Chinese economists and American students
about Western people reported in earlier studies which can be used as a comparison. It 
is hoped that such comparisons at least can lead to deeper understanding about cultural 
differences in probabilistic thinking. Yates et al. (1989) asked a group of American 
students to estimate 10 uncertain quantities (e.g. the temperature) in the future, and used 
the fractile method. I compare the probability judgments of the Chinese economists with 
those of the American students in Figure 4.9. It clearly shows that the Chinese 
economists were surprised in many more cases than the American students, although 
both groups were overconfident in their probability judgments. Even considering that the 
Chinese economists might face much more complicated situations than the American 
students, the differences between the two cultural groups in the characteristics of 
probability judgments are still impressive. The 2% surprise index for the American 
students is about 41, while for the Chinese economists it is as high as 80.
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The probability judgments elicited from Western experts were often found to be good. 
In the United States, the probability judgments of the weather forecasters were excellent. 
In forecasting tomorrow’s high temperature with five fractiles (0.125, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, and 
0.875), the two groups of forecasters in Murphy and Winkler’s (1974; 1977) studies 
respectively obtained 27 and 21 for the 25% surprise index (below 0.125 and above 
0.875), which nearly reached the level of perfect calibration. However, the subjects in the 
study of Stael von Holstein (1971) made quite poorly-calibrated probability judgments 
when they were asked to make forecasts for three fix-value events: (a) the average 
temperature tomorrow and the next day (dividing the entire response range into eight 
categories), (b) the average temperature 4 and 5 days from now (eight categories), and 
(c) the total amount of rain in the next 5 days (four categories). The surprise index, 
which was calculated by Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, and Phillips (1982) based on the density 
function produced from the experiment, was found to be too high. It reached 30 when 
2 was demanded. The study which was carried out by Kabus (1976) in Morgan Guaranty 
Trust Company perhaps is the most comparable study with this one. Kabus utilized 
histogram techniques to elicit the bankers’ predications about the interest rate on a 90- 
day Certificate of Deposit (CD) at some future date. The percentages of the bankers’ 
subjective chances (probabilities) over the possible interest rates were expressed by the 
heights of the histograms. It was found that individuals and the group as whole had 
performed very well. The forecasted values of the 90-day CD rate were fairly close to the 
actual values and never fell outside the 75% confidence interval. The direction was also 
always forecasted correctly. The results sharply contrast with present findings among the 
Chinese economists.
The present results showed that the Chinese economists had a very strong tendency of 
extremeness in making probability forecasts. Very often, the actual values of the 
economic indices even exceeded the highest values that they could imagine as possible. 
In previous studies, a quite different phenomenon was found among several Western 
cultural groups. These may suggest another pattern of cultural differences in making 
probability judgments. However, it is still too early to derive any serious conclusions. The 
evidence is very limited, and the comparisons have not been carried out on too sound 
a basis. There are obvious differences between the probabilistic tasks that were used in
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the different cultural groups, and this might have some impact on the results. In this 
experiment, the Chinese economists seemed to face a very difficult task. Even compared 
with the bankers in Kabus’ study, who were also asked to make forecasts of an economic 
index, the interest rate, the Chinese economists might have met more difficulties as their 
forecasts were more complicated and involved much more uncertain factors.
It may be argued that the cultural differences analyzed above were partly caused by the 
different elicitation methods employed in the studies. However, such obvious differences 
do not seem to be explained away by this reason alone. Moreover, with the SRI method, 
which is superior to other methods in several aspects, better results should be expected. 
Nevertheless, it is possible that the economists did not use the SRI method properly, as 
they were unable to get used to it within such a short period of time. From the graphs 
presented by the economists, the experimenter found that they might follow some steps 
carefully, but might not take sufficient care with some others. It can be seen that most 
economists checked the consistency of probability judgments, but it is not clear whether 
they had put enough effort into the construction of scenarios, because no scenarios were 
recorded.
4.3. General Discussion
The main findings of the experiments are that the Chinese do not deal with different 
uncertainties in a consistent way and so there may be no general pattern of cultural 
differences in probabilistic thinking between Chinese and some Western cultures. The 
cultural differences may vary for particular groups of people or under specific uncertain 
situations. First, let us analyze why the Chinese students and the card players made 
probability judgments differently.
Previous studies using general knowledge questions as tasks showed that the Chinese 
students had a strong tendency of pursuing the extremeness of probability, and of 
ignoring the calibration when they were choosing between the two alternative answers. 
It contrasted with the American and British students who were found to prefer 
calibration to extremeness. However, the results of the second experiment described a
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quite different picture. They demonstrated that while playing the game of bridge the 
Chinese amateur players became very cautious in predicting the outcome of a game. 
They changed, now avoiding extremeness of probability and preferring its calibration. 
The Chinese card players performed so differently from the Chinese students that the 
cultural differences previously found between Chinese and Western students did not 
repeat at all between the Chinese and Dutch card players. In fact, the probability 
judgments of the Dutch card players had expressed much more extreme tendency, and 
so the differences found between the Dutch and Chinese card players in making 
probability judgments have almost reversed previous findings of cultural differences in 
probabilistic thinking between several Western and Chinese student groups.
Why did the Chinese students and the amateur card players perform the probabilistic 
tasks so differently? And why did the pattern of cultural differences change so 
dramatically? Several factors appear to be related to such changes. For example, one 
may attribute such changes to the superiority or inferiority of people’s ability in dealing 
with uncertainty. There is no doubt that the amateur card players as a self-selected group 
may have more occasions to train themselves in dealing with uncertain situations through 
regularly playing the game than do the students who did not play the game at all. Thus, 
perhaps, they tended to think of uncertainty more in a probabilistic way. Even so, can 
we expect the Chinese amateur card players, if they were asked to answer the same 
general knowledge questionnaire as the Chinese students, to present the same 
performance as they did in playing the game of bridge? Unfortunately, due to the limited 
experiment time, I was not given the opportunity to ask the Chinese card players to 
answer a general knowledge questionnaire.
At present there is no experimental data that rejects such expectation. Some 
observations, however, do suggest that the Chinese card players might not be able to 
keep such good performance, if they were given a general knowledge questionnaire. 
Firstly, as mentioned before, the game of bridge is a very popular sport in Chinese 
university campuses and therefore it is very possible that many of the 95 Chinese 
students attending the previous experiment also had some experiences in playing the 
game, although I did not make a formal record of this. Secondly, many of the Chinese
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amateur card players taking part in the tournament were the students who had recently 
graduated from universities. These seem to suggest that the difference between the 
students and card players in the experience of playing the game did not contribute very 
much to the variations which have been found in this experiment. At most, they can only 
be part of the explanation. Another reason which could be supposed as leading to the 
changes is that this experiment and those using the general knowledge questionnaires did 
not apply the same method to extract subjects’ probability judgments. Allowing the full 
use of range of probability (0 -100%) in this experiment, for example, could be argued 
to stimulate card players to present more discrete probability judgments. However, 
Fischhoff, Slovic and Lichtenstein (1977) have found no supportive evidence in their 
experiments which used a variety of methods, such as, no alternative, one alternative, and 
two alternatives with half range (50%-100%) and full range.
Regarding the variation in cultural differences, it could also be argued that the results 
from the two cultural comparisons were incomparable, since they were not based on the 
same two cultural groups. Certainly, there is no way that the Anglo-Saxon and Dutch 
cultures are the same. Even so, it seems quite impossible to repeat previous cultural 
differences between Chinese and British card players, as the probability judgments made 
by the Chinese card players are significantly different from the students. In the 
calibration of probability judgment, the curve of the Chinese card players is far closer 
to the diagonal than that of the Chinese students. The Chinese card players also made 
far fewer extreme probability judgments than did the Chinese students. Thus, even if it 
is supposed that the probability judgments of British card players could be better 
calibrated and less extreme than those of the Dutch, the differences of probability 
judgments between them and the Chinese are not as significant as those we found 
between the British and Chinese students. Of course, it is also possible that the cultural 
difference between the Chinese and British card players could have developed into 
another pattern. For example, the probability judgments of the Dutch amateur card 
players have been found to be less calibrated and more extreme than the Chinese. In 
addition, from Keren’s (1987) report that the Dutch amateur card players had played the 
game for "a long time", so the Chinese amateur card players also did not possess any 
advantage in expertise, as they mostly had 4 or 5 years of experience. In fact, this
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experiment has employed a very Westernized instrument, so the Dutch must have 
benefitted more from this than their Chinese counterparts.
The main reason behind the variations, I consider, should be partly located in the 
differences of the characteristics between the two uncertain events. More particularly, 
the general knowledge questions and the game of bridge created considerably different 
uncertain situations among the students and the card players. In the terms of Howell and 
Burnett (1978), the uncertainty, for the case of general knowledge questionnaire, was 
internally generated. That is, the subjects did not perceive the uncertainty as entirely 
beyond their control. A general knowledge questionnaire simply asked subjects the facts. 
The students knew that there were already correct answers there and they must be 
among the alternatives given by the experimenter. They felt uncertain because they could 
not exactly remember most of the facts asked by the questions, but not because there 
were any external processes which could lead to different dispositions. So, such 
uncertainty reflected the beliefs that the students had about their exactness of memory 
and the reliability of their heuristic inference. This was the uncertainty about the 
subjects’ mind but not about the changes in the external world.
In estimating the success or failure of a game, however, the card players faced quite 
different situations. They felt uncertain because they could not know the exact 
distribution of cards and they could not foresee the way in which their opponents were 
going to play. The cards were dealt randomly and the distributions changed every time. 
The card players may know that every card has the same possibility of going to one of 
the four hands. However, they could never know the exact distribution of cards for any 
particular deal. Meanwhile, exactly how the opponents would play could also never be 
known for sure in advance, as they were dependent entirely on the opponent’s judgments 
and decisions. In contrast to the uncertainty created by the general knowledge 
questionnaire, these uncertainties were generated by external processes which were 
apparently beyond the control of the card players.
Such clear distinction between the two uncertain events, however, became more intricate 
with the involvement of bidding. The communication with the partners or opponents,
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although rather limited, could substantially increase card players’ confidence in their 
beliefs about the distribution of cards. After the bidding, in the card players’ mind 
uncertainty was further gauged on the fragmentary information and on the heuristic 
inference. So, the uncertainty may vary with the card players’ beliefs about the perfection 
of the information and the completeness of their inference. In that time, internal 
generating processes have crept in and mixed with external ones. Even for the intention 
of the opponents and the tactics which they would possibly take, the card players could 
have some prediction after the bidding phase. They may expect their opponents would 
play as "rational men" and feel to some extent that the progress of the game was under 
their control or within their expectation. Once again, internal generating processes could 
be involved.
Another important distinction between the two uncertain events was whether they were 
"frequentistic" or not. The general knowledge questionnaire which was used in the first 
experiment included 75 questions involving a variety of fields, such as astronomy, 
geography, biology, physics, history, philosophy. The contents of these questions, in 
general, were not related, and so every question could stimulate specific uncertain 
feelings among the students depending on the beliefs which the students had about their 
knowledge in a specific field. In other words, these uncertain events did not occur in a 
repetitive fashion and the subjects had to deal with them separately. Almost nothing 
could be learnt from their early performance. In the terms of Howell and Burnett (1978), 
a general knowledge questionnaire has nonfrequentistic nature. However, the card 
players had played the game of bridge for many many times before the competition. 
They dealt with similar uncertain situations again and again. In a strict sense, these 
uncertain events did not fall into the category of frequentistic events classified by Howell 
and Burnett (1978), except the dealing of a pack of cards which may follow a stochastic 
process. The opponents were shifting and the information got from bidding was variable. 
However, the characteristic of repetition could steer the cognitive processes of the card 
players quite differently from the general knowledge questions. The uncertainty involved 
in the game of bridge may have a similar nature as frequentistic events, although it is 
only in the sense of analogy. Frequency records about outcomes for different situations 
may already stored in the minds of card players. Another significant advantage which the
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card players had is that they could get immediate feedback from previous success and 
failure, and adjust their later performance.
I believe that people do not think and deal with such different uncertainties in the same 
way. Even if we assume that people go through a similar cognitive process in dealing 
with different uncertainties, their cognitive subprocesses of making uncertainty judgments 
may not be equally involved. The significant differences between the uncertainties 
contained in the two tasks discussed above, may be used to interpret the findings of this 
experiment in following ways.
One significant difference between the two probabilistic tasks, as argued above, is that 
in using a general knowledge questionnaire to create uncertainty among the students, 
internal generating processes were much involved. The accuracy of choices of alternative 
answers depended almost entirely on the processes within the students. If the students 
tended to overestimate the exactness of their memory, they would be more overconfident 
in their probability judgment. Similarly, if they trusted their "rules of thumb" or heuristics 
as complete, they would tend to judge with greater certainty than the evidence warrants. 
The previous study about the relationship between probabilistic thinking and cognitive 
style have revealed that overestimation of memory could lead to overconfidence in 
judging the correctness of choosing answers for general knowledge questions. The 
cultural differences found in previous studies could also partly account for the high self- 
confidence of the Chinese students in their memory. However, in playing the game of 
bridge, the card players were faced with a very different situation. The card players 
clearly knew that they could neither control the distribution of cards nor control the way 
in which their opponents played the game. They thus may perceive these uncertainties 
more tangibly in such uncertain situations. This would in turn decrease the strength of 
their beliefs in a particular outcome of a game.
In the above discussion, I have also emphasized the repetition characteristics of the task 
of playing the game of bridge. The results of the effect of feedback demonstrated that 
even in a short period of time card players might have consciously or unconsciously 
improved their calibration. It was observed by the experimenter that the card players
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often had a quick look at the probabilities which they had made earlier. Perhaps more 
important is that the card players had been playing the game for a long time and might 
have a rough record about the frequency of success or failure for several different 
situations in their mind. However, it is definitely not the case for the students answering 
the general knowledge questions. Unrelated questions and the lack of feedback about 
their performance provided the students with no information to improve the accuracy of 
their probability judgments. How could it? It is possible that the students could also have 
cumulated rough frequency records of their success and failure from watching "Master 
Mind" on the TV or attending a quiz competition. However, they may still be overridden 
by the students’ strong beliefs in the exactness of memory when choosing individual 
alternative answers.
The variations of cultural differences perhaps can also be explained as the changes of 
uncertain situations. Particularly, they might have striking impact on the Chinese cultural 
groups. The Chinese have been found to give low difficulty ratings to the memory items 
in the intelligence tests (Chen et al., 1982), indicating high self-confidence about their 
memory. So, they were probably more sensitive to the difference between the two tasks.
Previous analysis of the effect of role has also uncovered similarity or relationship 
between two probabilistic tasks, answering the general knowledge questions and playing 
the game of bridge. The fluctuations of the two curves in Figure 4.4 demonstrated that 
the card players were more overconfident when they played in an offensive role than in 
a defensive role. It further confirms the above analysis that people tend to offer a higher 
probability judgment than they should when perceiving themselves as exerting some 
measure of control. The card players tended to believe that they could make a contract 
when they were in offense and tended to believe that they could prevent the fulfilment 
of a contract when they were in defense. Although Keren’s (1987) study provides no 
corresponding curves which can be used to make a comparison with present study, from 
the statistical data listed in Table 4.3, it still can be found that the Chinese amateur card 
players were more likely to offer extreme probability judgments than the Dutch. For the 
Chinese group, especially, the difference of the proportions of above 80% probability 
judgments between the offense and defense roles is much more significant than that for
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Table 4.3. Effect of role
Probability Dutch Chinese
judgment
Offense Defense Offense Defense
.20 or less 20 35 11 25
.80 or more 185 165 211 150
the Dutch. Once again it demonstrated that the property of internal generating processes 
of uncertain events has a heavier impact on the probability judgment of the Chinese. 
However, such an impact became relatively trivial on judging the outcome of a game 
than on choosing an alternative answer for a general knowledge question, because 
internal generating processes were not dominated.
Previously, I have tried to explain why the students and the card players made probability 
judgments very differently. It is emphasized that people do not develop and follow the 
same way when dealing with different uncertainties. The characteristics of the task can 
have significant impact on people’s selection of cognitive options. The earlier analysis 
suggests that a repetitive task of externally generated uncertainty is likely to invoke 
calibrated probability judgments from Chinese people and a heterogenous task of 
internal generated uncertainty inclines to lead them to make extreme probability 
judgments. The performance of the Chinese economists, however, has portrayed another 
picture which does not seem to support this conjecture fully. On the one hand, the 
economists presented much more poorly calibrated probability judgments than the card 
players, although the two probabilistic tasks they performed had several obviously similar 
characteristics. However, on the other hand, even though answering the general 
knowledge questions and forecasting economic indices are quite different tasks, the 
probability judgments made by the economists and by the students both exhibited a 
strong tendency of extremeness. What do these results suggest? How should these 
seemingly inconsistent results be explained? In the rest of this section, I will analyze the
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similarities and differences in the probability judgments made by the economists and 
those made by the students and the card players.
The two tasks, judging the success or failure of a contract and forecasting economic 
indices in terms of probability, are similar in two primary aspects. First, all the main 
uncertainties which the economists and the card players faced are externally generated, 
that is, they are generated from the processes outside the economists and the card 
players. Second, both of the tasks asked the subjects to make probability judgments about 
the same or homogeneous uncertain events, which were similar in their problem 
structures and contents as well. Like the card players, the economists had dealt with 
similar problems for a long time and were able to accumulate mental records about the 
past fluctuations of the economic indices. However, several noticeable differences also 
exists between the two tasks, which may be attributed to the differences in the 
performances between the card players and the economists.
An obvious difference between the two tasks is that in judging the success or failure of 
a contract, the card players needed only to estimate the possibility of a contract being 
made, while the economists who were asked to predict continuous quantities had to 
imagine the possible outcomes themselves. The results from the economists have shown 
how often the actual values of the economic indices were outside the outcomes they were 
able to imagine. In many cases, the economists failed to foresee the rapid increase of the 
national economy in the fourth quarter of 1990. The task of forecasting the continuous 
economic indices, I suppose, might have led the Chinese economists to anchor on the 
earlier data and unwillingly to make a great upward or downward adjustment, even if it 
was necessary under the present situation. However, this phenomenon could not happen 
in judging the success or failure of a contract. To examine this, we need to know how the 
probability judgments of the economists were made.
After the experiment, I discussed with some of the economists about how they made 
their forecasts, in an attempt to understand their cognitive processes in forecasting 
economic indices. It was revealed that the economists felt it very difficult to give up their 
habitual way and to follow the way suggested by the experimenter, even though they
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quite understood the principle of the method. It was discovered that the economists often 
adopted a way of "linear extrapolation" to forecast the future values of an economic 
index. This way was typically described as two phases: first to average the values of the 
index in the previous three quarters; and then to estimate its future values by making 
some adjustments to the mean. The outcome was the best estimate to the index. Based 
on this best estimate, the range of all possible values was then decided. Nevertheless, the 
economists were rarely able to describe the process of adjusting in great detail. It was 
understood that such adjustments were sometimes affected by their previous experiences. 
For example, in the past several years, some of the indices usually had a greater increase 
in the fourth quarter than in the previous three, and so the indices in that quarter should 
have a higher speed of increase from month to month. It was also found that the 
economists often seemed to make the adjustments on, or partly on, their feelings and 
beliefs about the associations and impacts between various economic factors in the 
complicated economic activity. Some economists did make some arguments about why 
they made a high or low forecast, but it does not mean that they were able to explain any 
adjustment in numerical terms. Also the arguments made by individual economists were 
not always consistent, and sometimes could be quite different.
Therefore, the first reason, I consider, is that when the Chinese economists were asked 
to create alternative outcomes, they failed to make sufficient adjustment to the initial 
value extrapolated from previous data. The way of forecasting described above has been 
very useful in the past several years and thus has made the economists reluctant to 
present estimates that they feel too far from the anchors. Unfortunately, in the fourth 
quarter of 1990, the Chinese national economy turned out to have a great increase with 
unexpected fast speed. Some of the economists afterwards did recognize that they had 
ignored some factors or their possible significant impact on the forecast. For example, 
they had expected a longer period of time before some new economic policies actually 
took effect. Of course, if the "best estimate" had already been biased, a "biased range" 
was very likely to be produced. And if they were reluctant to make a big adjustment to 
the initial value, the range could not be made wide enough to encompass the actual 
values. I also suppose that the Chinese economists were more confident of their best 
estimates from the fact that there were too many cases, in which the 100% confidence
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interval of the judgments did not encompass the actual values. The sudden changes in 
the economic situation further aggravated the cognitive preference. It was suggested that 
the Chinese economists might not like to make the estimates of the highest and lowest 
values which were far from their best estimates.
The second difference between the two tasks is that the economists faced with a far more 
complicated uncertain situation than the card players. Unlike the game of bridge, the 
national economy is an open system. Forecasting economic indices involves much more 
uncertain factors than judging the success or failure of a contract. In playing the game 
of bridge, the card players clearly knew the distribution of cards and the way of playing 
of their opponents were uncertain, but the economists might not always be able to write 
down a thorough list of uncertainty. New uncertainty could emerge, and stable factors 
in the past could become uncertain in the future. The card players also knew how the 
uncertain factors affected the possibility of making a contract successfully, but the 
economists did not always have clear ideas about how the uncertain factors were related 
to a particular economic index. For such an open system, the repetition of uncertain 
situations cannot be as strict as it is in the play of the game of bridge. From time to 
time, greater variances in economic situations can happen and an economist did not have 
as many opportunities to experience similar situations as did the card players. Given such 
a big difference in economic measures, it is reasonable to expect the economist to be 
aware of the very peculiar nature of that quarter, and therefore to display a greater sense 
of uncertainty. However, in fact, they were much more overconfident than the card 
players. What are the reasons? I considered that the lack of the uncertainty from 
observable rivals perhaps is one. It might let the economists feel the situations less 
uncertain, or controllable to some extent, although the situations which they faced were 
much more uncertain. Indeed, since a long time ago, the Chinese have given much more 
concern to the uncertainty and risk involved in competition situations with clear rivals, 
such as a war. If one traces the Chinese history of decision making, one can find that 
most of the influential works about decision making are on wars.
Another important reason which might lead to the judgmental extremeness in forecasting 
economic indices, perhaps, is that the economists somehow mixed their expectations with
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actual possibilities. Even after the actual results have demonstrated the biases of their 
forecasts, they still argued, "such high speed of increase is abnormal,” "We could not 
expect such high rates," and even, "We have recommended only 6% to 7% increase in 
industrial production." Such feelings might have seriously discouraged them to think 
extensively of unlikely possibilities. They made the low forecasts of some indices, because 
they disliked seeing the high happen. In this aspect, sometimes they also had 
overconfidence in the impact of their recommendations on the government. It was also 
found that the general scenarios of the prospect of the national economy in the minds 
of the economists had heavily affected their judgments about particular economic indices. 
With a flamboyant scenario in mind, optimistic forecasts were more likely. Whereas with 
a conservative scenario, pessimistic forecasts were more possible. In September, 1990, 
most of the economists attending this experiment favoured moderate increase. It may 
suggest that the forecasts of the economists perhaps were also biased by their 
involvement of the processes of decision making regarding the economic policy.
The tasks which both the economists and the card players faced are also different in that 
the probability judgments would become well known to their colleagues and peers. So, 
it may be possible that the economists were pushed by some sort of social motivation to 
make "reasonable" forecasts, that is, a group-process factor may be involved here.
The economists made probability judgments quite similar to the students when they were 
asked to forecast the uncertain quantities. I suppose that it may be explained by one 
significant similarity between the two tasks, that is, both the students and the economists 
made probability judgments about continuous uncertain quantities. The dislike of 
imagining the "small" possibilities of the values which were far from their best estimates 
had led to their forecast range being too narrow. Expertise could have helped the 
economists to make better judgments than the students. Unfortunately it seemed to 
promote only their confidence in their best estimates. The similarity between the two 
Chinese groups in probability judgments may suggest an important characteristic of 
Chinese probabilistic thinking, acknowledging only what they think are most possible and 
overlooking what they think are almost impossible, especially when the outcomes are 
imagined by themselves.
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After all, the first conclusion which can be derived from the results of the two 
experiments is that previous findings of cultural differences cannot be generalized into 
other uncertain situations. People have no constant way of dealing with uncertainty, and 
they may consciously or unconsciously modify their way in dealing with different 
uncertainties. The present study has clearly manifested the close association between the 
ways by which people deal with uncertainty and the features of uncertain events. This 
finding is not isolated, and corresponds to the finding in the study of risk. For example, 
MacCrimmon and Wehrung (1986) have illustrated that the risk propensity of executives 
depended on the situations they confronted. For example, one manager could be found 
to be a risk taker in a law-suit and a joint venture, but a risk averter in personal gambles. 
MacCrimmon and Wehrung believe that behaviour in risky situations cannot be 
generalized across different tasks. It suggests that with varying characteristics of uncertain 
situations, cross-cultural studies can induce many possible patterns of cultural differences 
and similarities. Therefore, searching for a general pattern of cultural differences in 
probabilistic thinking will be unsuccessful, and the division of people from an individual 
culture into probabilistic thinker or non-probabilistic thinker is overly simplistic.
An important message which future cross-cultural studies in probabilistic thinking can 
get from this present study is that the investigation of cultural influence on uncertainty 
judgment should go deep into human cognitive processes in dealing with a variety of 
uncertain events. Prior generator knowledge, stored historical data, heuristics, and 
systematic biases may be stressed differently by people in different uncertain situations. 
This may also explain why early studies were not successful in inquiring into the cultural 
interpretation of the previous findings of cultural differences. Cultural interpretations can 
be meaningful and convincing only when they are related to particular uncertain 
situations. Cultural differences in probabilistic thinking must be traced to the cognitive 
processes which people go through in making probability judgments. Individual cultural 
factors may have influence on specific cognitive processes within a particular uncertain 
situation. It seems to be more persuasive to attribute the overconfidence of Chinese 
students in answering the general knowledge questions to their self-confidence in their 
memory, which obviously reflects Chinese cultural tradition in education. Similarly, the 
more probabilistic attitude that the Chinese amateur card players expressed in playing
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the game of bridge may be interpreted to their sensitivity to external uncertainty, 
especially when it comes from rivals, which is related to the cautious tradition in 
competition promoted by Sun Tzu. Intensive study is demanded in future to investigate 
human cognitive processes in dealing with different uncertain situations and to probe 
cultural differences at a more basic level.
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Chapter 5. Conclusions
This study started from questioning the validity and applicability of Western decision 
approaches in a non-Western, in particular the Chinese, culture. It criticized the attitude 
of simply copying Western decision approaches into China and emphasized the 
significance of examining the principle assumptions and limitations, and the adaptation 
of Western decision methods in a quite different cultural environment of decision 
making. It was recognized that the unique characteristics of Chinese decision makers and 
thus the clashes and agreements between the Western decision techniques and the 
Chinese decision culture could not be revealed and understood without studying the 
behaviour of Chinese decision makers. I considered that such a behavioral study had 
been neglected in China in the past decades for a number of reasons, and it now should 
be put at the top of the research agenda of decision making. The present study 
concerned one of the basic demands of modem decision theory for a decision maker: 
making adequate probability judgments. Its investigation was mainly concentrated on the 
adequacy of subjective probability judgments and the human cognitive processes of 
making the judgments. A series of experiments were designed and carried out for such 
a purpose. The first one followed earlier studies and employed a general knowledge 
questionnaire to stir up feelings of uncertainty in the minds of college students. Previous 
findings of cultural difference in probabilistic thinking were further confirmed and 
moreover, some relationships between probabilistic thinking and general information 
processing strategy were also revealed. The subsequent experiments extended the 
investigation to some other uncertain situations which people might get into in typical 
decision environments. Players of the game of bridge were asked to make probability 
judgments about the outcome of a contract in playing the game, and economists were 
asked to predict the indices which they were most familiar with in the form of probability 
distribution. I also made efforts to apply proper elicitation techniques in order to reduce 
avoidable distortion. With careful design of the experiment, I attempted to examine the 
actual capability of Chinese decision makers in making probability judgments when they 
were faced with less artificial or abstract tasks. It was my contention that such
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experiments might provide more meaningful data and thereby highlight more serious 
implications.
Although I have made an effort to choose typical decision environments to examine 
Chinese decision makers’ behaviour in dealing with uncertainty, this study is certainly far 
from thorough. Even so, fresh evidence from such empirical investigation may still allow 
me to make further discussions and induce several preliminary conclusions. First, I will 
try to describe the cognitive processes which people may go through in making 
probability judgments in more general terms based on the findings of the present study. 
Two subprocesses, the structuring of problem and the discriminating of feelings of 
uncertainty, will be particularly emphasized. With this description of cognitive processes, 
I hope we can explain better why people sometimes can complete probabilistic tasks as 
expected, but sometimes cannot. Following this description of cognitive processes, it will 
also become possible to explain the variation of cultural differences in making probability 
judgments under different uncertain situations, which were found in this study. In the 
second section, I will particularly discuss its implications and propose several suggestions 
for a future cross-cultural study in probabilistic thinking along the progression of 
cognitive process in making probability judgments. It is hoped that the cultural 
differences in probabilistic thinking will be further revealed and the specific conditions 
which are required by individual cultural groups for making good probability judgments 
will be identified. In the third section, my discussion will move beyond the issue of 
uncertainty judgment to explore the rationality embedded in Western decision theory. 
From the discords found between Western rationality in dealing with uncertainty and the 
observed behaviour of Chinese decision makers, I suggest that the introduction of 
Western decision approaches into China should be carried out carefully and needs 
serious preparatory works. Chinese decision makers should be informed about the 
implication of the Western rational way of decision making, its assumptions and 
limitations. The requirements for the proper use of Western decision techniques, such 
as the adequacy of probability judgments of Chinese decision makers, should be 
investigated before it is actually put into practical use. Also, the discussion about the 
Chinese way of making decisions and dealing with uncertainty will suggest that keeping 
an open mind to more alternative ways and synthesizing them efficiently may have some
152
advantage over sticking only to a single way. I believe that this is especially true for 
Chinese decision makers.
5.1. Cognitive processes in making probability judgment 
Previous studies
Numerous experimental data about human uncertainty judgments are available, but are 
not consistent. Christensen-Szalanski and Beach (1984), for example, found that 44 per 
cent of the total 87 empirical studies which they reviewed observed good performance, 
whereas 56 per cent observed poor performance. More recent empirical studies of 
calibration have also reported both calibrated and overconfident probability judgments 
(see some examples in chapter 2). The present study has further demonstrated such 
inconsistency in several Chinese subject groups. The student group and the economist 
group were found to be very overconfident, but the players of the game of bridge were 
much more realistic. Contradictory results often lead to opposite points of view. The 
pessimists claim that too often the cognitive short-cuts or heuristics that people use can 
lead to biased judgments in dealing with uncertainty (e.g. Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 
1982). I have previously mentioned availability, representativeness, anchoring and 
adjustment. In contrast, the optimists emphasize what Wallsten and Budescu (1983) call 
an "existence demonstration -- there do exist conditions under which experts can provide 
subjective probabilities which are relatively free of bias, are well calibrated, and score 
well". They encourage researchers to study how good uncertainty judgment is made, and 
to develop proper procedures to help people overcome possible cognitive biases. They 
also question the appropriateness of the normative models that are used as criteria in 
the evaluation of uncertainty judgment and argue that the pessimists’ evidence of bias 
may have no firm foundations, as in many studies the subjects and the experimenters may 
not have shared the same understanding of the experimental tasks at all (Beach, 
Christensen-Szalanski, & Barnes, 1987). This dispute between the optimists and the 
pessimists still continues.
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I consider that the fundamental difficulty in calming this dispute, is that there are still 
many unknowns about how people make judgments under uncertain situations. Indeed, 
it is far more difficult to probe the cognitive processes underneath good or poor 
uncertainty judgment than simply to demonstrate good or poor judgment. 
Understandably, most of the studies of calibration mainly focus on the latter issue and 
leave the subjects’ insight unknown. However, a few researchers have made initial efforts 
to trace the cognition paths in making probability judgments and have proposed several 
cognitive models, some of which we have seen in the earlier review. Memory searching, 
inference and discrimination of feelings of uncertainty are commonly described as three 
subprocesses, although their foci may not be the same. The model proposed by Koriat, 
Lichtenstein and Fischhoff (1980) emphasizes the processes of evidence searching and 
assessing, while the model of Phillips and Wright (1977) seems to stress more the 
tendency of discriminating uncertainty. More recently, based on his experiment using 
geographical north-south items, May (1986) has proposed a "global process model," 
describing the cognitive processes of making probability judgment as three phases: 
problem-solving, emergence of subjective certainty and quantification. With this model, 
the author illustrates how subjective confidence and the probability of a correct answer 
(accuracy) are related, and how background knowledge, and the inferences subjects have 
made from it, influence the two factors. The experimental items are assumed to be 
solved by inferences from cognitive maps, and miscalibration is explained as the result 
of a mismatch between subjective confidence and the probability of a correct answer.
However, to date most of the cognitive models of making uncertainty judgment are 
derived from the experiments using general knowledge questionnaires, and inevitably 
have their limitations. Perhaps it is not at all the original intention of those model 
constructors to describe human cognitive processes of making uncertainty judgments in 
general. Not surprisingly, they may not exactly describe how weather forecasters make 
probability judgments about precipitation or tornados, how underwriters estimate 
probability about a car crash, how lawyers assess the probability of whether a suspect is 
innocent or not, and so on. More important, as most of the models were developed 
under the shadow of the findings of overconfidence, is that they have less power in 
describing how some other groups or individual subjects can avoid overconfidence and
154
obtain calibrated probability judgment in dealing with different probabilistic tasks. In 
particular, these models tell us little about how people discriminate between their 
internal feelings of uncertainty and then transform them into numbers. I have suffered 
from such insufficiency myself in searching for the reasons behind the quite different 
performance between the Chinese students, the economists and the players of the game 
of bridge. The theoretical study of human cognitive processes of making probability 
judgment should go beyond the limitation of general knowledge questionnaires and 
develop cognitive models based on the evidence collected in more general uncertain 
situations.
The lack of a theoretical study in cognitive processes does not restrict researchers from 
finding ways of improving the quality of subjective probability judgment. Several 
necessary conditions have been identified and formal rules or procedures have also been 
proposed. Phillips (1987) has listed eight conditions which he believes to be essential for 
assessors to generate precise, reliable and accurate probability judgments. Mainly, the 
assessors are required to be experts or a group of experts in the concerned field. And, 
a training in probabilistic thinking should be given as necessary. Simplifying complex 
events or reconstructing problems are indispensable in some situations to ease the 
difficulties of making probability judgment.
Similarly, Von Winterfeldt and Edwards (1986) have also proposed several rules for 
getting probability judgments properly. They believe that assessing uncertainties that may 
control significant decisions is a serious business and should be done in the right 
atmosphere, and say that classroom settings are inappropriate. Good procedure is 
suggested too. The quantity to be assessed should be clearly defined. The same or related 
questions should be asked in various ways to look for inconsistencies, as this may 
promote people to think hard about the entire problem behind the uncertain quantity. 
And finally feeding back the scores obtained from proper scoring rules or calibration 
data to respondents, to a certain extent, can be helpful, although it is not informative 
about how one should think differently, only about how one should behave differently.
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Stael von Holstein and Matheson (1979) have even written a manual that provides 
decision analysts with detailed guidance to elicit subjective probability distribution about 
an uncertain quantity. They divide the procedure of eliciting probability into five phases: 
motivating, structuring, conditioning, encoding and verifying. In order to achieve reliable 
results, a subject is first motivated to realize the importance of his responses to the 
decision making and to become willing to take part in the encoding process. The 
uncertain quantity is defined and structured in the second phase. For this, it needs to 
inquire and understand how the subject considers the quantity, the variables he thinks 
relevant, the information he uses, and so on. In the third phase, the subject is promoted 
to evoke his knowledge relating to the quantity, which will provide the subject with a 
conscious basis for making probability judgments and can help him overcome possible 
encoding biases. The subject’s judgment is quantified in terms of a probability 
distribution in the fourth phase. All values or probabilities elicited in this phase are 
plotted on a probability graph paper away from the subject’s view. Finally, the judgments 
are tested to see if the subject really believes them. If the subject is not comfortable with 
the final distribution, it may be necessary to repeat some of the earlier steps of the 
interview process.
Although these studies did not directly discuss the cognitive processes of making 
probability judgments, we still can perceive some of their understanding about the 
processes from what they recommended or discredited. The formal rules or procedures 
of encoding accumulate the authors’ long-time observations and experiences as decision 
analysts, reflecting their perception of the conditions under which adequate probability 
judgment are more likely to be made in many real decision situations. Generally, good 
judgments are frequently found among experts. Feedback can help overcome 
inconsistency and encourage further thinking. Adequate elicitation techniques may ease 
the difficulty of discrimination of internal feelings. However, why can expertise be helpful 
and how can it guide the making of a calibrated judgment? How does feedback make 
adjusting of probability judgments happen, and what kind of feedback can lead the 
adjustment in the right direction? It is not enough to answer such questions depending 
only on external perception of the possible relationships between the performances and 
conditions. Even so, these studies, in non-experimental situations, are an inspiration and
156
do lead to deeper thinking of how good uncertainty judgments are made and where poor 
ones go astray.
Some scholars have also concentrated on developing particular techniques to improve 
subjective probability judgments, which also motivate deep thinking about the cognitive 
processes of making probability judgments. Fischhoff (1982), for example, has reviewed 
most of the well received studies and he reported two experimental findings: 
overconfidence and hindsight biases. He summarizes a series of debiasing strategies 
which are categorized according to their implicit allegation of culpability, that is, whether 
responsibility for biases is laid at the doorstep of the judge, the task, or some mismatch 
between the two. Lichtenstein and Fischhoff (1980) have conducted 11 training sessions, 
each of which involved 200 two-alternative general knowledge items, to observe whether 
training can ameliorate probability judgment. The subjects were given feedback 
immediately after every training session, which included the distributions of probability 
judgments used by the subjects and the quality of judgment measured by overconfidence, 
calibration, knowledge, resolution and the total Brier score. Most of the improvement 
happened after the first training session and cannot be generalized to other different 
tasks. Although the results are encouraging, such studies still leave us with uncomfortable 
feelings. Why was there no further improvement in the later training sessions, and more 
basically, how did the training reduce overconfidence? For example, it is a fact that 
Sweden is about thirteen thousand square kilometres smaller than Kenya, but a subject 
may be quite confident in his belief of the reverse and argues that Sweden does cover 
a larger area than Kenya in his Penguin Map of the World. How can the debiasing 
procedure described above considerably reduce subject’s confidence, without informing 
the subject that a same area is drawn larger in high latitudes than in low latitudes in the 
map? The corrective procedures described above seems to be "treating only symptoms 
but not the causes of a disease."
Satisfactory answers to the questions which I have raised above cannot be found from 
the results of early psychological studies of human cognitive processes of making 
probability judgments. Much more effort in theoretical study is required to examine 
human cognitive processes of making probability judgment in uncertain situations other
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than using general knowledge questionnaires. The task characteristics, which a general 
knowledge questionnaire may not have, should be given particular attention in the study. 
For without this, we will continue to argue about whether or not we should trust the 
subjective probability judgments of decision makers. And without this we cannot lay 
down a reliable foundation for further development of adequate encoding and correcting 
procedures. In the rest of this section I seek to develop a model based on present study, 
which may describe, in more general terms, how probability judgment is made. Before 
that, we need a further analysis in order to understand the connotation of the conception 
of calibration.
Calibration standard
Lichtenstein, Fischhoff and Phillips (1982) opened their review of the study of calibration 
of probabilities with the following statement:
"From the subjectivist point of view (de Finetti, 1937/1964), a probability is a degree of 
belief in a proposition. It expresses a purely internal state; there is no ‘right’,‘correct’, or 
‘objective’ probability residing somewhere ‘in reality’ against which one’s degree of belief 
can be compared. In many circumstances, however, it may become possible to verify the 
truth or falsity of the proposition to which a probability was attached. Today, one 
assesses the probability of the proposition ‘it will rain tomorrow.’ Tomorrow, one looks 
at the rain gauge to see whether or not it has rained. When possible, such verification 
can be used to determine the adequacy of probability assessments."
Here, Lichtenstein et al. reject the objective explanation of probability from the 
subjectivist stand, but apparently also recognize that useful subjective probability should 
not be far away from objective frequency of occurrences in a long term. Do the authors 
mean that calibration is an objective standard of subjective probability, at least in some 
cases? I would not like to speculate further and it may be better to follow them and 
thereby keep away from the long-lasting theoretic controversy. However, I should 
emphasize here, that no matter how theoretical the disputes are, the hard fact is that 
subjective uncertainty judgment has to face objective verification in many situations. And
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no matter how subjective uncertainty judgments are, if they guide decisions, the realistic 
ones may probably be rewarded more and unrealistic ones may probably be punished 
more in the real world. The argument here is very much concerned with the quality of 
subjective probability which the decision analysis technique demands, rather than the 
internal or external attributions of probability. Not surprisingly, even though such 
"goodness" of uncertainty judgment has been argued not to be required inherently in 
subjective decision theory, most decision analysts take this problem seriously and many 
decision makers hesitate to use decision analysis before they are convinced about the 
adequacy of subjective judgment. Indeed, according to a respondent of Von Winterfeldt 
and Edwards (1986), "Many serious decision makers are concerned about cognitive 
illusions and refuse to use decision analysis. I do not wish to justify this attitude but it 
is very common." Actually, in real life, people seem to be more pragmatic and are ready 
to get feedback and adjust their subjective opinions against external occurrences from 
time to time, even if they may not follow the Bayes* theorem spontaneously in the 
theorists’ eyes. They know they cannot afford to ignore the objective boundary of 
subjective judgment. From their experience, they know that to survive and to make a 
success they must adapt themselves to the changing environment.
Probability may be thought of as expressing decision makers’ internal feelings, but its 
freedom is certainly restricted by the external environment. Such restrictions can be 
sensed in the active adjustment of decision makers and in the pressure from reality. In 
fact, the emergence of the measurement of calibration is a response to the requirement 
of describing the restriction in a quantitative way. Making a probability judgment is a 
discrimination process of internal feelings about uncertain events which develop and 
happen following some unknown or partly unknown ways. Calibration requires decision 
makers to discriminate appropriately their feelings of uncertainty into categories of 
number and more importantly to map accurately such a numerical categories with the 
frequencies of uncertain events. Cognitive processes are needed to tune the mapping 
against the feedback from time to time.
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Discrimination
In order to make adequate probability judgments, people first must be able to 
discriminate their feelings of uncertainty finely. It means that people are required to 
express their feelings to a resolution of 0.01, or at least 0.1. The difficulty for people in 
fulfilling such a task can vary greatly in different uncertain situations. People may find 
even a rough discrimination almost impossible in one situation, but may be able to 
present their probability judgments with a high precision in another. Answering the 
general knowledge questions seems to be a very difficult task in the sense of 
discrimination of feelings of uncertainty. Lichtenstein and Fischhoff s (1980) subjects, for 
example, even after attending 11 training sessions of 200 general knowledge items, were 
still rarely able to describe how they made their mental discrimination in great detail, 
and especially felt it difficult in the use of intermediate responses of 0.6, 0.7, and 0.8. 
Such predicaments can be better understood from the vivid descriptions in the following 
students’ self reports, "I think I’m still kind of unsure on how to use 0.7 and how to use 
0.8 because I either feel I don’t know it or I know it, and it’s sort of hard to say how 
much I don’t know something," or "I think I’m judging a little bit better between my 0.5’s 
and 0.6’s --just what is a 0.6-but I don’t think I really know what a 0.7 is yet." Similar 
observations were obtained in the present experimental studies too. The students were 
found to be very hesitant to discriminate their feelings of uncertainty in answering some 
of the general knowledge questions.
The experiment of using the game of bridge as a task, however, provides us with a quite 
different picture. The Chinese players of the game of bridge seemed to be much more 
comfortable than the students in making probability predictions about the success or 
failure of a contract. It was a total surprise when the experimenter found that the card 
players made their probability judgments so decisively and swiftly that he was actually 
worried that they had not given the numbers wholeheartedly, they being captivated by 
the competition itself. However, as we have seen, their performance turned out to be 
much better than the students’, in terms both of discrimination and of calibration.
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It is clear that the students endured much more difficulty than the players of the game 
of bridge in making mental discriminations of their feelings of uncertainty. But what 
makes such a difference? There is no available answer. Most of the previous studies have 
concentrated on exploring the cognitive processes of how people solve a problem and the 
factors which may increase or decrease confidence, but the process itself, in which people 
discriminate their feelings of uncertainty into several categories, has more or less been 
neglected. Although most of the cognitive models of making probability judgments 
contain a phase of translating the feelings of uncertainty into numbers, few of them have 
described the process of mental discrimination in detail. The differences between 
uncertain situations in the need of mental efforts or the difficulty in discriminating 
between the feelings of uncertainty thus has also been ignored. From the study of 
Fischhoff, Slovic, and Lichtenstein (1977), it may be understood that overconfidence in 
making probability judgments results partly from subjects’ ignorance of the 
inappropriateness of their inferences and the biases in the views reconstructed from their 
memory. However, is the subjects’ inability to discriminate their feelings of uncertainty 
in a fine way also a reason behind the overconfidence phenomenon? Phillips and 
Wright’s (1977) model stresses the distinction between the thinking situation as black and 
white and the thinking situation probabilistically, so a detailed description of mental 
discrimination of uncertainty was not their major concern. However, the sharp contrast 
between the performances of the Chinese students and the card players suggests that 
serious mental difficulties in discriminating their feelings of uncertainty might have 
pushed the students to make more unrealistic probability judgments. These speculations 
led me to inquire how people translate their feelings of uncertainty into numbers.
First, let us consider how a player of the game of bridge estimates a probability of the 
success or failure of a contract. In playing the game, card players feel uncertain about 
whether a contract can be made or not, because they cannot get to know the actual 
distribution of cards in the hands of their partners and opponents, and because they 
cannot predict how their opponents are going to play. When the card players are asked 
to predict the outcome of a contract in terms of probability, the most natural way that 
they may follow to approach a probability judgment is the so-called "ergodic" way. That 
is, being card players of several years’ experience, they can estimate the probability of
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success of the contract in question by retrieving the frequency of success of a class of 
similar cases accumulated in their memory. This way can be further balanced by a 
singular way, with which the card players also take the propensities of the particular case 
at hand into account as they still observe the differences between the immediate case 
and previous similar cases.
However, my greater concern at this stage is how the card players translate their feelings 
of uncertainty about the success of a contract into probabilities. I suppose that the 
process is fulfilled through a kind of tangible comparison of evidence. The situation of 
playing the game of bridge allows the card players to make fine discriminations between 
their feelings of uncertainty about the success of contracts. It is clear in the card player’s 
mind that the distribution of cards, the opponents’ strategy and the content of the 
contract are main factors which decide whether a contract can be made or not. It is also 
clear how these factors affect the results. A contract of high claim has less possibility of 
completion than a contract of low claim. Facing strong opponents, the card players in the 
offensive position will have less chance of successfully making a contract than when 
facing weak ones, and with advantageous cards they are more likely to achieve good 
results than with disadvantageous cards. Most importantly, these factors can be measured 
to the extent that fine mental discrimination becomes possible for the card players. The 
card distributions can be carefully measured depending on whether they are in favour 
of making a contract. Ace is counted as 4 points, King 3 points, etc. The difficulties of 
making a contract may be measured by its required number of successful rounds (tricks). 
Even the strength or weakness of a card player can be measured according to the "level" 
which he has reached. Based on empirical evidence, a card player having played 
thousands of games may have stored a series of patterns of game in their memory, which 
are finely categorized according to their propensities of leading a contract to success or 
failure. Therefore, mental discrimination of feelings of uncertainty does not become 
difficult and can be fulfilled by recognizing the present patterns and comparing them 
with previous ones. Although no counts have been made yet about the number of 
patterns that an experienced card player of the bridge game can recognize, the numbers 
of different configurations of pieces on the chessboard which expert chess players can 
recognize have been estimated at around fifty thousand (Simon, 1983). Even assuming
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the numbers of patterns which the card players attending our experiment recognized are 
not so high, an accumulation of around several thousands or even several hundreds can 
make their mental discrimination much easier. It may partly explain why the card players 
could be so decisive and swift in making probability judgments and showed good 
performance. And a key difference between expert card players and amateurs, among 
others, is that the experts accumulate more patterns and are able to recognize and 
discriminate them more finely.
In contrast to the task of playing the game of bridge, a general knowledge questionnaire 
is a set of heterogenous items which covers a variety of domains of knowledge. For every 
question, subjects are required to make a choice from, say, two alternative answers and 
present a probability to express how sure they are about their choices. A choice made 
by a subject may be a result of memory searching, a consequence from reasoning, or a 
mixture of these two. It may even simply come from his intuition, "This answer sounds 
right." If a subject has no idea about a question, he just needs to pick up one and present 
a probability of 50%. If he finds evidence which can definitely reject or confirm one of 
the two alternatives, he will also have no difficulty to present a probability of 100%. 
However, it is more common that he cannot be absolutely sure that he has chosen the 
correct answer. The recollection in his mind may be blurred, the inferences may not be 
convincing enough. Past experiences may also tell him that intuition is not always 
reliable. In such situations, subjects have to find a number between 50% and 100% to 
express their feelings of uncertainty.
The subjects responding to a general knowledge questionnaire approach a probability in 
quite different ways from the card players. They make judgments based on the arguments 
of weighing and shifting evidence or on unanalyzed experience (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1982). However, I consider that to make fine discrimination of feelings of uncertainty 
with such ways is very difficult. Suppose that a subject is asked, "Which legs do cows use 
first when getting up from the ground, hind legs or front legs?" If he is like many other 
people, he may have never carefully observed how cows get up, although he has seen 
cows numerous times in his life. He decides to choose the answer, "front legs", simply 
because he feels an image of a cow getting up with hind legs is somewhat funny. How
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should the subject work out a number to express his feelings of uncertainty about the 
choice? It is very difficult based only on such unanalyzed experience. In such a situation, 
people fall into a situation which demands discrimination of pure feelings. With "pure", 
I mean that people have no way to transform such discrimination of feelings of 
uncertainty into some kind of tangible comparison between uncertain events. Maybe 
there are no difficulties in using 50% or 100% to express the feelings of total uncertainty 
or certainty. However, how strong should the feelings of 55%, 60%,..., and 95% be? Any 
attempt to ask subjects to enumerate their feelings of uncertainty will make us realize 
the difficulty of carrying out such discrimination of pure feelings, as the subjects of 
Lichtenstein and Fischhoff experienced. There is no demand in day-to-day life for making 
fine discrimination of pure feelings, and so there is very little practice. Similarly, people 
perhaps should present high probabilities when their recollections are sharp, or low 
probabilities when they are blurred. However, our experience can tell us that it is also 
a rather hard task to make fine mental discrimination depending only on memory clarity. 
Suppose in a subject’s memory the scene that acids turn litmus paper to red is brighter 
than the scene acids turn litmus to blue, so that the subject selects the answer "Red". But 
how sure should he be in terms of probability? Could you expect that he can sort this 
kind of feelings of uncertainty into eleven meaningful categories depending on the clarity 
of vague recollections? Although there is evidence that people are more confident when 
their memory is correct, I have less confidence in their ability of making fine 
discrimination depending on the clarity of their recollections. Until now, few calibrated 
probability judgments have been found in the responses to any general knowledge 
questionnaire. In contrast, very often the middle parts of the calibration curves were 
found horizontal or fluctuating randomly.
Can people make fine discrimination of feelings of uncertainty based on internal 
arguments? In many situations it may be very difficult. For example, the question, "Which 
city is further north, London or Beijing?" can be dealt with in a fashion of reasoning. A 
subject may first think that Beijing should be on a latitude further north than London, 
because Beijing is much colder than London in winter. However, the fact that Great 
Britain is an island country warmed by the Gulf stream may also remind him that the 
maritime climate may still make London warmer than Beijing, even if it is farther north.
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The two pieces of evidence lead to different choices, and both of them are obviously not 
sufficient to lead to a certain answer. The subject has to balance between the evidence 
with incomplete reasoning. Suppose that the subject finally somehow selects London. 
How high should his confidence be? It depends on the subject’s beliefs about the vague 
relationships between evidence and conclusions. Fine measurement of feelings of 
uncertainty seems to be less possible based on such vague reasons. The subject may 
hardly explain why he presents a probability of 70% but not 60%. People may recognize 
their own uncertainty and lower their overconfidence, if they can find other different 
ways to arrive at an answer (Pitz, 1974), or if they can find more negative reasons 
(Koriat, Lichtenstein, & Fischhoff, 1980). However, people still have to face difficulties 
of measuring their feelings of uncertainty. Perhaps it is one of the reasons why some 
elicitation techniques use instruments, such as the probability wheel, to ease such 
difficulty in making mental discrimination. The comparisons between two areas of sector 
in a wheel or two heights of counters in troughs may make mental discrimination visible. 
However, it is conceivable that even with such help, the mental discrimination described 
above is still rather difficult, due to its abstractness.
The characteristics that the contents of most of the questions are unrelated make such 
mental discrimination of feelings of uncertainty more difficult. Even when a subject 
notices that he ought to make consistent judgments among the general knowledge 
questions, he may still have difficulties if he tries to discriminate the feelings of 
uncertainty about unrelated questions. Suppose that a subject makes both of the 
judgments, based on unanalyzed experience, about the birth place of singer Frank Sinatra 
and the name of the Apollo lunar module that landed the first man on the moon. Can 
he explain why he gives a high probability to one of them and a low probability to the 
other. The fact that Japanese like eating rice may lead to a judgment that Japan 
produces more rice than wheat, and the fact that Finland was occupied by Sweden during 
late twelfth century may lead to selecting Swedish rather Norwegian as the second 
official language of Finland. How can a subject compare the power of conviction between 
the two pieces of unrelated evidence? Of course, it is quite possible that subjects may 
have different feelings of uncertainty about these two choices, but what I argue here is 
that people may have less difficulty with homogenous items and their probability
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judgment may also be more reliable. May (1986) supposed that the subjects had 
constructed a geographic image in their minds in judging which city was further north or 
south between many pairs of cities. If the two cities are quite close in a subject's image, 
his confidence about the judgment may be low. Similarly, if two cities are distant in his 
image, he has more confidence about his judgment. From this, May has distinguished two 
kinds of task difficulty and has further argued that calibration is theoretically possible, 
when the difficulty is noticeable for the subjects (e.g. in pure psychophysical problems 
where difficulty only results from variations in the objective differences which are the 
basis for a comparison). However, the subject is necessarily overconfident, if the difficulty 
is a property of an item that strengthens the tendency towards a wrong answer 
(misleadingness), but cannot be detected, because it is based on the individual's own 
wrong knowledge.
To make an adequate probability judgment people require to express their feelings of 
uncertainty in a fine differentiated way. Previous discussion suggests that this is 
sometimes easy, but sometimes it is a really hard task. Fine measurement is unlikely to 
be achieved when people wrestle with discrimination of pure feelings. It has been shown 
that the students had much more trouble than the card players in making probability 
judgments. With unanalyzed experience, they were not likely to make meaningful and 
fine mental discriminations of feelings of uncertainty aroused by unrelated general 
knowledge questions. I conjecture that fine measurement of feelings of uncertainty is 
more attainable when people can relate mental discrimination to a tangible comparison 
between uncertain events based on measurable evidence. If such comparisons can be 
carried out easily, mental discrimination can become less difficult, and the more 
meticulous such comparison can be, the finer the mental discrimination can be achieved. 
The card players obviously have an advantage in this aspect. Fine comparison between 
patterns has led to fine measurement of feelings of uncertainty about the success of 
contracts. The image in the card players' mind may be an accumulation of different game 
patterns which are related to possible results in some way. The examples that I discussed 
here may represent two extreme situations. More often people may not face such 
extreme situations and the mental difficulty in measuring the feelings of uncertainty can 
thus vary between the two extremes. Unanalyzed experience, incomplete inference, and
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fragmentary comparison between patterns may all make their contributions to an 
uncertainty judgment. It is also possible that people may not have the same mental 
difficulty in measuring their feelings of uncertainty even if they are in the same situation. 
Experts in an area may feel less difficulty in making fine discrimination between feelings 
of uncertainty than do novices, as they may know more and different patterns and can 
make a finer comparison between them. In this sense, mental discrimination depends on 
experience. However, the possibility of carrying out tangible comparisons is more 
essential.
Mental problem structure
Sound mental discrimination of uncertainty is a necessary condition for making adequate 
probability judgments, but it is certainly not a sufficient one. A group of subjective 
probabilities may be consistent and finely discriminated, but its curve can still be far 
from perfectly calibrated. Calibration requires decision makers not only to discriminate 
their feelings of uncertainty into fine categories and to express them consistently, but also 
to make precise mapping between subjective probability judgments and objective 
occurrences. This is the second, but more fundamental, hurdle that people have to 
overcome. I consider that such precision of mapping depends on whether people can 
develop a sound structure of the problem. Mental discrimination is carried out within 
structure, and if people construct an inappropriate problem structure, their judgment may 
have already been steered in the wrong direction, no matter how fine the discrimination. 
Calibrated probability judgment can be made only when the mental problem structure 
appropriately, or at least approximately, matches the real problem structure.
The issue of problem structure is certainly not new. In dealing with reality, people have 
to, and can, condense a huge outside world into a small world in their mind. Such words, 
"size up the situation accurately" or "get to the heart of the problem" express people’s 
desire to catch the core problem structure efficiently within the limitations of their 
capacity of information processing. However, this issue does not draw sufficient attention 
in the study of cognitive processes of making probability judgments. Recently, the lack
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of understanding of subjects’ problem structure has been noticed by several researchers, 
although they do discuss uncertainty judgment in general terms.
Phillips (1983), for example, has expounded the importance of knowing the subjects’ 
internal structural representation of the task for adequately interpreting their data. In 
proposing his generation paradigm, he further emphasized the role of problem 
structuring and argued that process was embedded in structure and people could not talk 
about information processing without reference to the internal representation of the task. 
He also distinguished general structure from problem structure which represented the 
task at hand. From the inspiration of the early research on cultural and individual 
differences in probabilistic thinking, Phillips supposed that people might impose a 
general structural framework on a problem. It was suggested that in dealing with 
uncertainty, British people tended to use causal structure, while the Chinese tended to 
take fatalistic structures. He regarded that general structuring, problem structuring, and 
information processing were carried out in any order and they were done iteratively.
In a similar vein, Beach, Barnes and Christensen-Szalanski (1986), and Beach, 
Christensen-Szalanski and Barnes (1987), have also argued that experimenters often 
neglect how the subjects frame the problems in their minds and they wrongly assume that 
subjects share the same understanding of the experimental task with them. They 
suspected that many of the reports of poor performance and findings of biases might not 
stand scrutiny, if the subjects had misframed the problems from the beginning. In their 
contingency model of judgmental forecasting, they proposed two ways which people 
might follow to frame problems: aleatory and epistemic reasoning.
The basic distinction between the two ways of framing problems is their focusing on the 
characteristics of the element in question. Aleatory reasoning treats all elements in a 
particular set as mutually intersubstitutable and ignores their unique properties. In 
contrast, epistemic reasoning explicitly involves knowledge about the unique 
characteristics of specific elements and the framework of knowledge, including the causal 
network and set memberships, in which they are embedded. It is suggested that some of 
the observed poor performance in judgmental and reasoning tasks results from subjects
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using epistemic logic on what "properly" are aleatory problems. More importantly, while 
in most discussions it is assumed that aleatory rather than epistemic logic is appropriate, 
this assumption is not necessarily justified from the subject’s point of view. These two 
ways of framing problem seem to be viewed as the general structures which Phillips have 
discussed. Beach, Barnes and Christensen-Szalanski also argued that whether a subject 
tended to use aleatory or epistemic reasoning to frame a problem was not arbitrary, and 
the characteristics of the task itself appeared to dictate the choice.
To develop a generative problem structuring calculus, Humphreys and Berkeley (1983; 
1985) have proposed a multi-level scheme to conceptualize decision problems. This 
scheme formalizes over five progressive levels of abstraction along with the process of 
cognitive development within decision makers. At each level, the operations performed 
by the decision maker in developing a problem representation are modeled. The content 
manipulated at each level is qualitatively different, and what is represented as form at 
one level can be manipulated as content at its next level.
The operations at the first level are concrete and limited to providing "best assessments" 
of quantities to be represented as content at a defined node in a problem structure that 
has been fixed a priori. Making probability judgments and assessing preferences are 
typical operations at this level. At the second level, formal operations are performed to 
explore the decision problem representation through varying the value assessed at any 
chosen node within the structure and to investigate the impact of doing this at other 
points of interest within the current representation. Sensitivity analysis is such a type of 
operation. More fundamental operations in structuring and restructuring a decision 
problem are manipulated at Level 3 and above. At the third level, a decision problem 
is structured to handle a particular uncertainty of high level, such as the uncertainty 
about how to conceptualize the worth of consequences when more than one criterion is 
involved, the procedural uncertainty that concerns means to process a decision, and so 
on (Berkeley & Humphreys, 1982). Decision problem-structuring activity at Level 4 is to 
articulate the principles that enable the manipulation of complete Level 3 problem- 
structuring systems as content. A decision maker working at this level has either to 
articulate these principles within his or her own natural language or to learn a new
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language for generating systems linking Level 3 (sub)problem representations into a 
structure comprising the whole range of aspects of the problem under consideration. The 
activities at Level 5 are moved forward to explore the small worlds that encompass the 
decision maker’s problem-structuring activities and the knowledge representations that 
the decision maker believes to be relevant to these activities. More high levels of 
abstraction can be developed.
However, in calibration study, the relationships between the development of problem 
structure and probability judgment do not draw enough attention. Subjects are often 
presented with a given uncertain event and are asked to make probability judgments. 
Perhaps it is because, in decision theory, people are often assumed to face a problem 
which has already been structured and only need to assess numbers to the given 
uncertain events. Humphreys and Berkeley have put the operation of making probability 
judgment on the lowest level of abstraction in representing decision problems. However, 
I must argue that whether people can provide adequate probability judgment is related 
to the exploration of the whole problem structure and that making probability judgment 
is a complicated process starting long before the moment of giving a number.
When uncertainty is one of the decision makers’ major concerns, the uncertainty of the 
problem of structure may become a main part of the whole decision problem structure. 
Uncertainty is perceived, identified, or disregarded with the development of decision 
problem structure. In many situations, the structuring of the problem of uncertainty 
cannot be separated from the whole decision problem structuring, which is embedded 
into the entire process of the development of decision problem structure. First, 
uncertainty is tied with the development of options. Specific uncertainty only draws the 
attention of a decision maker when it can be related to an option. Suppose that John 
works in a company and has not been promoted for many years. Now he considers 
whether he should take some actions to change such a situation. There may be no 
obvious uncertainty relating to the option of doing nothing. However, if he thinks of the 
option of moving to other companies, various uncertainties will emerge, the opportunity 
of promotion in the new position, the working environment, the prospects of these 
companies, and others. Very different uncertainties may also appear, if making a
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complaint to his boss has also been considered as an option. His boss may accept or 
reject his demand immediately, or may promise to consider it in the future. So, people 
consider different uncertainties when they think of taking different actions. Second, with 
the identification of uncertainty, further options will be created. For example, the 
possibilities of being rejected or getting no clear promise may lead John to consider 
further options, to threaten his boss that he may move to other companies, to wait for 
three months, and so on. New uncertainties then will come out in his mind with the 
creation of new options. In such a way, uncertainty is structured in the mind of decision 
maker with the unfolding of the whole problem structure, or in other words, the 
structuring of decision problem moves forward with the structuring of uncertainty.
In a calibration study, people are often asked to make a probability judgment about a 
given uncertain event, and there is no clear requirement for them to develop the whole 
uncertainty problem structure. However, I consider that making a probability judgment 
should be viewed as a process starting from the structuring of problem. Previous analysis 
suggests that it is not always appropriate to label uncertain events with a number, and 
very serious effort is needed to structure uncertainty problems, including the 
identification of all the possible outcomes (individual events) and the investigation of the 
relationships between the related events. Although in this phase, the quantification 
process of uncertain events may not have started, such activities can vitally affect later 
probability judgment about a particular uncertain event. In a calibration study, subjects 
usually are not asked to construct an exhaustive set of events themselves and 
experimenters often present them with a given event. In some situations, the exhaustive 
set to which the given event belongs is explicit. For example, success and failure clearly 
consist of an exhaustive set of events in a game of bridge. However, in some situations, 
it is not easy to imagine all the possibilities. For example, John may overlook the 
possibility that his boss does not take a simple action of rejecting or accepting his 
demand. Even for the game of bridge, if card players are not asked to judge the success 
of a contract, but the score of a game, they may meet much more difficulties to construct 
an exhaustive set of events. Humphreys (1983) has presented a real case which describes 
how Neer, a motor company failed to predict all the possible outcomes of an action that 
had been taken. After Neer took the decision from four options to investigate a private
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branding of tyres, to its surprise it found that no tyre manufacturer was willing to bid for 
its contract. Failing to construct an exhaustive set must bias the probability judgment 
towards the clearly identified uncertain events. Even failing to represent such a set 
properly may also lead to biased judgment. Fischhoff, Slovic, and Lichtenstein (1978) 
have found that subjects underestimated the possibility of "other reasons" causing the 
failure of starting a car. However, it is not uncommon in a calibration study to present 
subjects with an uncertain event and simply ask them to estimate the probability of 
whether one outcome will happen or not, without explicitly presenting many other 
possible outcomes. For example, the physicians in the Christensen-Szalanski and 
Bushyhend’s (1981) study perhaps would have given less overconfident probability 
judgments if they had been presented with or had been asked to imagine all of the main 
diseases, not only pneumonia, which can be associated with the symptom of a cough, 
rather than being simply asked to estimate the possibility of pneumonia. The second 
impact of early structuring of the problem of uncertainty on later probability judgment 
is that, with the development of problem structure, the relationships between the events 
have also been assumed. Such assumptions as independency, interdependency and 
conditional dependency, can also affect later thinking about uncertainty of individual 
events. Especially, in order to simplify a complicated problem, people tend to ignore 
"trivial" dependency, which sometimes can breed serious mistakes in making a probability 
judgment.
To make probability judgments about individual outcomes, people need further effort to 
explore the problem of related uncertainty. With the discovery of the relevant factors 
affecting the development of an uncertain event, and the understanding of how the 
movement of these factors leads to individual outcomes, a structure can gradually be 
built up. People grasp the real problem by developing such a problem structure before 
they make a probability judgment. This structure is a representation of a real problem 
in their mind, it dictates the information that they demand in judging outcomes, it 
determines the rules that they follow in weighing and integrating evidence, and it 
influences the ways that they apply in discriminating the feelings of uncertainty. 
Obviously, it may not always be possible to find a perfect structure under uncertain 
situations. In some situations, people are unable to find a causal system at all, and may
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have to retreat to a reliance on their observations of occurrences of past events. Making 
probability judgment about the side of a coin tossed in the air, the sex of a newborn 
baby, and the outcome of thrown dice are all such cases. However, there are few 
uncertain situations which in reality have so neat a form, and subjective probabilities 
about such uncertain events are rarely needed. More often, people are able to go beyond 
the accumulation of frequencies and probe a problem more deeply, although they may 
only be able to develop an unsound or fragmentary structure. The factors involved may 
not all be identified and the associations between the known factors and possible 
outcomes may not be clearly clarified. Such a structure cannot serve people as a good 
guidance in searching for information or in utilizing it to predict the possible outcomes. 
So, feelings of uncertainty will emerge. This kind of uncertainty expresses solely people’s 
beliefs or confidence in the appropriateness of their mental problem structure.
People make probability judgments with the problem structure they have developed and 
the accuracy of the judgments, thus, depends heavily on the appropriateness of the 
problem structure. Although any problem structure can be argued as a biased 
representation of a reality, some structure may still be more appropriate than the others. 
It should not be doubted that people are more likely to make calibrated probability 
judgments with an appropriate structure than with a distorted one. Therefore, the 
verification of probability judgment is primarily the verification of subjective problem 
structure. In this sense, developing a sound problem structure has prime importance in 
making probability judgments.
A subjective probability is a degree of belief in an uncertain event, but such belief is 
strengthened or weakened by the belief in the soundness of the structure on which the 
probability judgment is based. Before estimating probabilities, people have already 
assessed the soundness of the structure that they developed. Just how uncertain people 
may feel about an event is closely related to their beliefs in the soundness of structure 
of the problem which has the event as one of its outcomes. Obviously, confident 
judgment is more likely to be made with a satisfactory structure, while less confident 
judgment is more likely to be made with an unsatisfactory structure. The feelings that 
people have about the soundness of the structure may vary with the change of situation.
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A complete structure can become incomplete when the information about a key factor 
is not available. A structure may only be valid under specific conditions and can be very 
sensitive to the change of some relevant factors. In dealing with uncertainty, people may 
develop a series of variations on a basic structure. In order to make calibrated 
probability judgment, people must be able to assess the soundness of the variations of 
structure in a proper way. Overestimating or underestimating the soundness of a 
structure can bias probability judgments.
Once people have a problem structure in their mind, no matter if it is complete or 
incomplete, they will search for information and process information within this 
framework. Various compositions of information representing different situations then 
can be compared and the discrimination is fulfilled. A sound structure can make it easier 
to realize tangible comparisons and fine discrimination is more hopeful than a 
fragmentary structure.
Uncertainty can be increased by an assessor’s inability to develop a sound problem 
structure. However, even with a sound problem structure, people can still feel uncertain, 
if they cannot get sufficient and reliable information. Of course, people more often face 
worse situations, under which both of the problem structure and information 
environment are not ideal. Their beliefs about the quality of information can also 
increase or decrease their confidence about the probability judgments which are made 
based on such information. The final number, a probability, is a result of integrating all 
the feelings about the structure and information and comparing the present case with 
past similar cases, or with other parallel uncertain events. Therefore, I suppose that in 
making probability judgments, people may go through the processes of problem 
structuring, information searching, and uncertainty quantifying. In this supposition, I have 
particularly stressed the effect of uncertainty problem structuring on probability judgment 
and the possible ways with which people discriminate their feelings of uncertainty.
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Applications of the general model
With the model proposed here, several problems which I raised earlier perhaps can be 
better explained. The key point I argue here is that a proper matching between 
subjective and real problem structures is a fundamental condition for making calibrated 
probability judgment. Many early studies gave little regard to the effect of feedback on 
adjusting the uncertainty problem structure and only noticed its effect on discouraging 
overconfidence. In this study, only an insignificant effect of feedback was found in the 
probability judgments of the card players of the game of bridge. Perhaps, it is because 
the card players have formed rather stable problem structures from their long time at 
playing the game and that cannot be significantly modified with only short-term feedback. 
The previous lack of success in experiments on training may have been the result of the 
failure of the feedback provided to have any impact on the adjustment of problem 
structure. So, training people to develop a sound problem structure may be more helpful 
than just letting them scratch the surface of overconfidence. Probability judgments about 
homogenous and repeated events are often found to be better calibrated. The main 
reason, I suppose, is that with such events people are allowed to develop a consistent 
problem structure. There should be no surprise when we find experts often presenting 
good performance in making probability judgment about events in their area, as they 
have almost all the advantages mentioned above and so they are able to develop a sound 
problem structure which leads their probability judgment in the right direction. Previous 
analysis has clearly shown that the players of the game of bridge is such a case. Similarly, 
calibrated probability judgments are also found among the players of field hockey games 
(Vertinsky, Kanetkar, Vertinsky, & Wilson, 1986), the meteorologists in weather 
forecasting (Murphy & Winkler, 1974), the physicians attending an emergency room 
(Lusted et al., 1980), banking experts in predicting future interest rates (Kabus, 1976), 
and so on. I suppose that such good performances are grounded on the sound problem 
structures they have developed.
However, if developing a sound problem structure becomes difficult or almost 
impossible, poor performances will probably result. The physicians (Christensen-Szalanski 
& Bushyhend, 1981), even as experts, did present very uncalibrated probabilities of
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pneumonia for 1,531 patients who were examined because of a cough. The reason behind 
the poor performance perhaps is that the physicians had never faced such a task in their 
routine diagnosis and failed to adjust the problem structure developed in the past to deal 
with the new problem which was specifically designed for the purpose of the experiment. 
Not surprisingly, very poor performances were shown when people had difficulty in 
developing a sound problem structure, that is, catching the core of the problem. Asking 
the college students to judge the nationality of the children by their drawings, to predict 
stock price depending only on the data published in the newspapers (Lichtenstein & 
Fischhoff, 1977) are exactly such cases. If they did not know how to deal with the 
problems, we would not expect that they could build up a sound problem structure, and 
thereby present calibrated probability judgments. Calibration could be even worse if the 
experimenters presented a subtle task which can easily lead subjects to develop a wrong 
problem structure or ignore the difficulty in developing a sound problem structure.
52 . Implications for future cross-cultural studies
The development of this cognitive model also has important implications for any future 
cross-cultural study in probability judgment. Early findings of cultural differences between 
the British and several Asian groups in probabilistic thinking have led to the supposition 
that people from different cultures deal with uncertainty differently because they may not 
cast the same general problem structure in dealing with uncertainties (Phillips, 1983). In 
the first experiment of this study I examined whether people’s probability judgment was 
related to their ways of perceiving information and of making decisions, and the results 
suggested some different characteristics between the general problem structures of the 
Chinese and the British students. Although the first experiment provided some positive 
evidence to the supposition, the possible general problem structures that Chinese and 
British people may hold have not been clearly identified and how they lead to different 
performances in making probability judgments is also far from clear. The inconsistent 
performances which were later found among several groups of Chinese subjects implies 
that the relationship is much more complicated than it first seemed to be and may not 
allow a simple explanation. In future studies, more extensive experimental works are 
required to investigate the variations of performance under a wider range of uncertain
176
situations, especially for the Chinese case. Moreover, such investigations should go more 
deeply into human cognitive processes of making probability judgments. On this point, 
the cognitive model proposed here may be helpful as it can lead the investigation of 
cultural differences in probabilistic thinking into individual cognitive levels. In future 
experimental studies, the tasks which can lead to identify the general problem structure, 
both Western and Chinese, and to contrast the ability of discriminating their feelings of 
uncertainty between Western and Chinese people, should be carefully chosen. It may also 
be particularly useful, if we can find some way of comparing people’s performances 
before and after they have built up a structured way of thinking about a problem. It may 
be able to tell us more about the effect of problem structuring in making probability 
judgments.
This study has shown that the cultural differences are task specific. It demonstrated that 
the Chinese card players judged the outcome of a contract in a probabilistic way, but the 
Chinese students and economists performed their tasks in a non-probabilistic way. 
Subsequently, the cultural differences found between the Chinese and Western people 
do not form a constant pattern. Indeed, people may start from different points and follow 
different routes to achieve their objectives (equifinality). According to the model 
proposed above, future cross-cultural study needs to investigate how Chinese and 
Western people form their problem structure in dealing with various uncertainties and 
whether their problem structures have different characteristics. We may not expect that 
Chinese and British always form the same problem structure, even for the same problem. 
Obviously, Western and Chinese traditional physicians definitely do not follow the same 
way of examining patients and interpreting the origin of diseases. And Chinese 
businessmen and their Western counterparts may perceive uncertain situations quite 
differently. Therefore, if Chinese are found to perform probabilistic tasks differently from 
their Western counterparts, it is quite possibly because they may not structure the same 
problem in the same way in the first place. Correspondingly, when Chinese and Western 
people make alike probability judgments, perhaps that is first because they hold similar 
problem structures. The experiment of the game of bridge is probably is one such case. 
Western and Chinese card players quite possibly held the same problem structure. So, 
how people from different cultural backgrounds structure problems of uncertainty should
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be the first issue to be investigated in any future cross-cultural study. Before searching 
direct associations between general problem structure and probability judgment, it is very 
worthwhile to look at how people in different cultures develop their own problem 
structures. Only after sufficient investigations of problem structuring in a variety of 
uncertain situations, can we identify some general problem structures which Western and 
Chinese people may have in their minds in dealing with uncertainty and understand how 
the identified general problem structures influence the formation of the structure of a 
specific problem and the whole process of making probability judgment.
In problem structuring, there are two issues which I suggest future investigation should 
look closely at. The first one is the imagination of alternative outcomes of an uncertain 
event. Until now this issue has not been carefully explored in calibration study. In fact, 
many previous studies either simply presented the subjects with all the outcomes of the 
uncertain events and thus eliminated the possibility to observe how people themselves 
would have thought about the outcomes or assumed the subjects would know all 
alternative outcomes, but made no inquiry to the process of imagining of outcomes. 
However, I consider that the imagination of alternative outcomes should not be 
separated from the investigation of calibration, since it may influence probability 
judgment. The Chinese economists made extreme probability judgments, probably 
because they could not imagine a wider range of possible values of the economic indices 
for the future. And even the Chinese card players were asked to judge only the success 
of a contract, but it was still possible that they had more alternative outcomes in their 
minds, e.g. a contract failed with 4 tricks or 5 tricks, a contract made with 7, 8, 9 tricks. 
In future cross-cultural studies, the ways people in different cultures imagine outcomes, 
and the number of the outcomes that they can imagine, should be compared, and 
possible reasons should also be analyzed.
Another issue I consider as important is the focusing that people have on probabilistic 
tasks. A  calibration study usually requires subjects to make probability judgments about 
a series of uncertain events, which may be tightly or loosely related in some way. People 
may focus their attention on these uncertain events differently. Some of them may give 
more attention to the common characteristics of the whole task and easily build up a
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common problem structure to deal with individual items. Good probability judgments, 
or at least consistent judgments, more likely occur based on a sound problem structure. 
However, some people may tend to focus their attention more on the particular 
characteristics of individual items or their differences and so ignore their common 
characteristics. A  common problem structure thereby is less likely to be developed, and 
the experimental items are dealt with separately. With such a way, consistent and good 
probability judgments probably cannot be expected. In the discussion about Chinese 
culture, focusing on particularity has long been argued as an evident characteristic of 
Chinese thought. It may be one of the reasons why Chinese people tend to make extreme 
probability judgments in some situations. In future cross-cultural study, comparison 
between different cultural groups in this aspect will give us more insights about the 
cultural differences in probabilistic thinking.
Future cross-cultural studies should also consider how people in different cultures search 
out information to support their making of uncertainty judgment. Although this study has 
compared the ways of information perception and evaluation between Chinese and 
British students, I have discussed little about the characteristics of the content of 
information itself. Is there any cultural difference in the preferences of information 
between Chinese and Western decision makers? In calibration study, subjects are often 
asked to make probability judgments about a series of repeatable uncertain events. 
However, in reality, few uncertain events can exactly repeat themselves as tossing a coin 
in the air, and one specific case is always different from others in this or that aspect. I 
suppose that Chinese tend to catch particular and concrete information in some 
situations, as they view the cases as individuals and Western people may be more 
interested in general information about all the cases and tolerate the "trivial" differences.
In previous studies of probabilistic thinking, mental discrimination of feelings of 
uncertainty has remained almost untouched. However, this present study suggests that 
there may be a cultural difference between Chinese and Western people in 
discriminating their feelings of uncertainty, especially when such discrimination cannot 
be transformed into some kind of tangible comparison of evidence. It requires further 
investigation to see if Chinese people have more difficulty in discriminating internal
179
uncertainty than their Western counterparts, as suggested in the comparison between the 
Chinese and the British students.
The investigation of these issues may be closely related in many situations. For example, 
we may still not be able to understand why people in one culture feel more difficulties 
than those from another culture in discriminating their feelings of uncertainty without 
comparing the structures they developed for a particular problem.
5.3. Rationality in dealing with uncertainty
Until now the inquiry of the present study to the applicability of Western decision 
approaches in China has mainly concentrated on the adequacy of probability judgments 
of Chinese decision makers. Although the inconsistency between the three groups of 
Chinese people in making probability judgments still does not allow me to make a 
conclusion easily, a series of analyses of the results do demonstrate that culture has 
significant impact on the way of probabilistic thinking, and such impact may vary from 
situation to situation. These findings imply the conditionality of the use of decision 
analysis techniques on culture, and promote a more serious and cautious attitude to the 
introduction of such "soft” Western techniques into China, which is definitely not as 
simple as the import of some forms of "hard" Western techniques. In this final section, 
however, my discussion will go beyond the adequacy of probability judgments to a more 
general issue, the rationality behind the way of making decisions and dealing with 
uncertainty advocated in the Western decision theory. I will examine the strengths and 
weaknesses of the Western rationality in Chinese culture.
Western Rationality
Rationality is used to describe human behaviour. In the West, the conception of 
rationality is closely related to reason. When J. H. Newman said "We call rationality the 
distinction of man, when compared with other animals", he meant that human beings had 
the power of being able to exercise reason. Rationality has been extensively discussed
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in the literature of philosophy and economics. For example, some economists have 
described a human being as "economic man" who behaves in a rational way of pursuing 
the maximization of subjectively expected value. A broad definition of rationality is given 
by Simon in "A Dictionary of the Social Science" (Gould & Kolb, 1964), which denotes 
rational behaviour as being appropriate to the achievement of given goals within the 
limits imposed by given conditions and constraints. Later Simon (1976) further defines 
such rationality as substantive and distinguishes it from procedural rationality which is 
used when behaviour is the outcome of appropriate deliberation. This definition is quite 
understandable from people’s daily experience of using the word(s). Most people here 
or in the United States might think that Saddam Hussein was irrational in deciding to 
fight with the allied army in the Gulf war. Henry Kissinger, the former American 
Secretary of State, must be one of them, for only nine days before the Gulf war broke 
out, he had made the confident prediction on BBC television Newsnight programme that 
no such conflict would take place by saying "Saddam is not mad. He knows that a war 
will destroy the one thing that keeps him in power - his military machine."(The Times, 
January 17, 1991). So, from Doctor Henry Kissinger’s point of view, Saddam was 
certainly irrational, or substantively irrational, because his behaviour was not in line with 
his own goal. Rationality may also be used in another way, to evaluate the processes of 
making judgments or decisions. For example, one person is appreciated by his colleagues 
as rational, often because his judgments or decisions are made based on proper reason, 
not dominated by his feelings or emotions. Of course, with rationality people may mean 
both the action and the way of deciding to take the action are rational in many 
situations.
Von Winterfeldt and Edwards (1986) have also clearly distinguished two kinds of 
rationality, the rationality in the build-up of goals or the selection of ends or moral 
imperatives and the rationality in selecting ways of thinking and acting to serve the ends 
or goals or moral imperatives. They called the latter "instrumental rationality". In the 
literature of decision making, a definition which Jungermann (1983) thought was 
common, specifies rational action as being in line with the values and beliefs of the 
individual concerned, or more precisely, is "logical" or "consistent" as stated in a set of 
axioms. Watson and Buede (1987) have more directly defined that a person’s behaviour
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is considered as rational when his action is consistent with the rules which he has 
adopted. In modem decision theory, the principle rule of making a choice is maximizing 
subjectively expected utility, and the rule of judging uncertainty is to follow several 
axioms of probability.
It is obvious that Western and Chinese cultures do not cultivate consistent ideas of value, 
beliefs, social consensus, and so on. Therefore, very possibly, some behaviour which is 
considered as rational in Chinese culture may be evaluated as irrational in the West and 
vice versa. For example, borrowing money and paying high interest in order to buy a car 
or some other expensive goods is quite normal here, but most Chinese may think it is 
irrational. It is not unusual to find Chinese families in Britain placing saving as a priority, 
even if it may disqualify the families on low incomes from claiming social benefits. This 
kind of difference is more concerned with the ideas of value and social traditions 
between the two cultures, but not the ways by which they reach their judgments or 
decisions. This study does not discuss such conflict of rationality, which is closely related 
to the values or beliefs rooted in different cultures. It is interested in the rationality of 
the way by which people achieve the goal, that is, the rationality in the way of making 
decisions, the way of dealing with uncertainty in particular, and the cultural differences 
between Chinese and Westerners in such rationality.
The essence of Western decision theory and the analytic procedure developed from it 
is that they provide formal guidance of strict logic to decision makers. Western decision 
theory is the fruit of Western philosophy, which is keen to develop a theoretic system 
from assuming a set of simple axioms about utility and probability. The rationality that 
it advocates is to adopt these axioms and make judgments and decisions only when they 
conform to them. Whether a decision maker behaves rationally or not is judged by 
whether his thought and action comply with the rules, which are either defined by the 
assumed axioms or derived from them. For example, if one’s probability judgments can 
satisfy P(A)P(B/A) = P(B)P(A/B), one’s probabilistic thinking is rational, otherwise it 
is irrational, because one’s judgments are contradictory to the rules of probability. If one 
takes the course of action leading to maximal expected utility, one behaves in a rational
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way, otherwise one doesn't, because one gives up the choice which can be proved as the 
best on the basis of rules of utility.
Exercising rationality needs great effort. Following the analysis procedure developed in 
Bayesian decision theory, a complex and uncertain decision problem should first be 
decomposed into several alternative actions and the expected consequences, when each 
action is taken, listed. The preferences of a decision maker to certain outcomes are 
measured in terms of utility, and the possibility of the occurrence of the outcomes are 
estimated as a probability value. Following particular rules, numerical judgments about 
values and possibilities are recomposed, and the best candidate for the course of action 
emerges as the one which has maximal expected utility. In the past decades, many 
techniques have been researched and developed to help people properly carry out such 
analysis.
However, this rationality, even in the West, is still far from being widely acknowledged. 
Its basic assumptions and feasibility of operation are both under fire. Many scholars have 
criticized Bayesian decision theory on the basis of the findings concerning the conflicts 
between human behaviour and the fundamental assumptions of the theory. One piece 
of evidence often referred to is that many people do not respond to Allais’ (1953) 
paradox in a rational way, as assumed by Savage’s "sure-thing" principle. For example, 
consider the following table which describes Allais’ paradox. The task is to choose 
between gamble 1 and gamble 2 in both situation A and situation B. The table shows the 
probabilities of winning and the amounts of money for the various gambles.
Probability of winning
Situation A 
Gamble 1 
Gamble 2
0.01 0.10 0.89
£1,000 £1,000 £1,000
£0 £5,000 £1,000
Situation B 
Gamble 1 £1,000
£0
£1,000 £0
£5,000 £0Gamble 2
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For this problem, the "sure-thing" principle supposes that a subject would choose either 
gamble 1 or gamble 2 in both situations, that is the change in the amounts of money with 
0.89 chance of winning should not influence the subject's choice, as for both gambles they 
are still same. However, in responding to such a test, most subjects who had chosen 
gamble 1 in situation A, were found to turn to gamble 2 in situation B. So, varying the 
values of outcomes of a state do affect people’s choice between two alternatives, even 
if the values are still kept as the same for the two alternatives.
Similarly, Ellsberg’s (1961) paradox also showed that many people’s behaviour violated 
the "sure-thing" principle. In the Ellsberg’s test, a subject is first asked to imagine an urn 
known to contain 90 balls, 30 red, and 60 black or yellow with unknown proportions. 
Then he is asked to consider a decision problem under two situations which can be 
described below.
Red Black Yellow
(30) (60)
Situation A
Bet on red £100 £0 £0
Bet on black £0 £100 £0
Situation B
Bet on red or yellow £100 £0 £100
Bet on black or yellow £0 £100 £100
It was found that most subjects responding to such a test preferred betting on red than 
on black in situation A, but preferred betting on black or yellow than on red or yellow 
in situation B. Obviously, it conflicts with the "sure-thing" principle, as it is easy to see 
that in both situations, the two alternatives have the same outcomes if a yellow ball is 
picked up. In situation A, the subjects who decided to choose betting on red, probably 
had presumed that there were less than 30 black, or more than 30 yellow balls in the urn. 
However, in situation B, they turned to betting on black or yellow, probably because they 
supposed that there were less than 30 yellow balls! This phenomenon also leads to
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doubting the assumption that a decision maker’s beliefs can be represented by a unique 
probability measure, as it is shown that most people prefer the alternative of exact 
probability to the alternative of "ambiguous” probability.
There are not many scholars who still argue that rationality is a sound description of the 
natural mind. That is, in reality people may often violate the rules which are set 
according to the axioms of utility and probability. However, many scholars accept the 
adequacy of this version of rationality and emphasize more and more its normative 
characteristics.
Howard (1980) speaks bluntly of normative rationality embraced in Bayesian decision 
theory. In his opinion, it is not important whether the rationality is descriptive or not. 
The power of decision analysis is just that it can improve natural decision making as 
people’s natural decision processes are often deficient when they meet complex decision 
problems. Howard has also strongly defended the rationality implicated in the axioms of 
probability. More moderate attitudes to the imposition of such rationality are found 
among other scholars. Watson and Buede (1987), for example, explicitly point out the 
conditionality of rationality on fundamental assumptions and its usefulness in enhancing 
consistency in decision making. Rationality is judged by the rules it adopts, and different 
rules can lead to different judgments about rationality. Choosing one rule is to decide 
how to behave in a complex decision making situation. Watson and Buede emphasize 
that although decision theory constitutes a sensible set of rules to follow, it does not 
necessarily mean that people who do not comply with the precepts of decision theory are 
irrational and they may well have perfectly sensible rules of their own which they are 
following most rationally.
If we accept normative rationality, can it be achieved in dealing with real decision 
problems? The answer of Von Winterfeldt and Edwards (1986) to this question is that 
rationality is attainable. They believe that rationality in decision making can be reached 
if decision makers can be provided with sufficient and efficient decision aids. They have 
argued that the SEU model is an appropriate tool for finding a rational choice and 
introduced many decision techniques which they thought can help a decision maker
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assess probability and evaluate utility properly. However, they also clearly recognize the 
reliance of realizing instrumental rationality on structuring decision problems. The SEU 
model can lead a decision maker to a rational act, only after he knows the problem, the 
alternatives, the uncertainty, and the values of outcomes, that is, after he has clearly 
structured the problem. Rationality is meaningful only when it is related to a specific 
problem structure.
In contrast, Simon (1983) believes that rationality is unattainable from the point of the 
impossibility of satisfying the requirements of using the SEU model. He described the 
SEU model as "a beautiful object deserving a prominent place in Plato’s heaven of 
ideas," but could not be employed in any literal way in making actual human decisions. 
He argues that when facing a complex, dynamic and uncertain decision problem, a 
decision maker, with limited information processing ability, just cannot find all the 
alternative choices, cannot predict the consequences of each of the available choices, 
cannot assign a joint probability distribution to future states of the world, and cannot 
balance all his conflicting partial values and synthesize them into a single utility function, 
as the SEU theory assumes he can do. Simon considers that people cannot realize global 
rationality, but only "bounded rationality". In reality, people rarely pursue the object of 
maximization, but behave like "administrative men" and search only for satisfying 
solutions. From his argument about the limits of reason, Simon also emphasizes that the 
SEU model at best tells us how to reason about fact and value premises, but says nothing 
about where they come from. In fact, Winterfeldt and Edwards have also recognized the 
weakness of the SEU model, but they attempt to remedy it by developing adequate 
techniques of structuring decision problems.
Simon rejects global rationality and admits only bounded rationality, from the 
impossibility of satisfying the premises of the SEU model. However, there are other 
scholars who do not reject the use of the SEU model, although they also accept that 
people have limited information processing ability. They promote the rational way of 
making decisions, but at the same time, are very cautious in imposing the analytic result 
into the real world as a rational act. Phillips (1983), in discussing his theory of requisite 
decision models, seems to express such a point of view. The key point of his arguments,
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of concern here, is that the primary use of building models in decision analysis is to 
develop a social reality of shared understanding of the problem by the problem owners. 
The goal of creating a requisite model is to help construct a new reality, to create a 
future. The final result should be seen as a guidance and at best it is conditionally 
prescriptive, because the model is only an approximation of reality and the understanding 
of decision makers to the problem may be deficient when the model is built up. Although 
in the case study that they introduced, Phillips and his colleagues employed the multi­
attribute value model as a tool, his arguments, to my understanding, certainly do not 
exclude the SEU model.
Rationality has been widely disputed for decades and the above discussion is far too 
limited to do it justice. However, with this discussion I wish to highlight several points 
which are of real concern here. First, decision analysis with the SEU model as a major 
instrument is powerful in enhancing logic and consistent thinking in judging uncertainty 
and making decisions. Second, the rationality contained in Western decision theory is 
derived from a series of fundamental assumptions and so it is not unique and must have 
some limitations. Third, the SEU model does not contain a vital decision activity, 
structuring the decision problem. This still remains as art.
"Irrational" Chinese way
The Chinese way of making decisions and dealing with uncertainty in many aspects has 
been suggested as irrational by today’s Western decision theorists and analysts. Some of 
their viewpoints have been mentioned in the first chapter. Recently, Lieberthal and 
Oksenberg (1988) have discussed the limitation of imposing a rational model to interpret 
the processes of current Chinese policy making and argue that the reality does not allow 
the Chinese leaders to attain the rationality which the Western scholars assume. Instead, 
Chinese leaders actually pursue the building of consensus among participants in decision 
making. Perhaps, from the Western standpoint of rationality, the Chinese way of making 
decisions can be judged as irrational in many aspects. However, in a broad sense of 
rationality, such judgments may not stand. It is hard to imagine that the ancient Chinese 
developed only very irrational ways of making decisions over several thousand years, and
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that it could survive. Many decisions in Chinese history are appreciated not only in 
China, but also in other countries. Fukuda (1988), for example, regards Qin Shi Huang 
(The First Emperor), who unified the country in 221 BC, as a great manager by any 
standards. After the dynasty was founded, The Emperor decided to standardize weights 
and measures, currency, roads, written language, and so on, which accelerated subsequent 
development of China as a unified nation, and which even today are considered as 
crucial and should be admired. Probably, the fact is that Chinese decision culture had 
developed in a very long period of isolation from the West and thus cultivated a very 
different way of decision making and different ideas of rationality.
Perhaps, the main characteristic of Chinese decision making which astonishes Westerners 
and leads them to make judgments of its irrationality is its lack of a strictly logical 
analysis and its heavy dependence on intuition. However, this point may not be fully 
supported by the results of the first experiment which used the MBTI. This is possibly 
because the concept of intuition discussed by many philosophers is much more general 
than the MBTI can test with several simple questions. This phenomenon is closely 
related to the development of the whole Chinese culture. Indeed, recent rethinking about 
Chinese culture has attributed the sluggish development of science and technology in 
modern China to the lack of boldness in creating a strict theoretic system from several 
assumptions made in ancient China (Lin, 1985; Jin, 1988). Ancient Chinese had no less 
scientific findings than their Western contemporaries. For example, the description about 
the Gou Gu theorem (Pythagorean theorem) can be found in an ancient Chinese 
mathematical book, Zhou Bi Suan Jing (The Arithmetical Classic of the Gnomon and 
the Circular Paths of Heaven) written during Warring States period over two thousand 
years ago. However this finding and many others had never led to a development of a 
theoretical system of geometry and they were often proposed along with the solving of 
practical problems. Again, the Mohists even designed very elegant experiments in physics, 
especially in optics. However, this research method was soon given up in later scientific 
research. The ancient Chinese scientists left their descendants many masterpieces, such 
as, "Qi Min Yao Shu", "Meng Xi Bi Tan", "Ben Cao Gang Mu", and "Tian Gong Kai Wu", 
which collected, sorted, and compiled ancient Chinese knowledge, experiences, and 
methods in agriculture, handicraft industry, and medicine. However, no integrated theory
188
has been further developed from these works. The deficiency in the development of a 
theoretical system in ancient China is closely related to less interest by ancient Chinese 
in logical reason and modelling.
So, not surprisingly, in ancient Chinese decision books, one may hardly find any strict 
development of concepts as in the West, but simply principles. For example, Sun Tzu 
(Griffith, 1963), in the opening chapter, spoke directly of the five fundamental factors 
and seven elements in the estimation of a war situation without making any logical 
arguments. Ancient Chinese sages developed principles from experiences and their 
intuition. These principles were then explained and taught by vivid analogy and actual 
cases. For example, to let people understand the proposition that soft can beat firm and 
weak can overcome strong, Lao Tzu explained, "Nothing is softer than water in the 
world, but in attacking strongholds water is second to nothing." When Sun Tzu 
emphasized to the readers the importance of adapting to the situation, he compared an 
army with water and said, "as water shapes its flow in accordance with the ground, so an 
army manages its victory in accordance with the situation of the enemy." The readers 
were not convinced by logical arguments, but by such analogy, context, and actual cases. 
The readers understood the profound meanings behind principles with their own 
experience and intuition, and the resonance stuck in their mind. So, teaching and 
learning were not completed through strict definitions, concepts, and logical arguments, 
but intuitive comprehension. And in the development of the Chinese way of decision 
making, the decomposition of problem, logical reason and synthesis which prevailed in 
the West were apparently bypassed.
Of course, it is naive to say that the ancient Chinese made decisions without analysis. In 
fact, one can find very rational analysis in many ancient decision works. However, the 
rationality mostly reflected in their penetrating comprehension of a problem, but not the 
rationality in the way of making decisions that stresses strict logical analysis as advised 
in the West. The lack of logical analysis presumably results from Chinese decision 
makers’ extreme faith in their intuition. Indeed, even now when the Chinese managers 
attending the training course given by Western scholars in Da Lian, China were asked 
to estimate their own managerial type, most of them still thought they were intuitive in
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decision making (Pegels, 1987). However, the intuition admired by Chinese is not 
intuition in a simple sense, but intuition inspired from the experience of their own and 
more importantly, of their ancestors which they inherited from the immense historical 
records of decision making. Since Confucius compiled "Spring and Autumn", over two 
thousand years of ancient Chinese history has been chronologically recorded by ancient 
historians throughout the dynasties. Si Maqian wrote "Shi Ji", 130 chapters in 13 years 
(104 B.C. to 91 B.C.), which recorded the rise and fall of nations and historical figures 
over several hundred years. "Zi Zhi Tong Jian" of 294 chapters written by Si Maguang 
in 19 years recorded the experiences of success and the lessons of failure in country 
management for over 1,300 years, which served as reference for governors. Ancient 
Chinese history is also rich in works on decision making, especially about war. Chinese 
decision making is heavily affected by this historical heritage.
In ancient China, some decision problems, such as in war, were well explored and had 
relatively stable structures. From the experience accumulated and recorded over a long 
period of time, an uncertain situation has gradually been substituted by a group of 
possible states which happened in the past. At the same time, for every state, various 
alternative ways had been tried, selected and compiled to cope with the problem. 
Therefore, for successive decision makers, the solution to the problem seems to be 
straightforward. The present situation may be compared with similar situations in the 
past, and the best option is suggested from previous experience of success and failure. 
What some ancient decision theorists actually did was to categorize situations and advise 
corresponding strategies. For example, in an ancient Chinese work on war, "Thirty-six 
Strategies", a series of alternative strategies were assembled and recommended, which 
could be chosen in fights according to different situations. Wu Tzu, another well-known 
ancient Chinese military strategist, especially wrote one chapter in his own "the Art of 
War" to explain how to respond to changing situations, one solution to one particular 
situation. In "Bai Zhan Qi Lue" ("One Hundred Ingenious Strategies"), Liu Qi expounded 
100 different military strategies based on historical battle cases.
Therefore, over a long period of time, a series of relatively stable problem structures 
have been developed in Chinese decision culture. Of course, new experience may add
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more alternative options and different possible states from time to time. Therefore, 
decision making might consist of two main activities, correctly identifying a situation and 
choosing an option from the alternatives suggested to the identified situation. Knowing 
that reality is always more complicated and varying, many ancient Chinese decision 
theorists also emphasized the art in the application of strategy and repudiated any rigid 
manner. "Fighting only on paper" has been used to satirize the person who applies theory 
idly. Of course, the developed strategies and tactics may also be extended to deal with 
other quite different decision problems, but with similar problem structure. For example, 
some strategies and tactics developed for fighting can be used for running a business.
In dealing with uncertainty, ancient Chinese decision theorists have emphasized prudence 
and adaptability to change. The famous argument of Sun Tzu, "Know the enemy and 
know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril" has suggested the attitude. 
Zhu Geliang, a famous military strategist in Chinese history, was well known for his 
extreme discretion in making decisions. To estimate uncertain situations many 
relationships between evidence and possibility have been suggested based on past 
experience. Chinese decision makers may prefer waiting until the situation becomes 
almost certain rather than taking a decision under uncertainty, especially, when they 
believe that they have been able to predict all the possibilities and have been well 
prepared to deal with whatever happens. This tendency is obviously related to their 
beliefs in experience and intuition. Of course, it probably also reflects the cultural 
differences in the attitude towards risk between Chinese and Western people. For 
example, Chinese people tend to wait to see when facing uncertainty, as they may be 
more prone to risk avoidance. However, such discussion will make us include another 
important topic in the cross-cultural study, but unfortunately, I am not able to discuss it 
further here. Nevertheless, it is evident that the Chinese way is unlikely to lead to a 
trade-off between value and uncertainty, or to lead to a balance between gains and losses 
in terms of a series of quite different decisions. Following the Chinese way, uncertainty 
is overcome step by step with the development of a situation, and a decision is often 
made in an incremental fashion.
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The traditional Chinese decision culture has significantly impacted modern Chinese 
decision makers. One can easily find how similar Mao Tzetong’s military thought is to 
Sun Tsai’s. One can also find the way of dealing with uncertainty described above in 
today’s Chinese officials or managers engaging in the corporation that is developing oil 
resources with Western companies. When the prospect of oil or gas in an area is not 
clear, they avoid any participation of finance and leave it to foreign oil companies, but 
keep the door of later participation in development open as wide as possible. The 
decision about the project of Three Gorges has been prolonged for several decades, as 
huge uncertain factors are involved.
Assimilation of Western decision approaches
Therefore, the Chinese way of decision making is concrete, experience-oriented, and 
intuitive, which consists of particular rules and strategies to deal with different kinds of 
problems. Chinese decision makers are guided by the strategies which have been used 
and enriched from generation to generation. They are decision tools for Chinese, but the 
application of them remains as art and needs intuition and creativity. Considering the 
lack of logical analysis, it is clear that the quality of Chinese decision making should and 
can be improved through use of Western decision approaches, in the sense that they are 
powerful in stressing formal procedure and enhancing logical and consistent thinking. 
The Chinese processes of decision making, in which experience and intuition dominate, 
can be compensated from and reinforced by powerful analysis aids. This becomes more 
important, if we notice that in modern China an overappreciation of experience and 
intuition is still popular. In early 80’s, the Baoshan project, building a steel factory which 
was the biggest in Chinese history, started even without a careful feasibility study. It is 
not unusual that decisions are made in such a way. Formal and analytic procedures can 
promote careful investigation and consistent thinking. Especially, when the analysis is 
supported by advanced information technology, such as decision support systems, it 
becomes more powerful. Complicated computerized models of decision problems are 
built and run, which can demonstrate a possible future. Sensitive factors can be tested 
and warnings given in vital situations. With the help of Western decision techniques, 
better decisions will become more possible.
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However, in the Chinese reactions to the Western decision approaches, one attitude 
should be immediately rejected, which is held by some people, and that is the fascination 
with only the beauty of modelling and the quantifying of a decision problem in Western 
decision approaches. They ignore the fact that no matter how exquisite a model is, 
"garbage in, garbage out”. I fully agree with Howard’s points of view that the overall aim 
of decision analysis is not numbers, but insight. Particularly, I argue here that quantifying 
decision makers’ feelings of uncertainty cannot reduce the substantial uncertainty they 
face. In calibration study, it has been long argued whether or not people can make 
calibrated or adequate probability judgments. However, there are no researchers, to my 
knowledge, who have discussed the limitation of calibration of probability judgments. In 
particular, some optimists seem to deliver an illusion that people can make calibrated 
probability judgments, if they are well trained, aided, and so on. However, it must be said 
here that in some uncertain situations there is no way which can lead people to make 
calibrated probability judgments. From the previous discussion about problem structuring, 
it is believed that people feel uncertain first about the structure of a problem. Facing an 
open system, they are not able to identify a complete set of events. They may not even 
know what they need know. In this sense, probability judgment is only a kind of 
numerical expression of uncertain feelings and calibration is simply an aim which cannot 
be reached under some uncertain situations.
In the introduction of Western decision techniques, one should clearly notice its 
limitation. As mentioned previously, the Western way of decision making has provided 
very limited help as yet for these vital activities of decision making, structuring problems 
and creating alternatives. Also, modem decision theory only permits long-term benefits 
for a decision maker. However, long-term benefits are irrelevant, when a decision maker 
is unable to continue his decision activity because of an immediate loss. The Chinese way 
should not be disregarded as it has some merits. First, Chinese culture has a rich vein 
of alternative options, or strategies, which were developed for dealing with particular 
decision problems. They are the great resource of the Chinese people and should be 
better tapped and used. With these, new alternatives can be further inspired and 
imagined for the problems confronted. Second, as intuition has played a very important 
role, Chinese decision culture may have some advantage in developing intuition in
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decision making. For example, Sun Tzu proposed the alternative of defeating the enemy 
without fighting, which even today is well appreciated in the West. In many aspects, the 
Chinese and Western way of decision making can reinforce each other. Following the 
Chinese way of decision making people examine change through deep investigation into 
particular problems and attempt to find the most likely outcome, while the Western way 
may promote people to consider a variety of possibilities properly but may also lead 
them to being satisfied with simple uncertainty estimates. It is a great challenge to find 
a proper way to synthesize the Chinese way with Western decision approaches.
5.4. Concluding remarks
In this final chapter, I have made my own contributions to the progress of cross-cultural 
studies of calibration and of decision making. I hope that I have made clear several 
points, which I consider to be very important. In comparison with previous studies, this 
present study has made a much greater effort in probing how people develop a problem 
structure and how they discriminate their feelings of uncertainty within that structure. It 
has been demonstrated that Chinese people may feel more difficulty in discriminating 
their feelings of uncertainty if they are unable to transfer it into some sort of tangible 
comparison. In some situations, cultural differences found between Western and Chinese 
people may be explained simply in that they do not develop similar problem structures 
for a same problem in the first place. The Dutch and Chinese amateur card players did 
not present very different performances, probably because they generated and held 
similar problem structures in making their probability judgments for the outcomes of the 
game of bridge. The tendency of extremeness found in the probability judgments of the 
Chinese students may show that they were less capable in making fine discrimination of 
feelings of uncertainty. The difficulties in developing a precise mental problem structure 
might have forced the Chinese economists to take some heuristic ways of making their 
forecasts and this led to their failure.
Although the experimental work of this study has provided some positive evidence, one 
may easily find that such support is still limited in some aspects. When I started this 
study, I had the ambition of presenting a more general description of the Chinese way
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of dealing with uncertainty and making decisions. Unfortunately, such an ambition is still 
far from being realized, due to my inexperience and the particular difficulties for a 
student in organizing the experiments in a foreign land. I managed to carry out three 
experiments, but two parallel experiments for British card players and economists had 
to be abandoned. Otherwise, the cross-cultural comparisons would have been better. 
Some regrets are also unavoidable. My speculations about the subprocesses of problem 
structure and discrimination of feelings of uncertainty emerged only after the 
experiments were completed, so with hindsight, I thought I should have done them 
better. Future studies certainly can advance this study in many ways. The subprocesses 
of discrimination of feelings of uncertainty and problem structure can be more effectively 
investigated with more soundly designed experiments. Future cross-cultural comparisons 
in probabilistic thinking may also be more productive through turning their investigations 
to the differences between Western and Chinese people in developing problem structures 
and discriminating feelings of uncertainty. It may not be too far away that a better 
explanation for the cultural differences in dealing with uncertainty and decision making 
in general will appear.
I hope that I have been successful in arguing the serious implications of the findings of 
cultural differences in dealing with uncertainty for the introduction of Western decision 
approaches. I believe that Chinese decision makers need to assimilate Western 
information technology and decision analysis techniques to improve their decision 
making. However, it should be a process of selection and renovation according to 
Chinese decision culture. Chinese decision makers must avoid counterproductive 
learning. They should listen to the old Chinese saying:"A young man heard that the 
people in Han Dan, the capital of Zhao, walked in a very graceful manner and went to 
learn from them. He returned home, crawling. Not only was he unable to learn the Han 
Dan’s way, but he also forgot his own".
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